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Polonization as a Determinant of National Identities of Ukraine and Belarus

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Abstract: Since their independence, Ukraine and Belarus have pursued relatively consistent but almost polar-opposite policies toward Russia. For the most part, the difference is explicable not as a product of differing material pressures and incentives (which do not, in fact, differ significantly), but as a consequence of differing popular and elite conceptions of Ukrainian and Belarusian national identities, which yield different beliefs about the proper relationship of those nations to Russia. The article argues that the difference is largely traceable to the 16th and 17th centuries, when the Grand Duchy of Lithuania's southern lands – modern western and central Ukraine – were transferred to the Kingdom of Poland, and subsequently conquered by Russia in stages, while Belarus remained within Lithuania until also conquered by Russia. This resulted in different Ukrainian and Belarusian territories spending vastly different amounts of time under Polish rule. Considering that *Rusian* culture originally had a high status in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and that Polonization naturally proceeded more intensely in Poland than in Lithuania, the author hypothesizes that: 1) the longer a territory was under Polish rule, the more subject it was to Polonization; 2) the more it was subject to Polonization, the more it developed a *western* European identity; 3) the more Ukrainian and Belarusian national identities were westernized, the more alienated they became from non-westernized *Rusian* nationalities, primarily the (Great) Russian (*русский / великорусский / российский*); 4) the more alienated a national identity is from Russia, the more its bearers seek to separate themselves from Russia. The research finds out that the longer an area was under Polish rule, the more support it subsequently displayed for separation and distancing from Russia. Ukrainian territories, especially in the west and center of the country, were long under Polish rule and accordingly tend toward an anti-Russian alignment that was visible even a century ago. On the other hand, Belarus, ruled by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania but never by Poland directly, expressed little desire to abandon the Russian Empire a century ago, and today continues a policy of friendship and integration with Russia.

The article combines various qualitative and quantitative methods to demonstrate how centuries-long historical processes reshaped a national identity, with massive consequences that still endure today.

Keywords: Polonization, Ukraine, Belarus, national identity, Russia, Poland, USSR, Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Kingdom of Poland, nationalism

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Terminology and Methodology

To ensure clarity, I use the following terms and definitions in this article:

Rusian refers to the people/nation (language, etc.) of Rus', before and after its division into three (four, counting the Rusyns as separate from Ukrainians) (sub)ethnicities. The nonstandard (i.e. incorrect) spelling (*Rusian* instead of *Russian*) is used exclusively for the purpose of distinguishing it clearly from the word *Russian*, which today usually refers to the northeastern descendants of the Rusian superethnos, who were once known as Great Russians (*великорусские*). I should note that, until quite recently (in a historical context), the ancestors of modern Belarusians and Ukrainians referred to themselves simply as *Rusians* (*русские, руське, руские, Rutheni,* etc. – the orthographical differences are meaningless). Hence, for example, the variant of the Rusian language that was spoken in Lithuanian-conquered territories – and which is the ancestor of modern Belarusian and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainian – was known simply as the *Lingua Ruthenica,* or *рус(ь)ка(я) мова.*

Russia(n) refers to the Russian state, either Empire or Federation.

(Great) Russian refers to the northeastern subethnos of the Rusian superethnos. Note that the (Great) Russians typically referred to themselves simply as *Russians (русские).* The modifier "Great" is included in this article in order to avoid confusion with the word *Rusian*.

Belarusian refers to the western subethnos of the Rusian superethnos. Note that the Belarusians – despite undoubtedly differing from the other Rusian peoples in certain respects – called themselves simply *Rusians (руские)* into the 19th century.

Ukrainian / Southern Rusian refers to the southern subethnos of the Rusian superethnos. Note that the Ukrainians – despite undoubtedly differing from the other Rusian peoples in certain respects – called themselves simply *Rusians (руське)* into the 19th century.

A brief survey of the recent histories of Ukraine and Belarus illustrates the difference that this article seeks to explain. Literature on the histories of Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and/or Lithuania describes how Polish rule differed from Lithuanian rule and may have led to the westernization of the national identities of those under Polish rule. Some survey data are presented to illustrate the presence, in western-central Ukraine, of a more westernized conception of Ukrainian national identity. Finally, linear regressions support this theory, finding that the duration of Polish rule in a Polish or Belarusian region is strongly positively correlated with the degree of support in that region for separation/distancing from Russia, both in 1917 and in the post-Soviet period. Thus, this article combines various qualitative and quantitative methods to demonstrate how centuries-long historical processes reshaped a national identity, with massive consequences that still endure today. This article consequently contributes to the literatures on: East Slavic / Rusian history; Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Belarusian relations; Russian foreign policy and nation-building; and the Huntingtonian or civilizational approach to international affairs, including related concepts such as the Russian World.

The separate ways of Ukraine and Belarus

Ukrainians and Belarusians are both East Slavic peoples with deep cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical ties to Russia. The histories of Ukraine and Belarus, for several centuries, have run parallel to one another, featuring inclusion in the Russian Empire, brief existence as German protectorates at the end of World War I, Soviet rule, and independence in 1991. And yet the two states' post-Soviet trajectories could not be more different, starting with how they achieved independence in the first place.

In the 17 March 1991 referendum on preserving the USSR, 83% of Belarus' residents and 70% of Ukraine's residents supported the Union's continuation[1]. However, just a few months later, on 1 December 1991, an overwhelming 90% of Ukraine's residents voted for independence from the USSR, with only 8% opposed[2]. In contrast, Belarus never conducted an independence referendum at all, its separation from the USSR instead being essentially imposed upon it by the Russian leadership and the centrifugal forces operating throughout much of the rest of the Soviet Union. From this point, the Ukrainian-Belarusian divergence only intensified.

In a 1995 referendum, Belarusian citizens voted to establish (Great) Russian as an official language with status equal to Belarusian (83% support vs. 13% opposition); to replace state symbols associated with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the 1917 German protectorate with ones that are more aesthetically Soviet and that lack anti-Russian connotations (75% vs. 9%); and to pursue economic integration with Russia (83% vs. 13%)[3]. Shortly thereafter, Belarus formed a "Union State" (*Союзное государство*) with Russia. Though initially more symbolic than substantive, and still incomplete to this day, the Union State nevertheless means that Belarus and Russia share a common border, a common labor market, and a high degree of economic integration. Economic integration was further deepened by Belarus' accession in 2010 to a Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan, and in 2014 to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) that also includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. Military integration with Russia is also extensive. It is facilitated partly by membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (whose membership overlaps with that of the EAEU, plus Tajikistan), but goes far deeper than the integration between Russia and most of the CSTO other members.

In Ukraine, on the other hand, the (Great) Russian language currently has no official status at all, having lost even an official secondary status in heavily-Russophone

[1] Референдум о сохранении СССР 17 марта 1991 г. Справка. *РИА Новости*. 15 марта 2011. URL: https://ria.ru/20110315/354060265.html (accessed 24.02.2021)

[2] Відомість про результати Всеукраїнського референдуму, 1 грудня 1991 року. Центральний державний архів вищих органів України. URL: https://archives.gov.ua/Sections/15r-V_Ref/index.php?11 (accessed 24.02.2021)

[3] Об итогах голосования на республиканском референдуме 14 мая 1995 г. Центральная комиссия Республики Беларусь по выборам и проведению республиканских референдумов. URL: http://www.rec.gov.by/refer/ref1995resdoc.html (accessed 24.02.2021)

regions in 2018[4]. Ukraine pursued economic integration with Russia only via the CIS Free Trade Zone (the Commonwealth of Independent States), but even this highly-limited mechanism was incompatible with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU into which Ukraine entered in 2016[5], and Russia consequently expelled Ukraine from the CIS FTZ just before its accession to the DCFTA[6]. With regard to the military sphere, Ukraine never joined the CSTO. To the contrary, the Ukrainian people have brought to power leaders who have pursued an increasingly anti-Russian and pro-Atlantic trajectory. The Ukrainian Rada enshrined the pursuit of EU membership into law as early as 1993 (Усова 2011: 156), and President Kuchma legally committed Ukraine to NATO membership in 2002[7], well before the 2005 Orange Revolution, NATO's 2008 pledge to grant Ukraine membership[8], and the beginning of Ukraine-EU negotiations on an Association between the two[9]. Even the "pro-Russian" President Yanukovych continued pursuit of that Association Agreement and, when Russian coercion and incentives changed his mind in late 2013, popular protests again erupted, ultimately replacing him with the most pro-Atlantic and anti-Russian government that the country had yet seen. Of course, the ensuing Russian acquisition of Crimea and support for the Donbass rebels greatly accelerated Ukraine's westward trajectory, but the point here is that this was a path that the country had been already treading since gaining independence, thanks to both elite and popular support. Any attempt to arrest this movement could not be sustained in the face of mass public opposition. Yet popular opinion is substantially more complicated in Ukraine than it is in Belarus, varying across the country's four macro-regions: the west (the most pro-Atlantic and anti-Russian), the center, the south, and the east (the most anti-Atlantic and pro-Russian).

In short, both the people and government of Belarus have consistently supported and pursued a policy of alignment and integration with Russia since and even before their country's independence, while the Ukrainian government, supported mainly by central and especially western Ukrainians, has pursued a policy of distancing from Russia and, increasingly, of alignment with Euro-Atlantic institutions that are adversarial to Moscow.

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[4] КСУ возьмётся за закон о региональных языках. *Закон и Бизнес*. 17 ноября 2016. URL: https://zib.com.ua/ru/126388-ksu_vozmetsya_za_zakon_o_regionalnih_yazikah.html (accessed 24.02.2021); Рішення Конституційного суду України у справі за конституційним поданням 57 народних депутатів України щодо відповідності Конституції України (конституційності) Закону України "Про засади державної мовної політики". Constitutional Court of Ukraine, 28 February 2018. URL: http://www.ccu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/docs/2-p_2018.pdf (accessed 24.02.2021)

[5] Соглашение об ассоциации Украины и ЕС: что это значит. *BBC Russia Service*. 30 мая 2017. URL: https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-40099063 (accessed 24.02.2021)

[6] Действие договора с Украиной о ЗСТ приостанавливается с 1 января 2016 г. Указ президента России. *Интерфакс-Украина*. 16 декабря 2015. URL: https://interfax.com.ua/news/economic/311915.html (accessed 24.02.2021)

[7] Кучма подписал Указ о вступлении Украины в НАТО. *Корреспондент*. 10 июля 2002. URL: https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/50325-kuchma-podpisal-ukaz-o-vstuplenii-ukrainy-v-nato (accessed 24.02.2021)

[8] Bucharest Summit Declaration. NATO. 3 April 2008. URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed 10.01.2021)

[9] Joint Declaration on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement within the EU-Ukraine Summit press release. 9 September 2008, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/102633.pdf (accessed 24.02.2021)

What can explain the divergence between the political and cultural preferences of Belarusians and southeastern Ukrainians, on the one hand, and western-central Ukrainians on the other?

A realist explanation of Ukrainian and Belarusian strategy appears insupportable: the two countries faced roughly equivalent situations from the moment of their independence, yet Ukraine from the outset saw Russia as a potential threat that could be countered through Atlantic alignment, while Belarus has ensured its security by alignment with Russia itself. Materialist explanations also fail to explain Ukrainian and Belarusian economic choices: at their independence, both countries were highly integrated with the Russian economy, heavily dependent on agriculture and industry with questionable competitiveness in western European markets and benefitting from the transit and/or refinement of Russian energy exports to western and central Europe. Yet Belarus responded to these conditions by (re-)integrating with Russian markets, and by accommodating Moscow's strategic interests in exchange for continued low-cost access to Russian energy exports. Ukraine, in contrast, eschewed significant economic integration with Russia, ultimately sacrificing what little it had secured for the sake of integration into EU markets, and rebuffed Russian offers of continued access to low-cost energy in exchange for political alignment or at least neutrality.

In place of these materialist explanations, I argue that the divergent paths of Ukraine and Belarus can be explained by the differences in Belarusians' and western-central Ukrainians' national identities. The dominant Belarusian national identity holds Belarusians and (Great) Russians to be "brotherly peoples", as stated in the 1999 treaty establishing the Union State[10] and as constantly reiterated by Belarusian and Russian elites. Consequently, close alignment with Russia is fully in keeping with Belarusian national identity and interests. In contrast, the Ukrainian national identity that is dominant throughout the country in general, and in its west and center in particular, holds Ukraine to be a "western", "European" country, but does not view Russia as one. Consequently, close alignment with western-central Europe is in keeping with Ukrainian national identity and interests, even though (or especially because) this inevitably entails a distancing from Russia. As this alignment proceeds, the increasingly forceful Russian reaction to it – driven by a combination of military-strategic, economic, and ideological motives – further reinforces the dominant version of Ukrainian national identity, which constructs explicit barriers between the Ukrainian and (Great) Russian nations, viewing the latter as an adversarial "other".

[10] Целями Союзного государства являются: обеспечение мирного и демократического развития братских народов государств–участников… [The goals of the Union State are: ensuring the peaceful and democratic development of the brotherly peoples of the member-states…], Article 2, Point 1 of the Договор между Российской федерацией и Республикой Беларусь "О создании Союзного государства" [Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus "On the formation of the Union State"]. 8 December 1999. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=LAW&n=25282&fld=134&dst=1000000001,0&rnd=0.9846671118660278 (accessed 24.02.2021)

This explanation is supported by strictly symbolic and cultural actions and attitudes of Belarusians and Ukrainians, which express their national identities and defy materialist accounts.

Compare, *inter alia,* the Belarusians' abovementioned 1995 rejection of state symbols associated with Lithuanian and German – rather than Russian – rule, versus the Ukrainians' rehabilitation of the anti-Soviet Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) / Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and of Ukrainian leaders who resisted Russian rule.

For instance, Stepan Mazepa, a Ukrainian Hetman who defected from Russia to Sweden during the Great Northern War, is lionized in some Ukrainian textbooks as a man who "tried to make Ukraine a great European state and to free it from the knout of the Muscovite Tsardom"[11]. His birthday was made a national holiday in 2008[12], and a state medal was established in his honor in 2009[13].

Stepan Bandera, a leader of the OUN, and Roman Shukhevich, the commander of the UPA, were similarly made Heroes of Ukraine in 2007 and 2010 (although these awards were annulled by the Ukrainian courts in 2011 on the grounds that they can be made only to citizens of Ukraine)[14]. It should be noted that the OUN/UPA participated in, and independently conducted, genocide of Jews and Poles, respectively. Celebrating them, and the organizations that they led, is thus a radical move that – insofar as it is adopted by Ukrainian nationalism – represents a total break between it and Russia (as well as modern European identity, and understanding of the Second World War, more generally)[15].

Yet one more, even clearer expression of the presently dominant Ukrainian identity's particularistic nature (vis-à-vis other *Rusian* nations): since 2016, the Ukrainian Ministry of Education has recommended eight geography textbooks. According to the first one listed, Ukrainians and Poles have Slavic ancestry, but (Great) Russians are Finno-Ugrics and Belarusians are Balts.[16]

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[11] Маркарян К. et al. Гитлера победили румыны, а Наполеона – украинцы? *Комсомольская правда.* 1 сентября 2005. https://www.kp.ru/daily/23571/43923/print/ (accessed 24.02.2021)

[12] Верховная рада Украины поддержала празднование на госуровне юбилеев Бандеры и Мазепы. *Regnum*, 25 декабря 2008. URL: https://regnum.ru/news/1105096.html (accessed 23.02.2021)

[13] Про відзнаку Президента України – Хрест Івана Мазепи. Указ Президента України 189/2009. 26 марта 2009. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/189/2009 (accessed 24.02.2021)

[14] Бандера и Шухевич остались без звания Героя Украины. *BBC Russian Service.* 2 августа 2011. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20190329033257/https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2011/08/110802_bandera_shukhevich_court (accessed 24.02.2021)

[15] On the actions and memory of Bandera, Shukhevych, and the OUN/UPA, see, *inter alia:* Berkhoff 2008, Himka 2011, Liebich and Myshlovska 2014, Rudling 2016.

[16] Масляк П.О., Капіруліна С.Л. *География: Підручник для 8 класу загальноосвітніх навчальних закладів.* Кам'янець-Подільский: Аксіома, 2016. С. 271. Full passage: "Linguistic proximity between two nations does not always indicate that they, or even their races, are genetically close to one another. Thus, the Turkic peoples belong to different races, even though their languages are very close to one another. For instance, Azeris are Europid, while Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Yakuts are Mongoloid. The Slavic-speaking Russians have a Finno-Ugric origin, and the Bulgarians, who are close to them linguistically, have a Turkic origin. The Belarusians and Poles, who are close to Ukrainians linguistically, have different genetic origins: Poles, a Slavic one, and Belarusians, a Baltic one".

Conventional explanations of nationalism – how recent is a particularistic Ukrainian national identity?

Why are national identities in Belarus and (to a lesser extent) southeastern Ukraine non-particularistic, while Ukrainian identity in western-central Ukraine is particularistic? Gellner sees nationalism as a source of social cohesion in atomized modern society, and a mechanism for coordination in an industrial economy (Gellner 1983). Anderson conceives of it in a rather less instrumental manner, holding that it is generated within networks of "print capitalism" and the boundaries defining the "pilgrimages" of elites (Anderson 1983). Darden argues that the first generation to be schooled and acquire literacy adopts whatever identity is conveyed via its education (Darden 2013). Many Russian nationalists today argue that the Soviet Union's policies of *korenizatsiya* ("nativization"), and its separation of the largely unitary Russian Empire into multiple semi-autonomous states, manufactured nationalist and separatist identities amongst the "titular nationalities" – that, in the words of President Putin, Lenin "laid an atomic bomb beneath the building that is Russia"[17]. This theory is to some degree supported by academic arguments to the effect that Soviet nationalities policy constructed nations, national elites, and proto-nation-states – all of which would ultimately break the USSR apart into sovereign states along the lines of its republics – on ground where national identity had not been homogeneous, strongly held, or even existent to begin with (Hirsch 2005; Slezkine 1994; Suny 1993; Brubaker 1996; Fowkes 1997; Simon 1991).

All of these theories likely have some truth to them, yet none can explain why Belarusian, (western-central) Ukrainian, and (southeastern) Ukrainian national identities have such varying levels of particularism.

First, it is not the case that national identity developed only in western Ukraine: 78% of Ukraine's citizens claimed Ukrainian nationality in the 2001 census[18], and 84% of Belarus' citizens claimed Belarusian nationality in the 2009 one[19]. Thus, there is a difference in the *content* of Belarusian and the various Ukrainian national identities,

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Ukrainian original: "Близькість мови не завжди означає близькість генетичного походження народів чи навіть їхньої раси. Так, дуже близькі між собою за мовами тюркські народи належать навіть до різних рас. Наприклад, азербайджанці – до європеоїдної, а казахи, киргизи чи якути – до монголоїдної. Слов'яномовні росіяни мають угрофінське походження, а найближчі до них за мовою болгари – тюркське. Мовно найближчі до українців білоруси і поляки теж мають різне генетичне походження. Поляки – слов'янське, а білоруси – балтійське".

The list of textbooks recommended by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine: "Перелік підручників для учнів 8 класу загальноосвітніх навчальних закладів, що можуть друкуватися за кошти державного бюджету". Наказ Міністерства освіти і науки України № 586, 27 мая 2016. URL: https://osvita.ua/doc/files/news/514/51469/perelik_derzhzamovlennya.doc (accessed 24.02.2021)

[17] Владимир Путин обвинил Владимира Ленина в развале СССР. *Коммерсантъ*. 21 января 2016. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2897423 (accessed 24.02.2021)

[18] Численность и состав населения Украины по итогам Всеукраинской переписи населения 2001 года. Всеукраинская перепись населения 2001. URL: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/general/nationality (accessed 24.02.2021)

[19] National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus. Changes in the population of the majority ethnic groups. Population Census 2009. URL: http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/census/2009/main.php (accessed 24.02.2021)

not in their outright presence. Yet Gellner and Anderson do not deal with the content of nationalism (including how it relates to other nations), only its existence.

Second, Belarus and Ukraine were "treated" by these theories' independent variables in a roughly similar manner: socio-economic modernization (Gellner and Anderson) and the spread of education and literacy (Anderson and Darden) occurred in western Ukraine, southeastern Ukraine, and Belarus to roughly the same degrees at roughly the same times: both were overwhelmingly agricultural and uneducated lands through the 19th century, with limited economic and educational modernization beginning at the very end of the century and ramping up in the 1930's and 1920's, respectively. For instance, the literacy rates of ethnically-Ukrainian and -Belarusian lands were quite low as recorded in the 1897 census (Рашин 1956) (Table 1, Table 2).

Table 1. Significantly- or primarily-ethnolinguistically-Belarusian governates

governate	% literate
Mogilyov	16
Minsk	16
Vitebsk	16
Vilnius	17
Grodno	17

Source: (Рашин 1956)

Table 2. Significantly- or primarily-ethnolinguistically-Ukrainian governates

governate	% literate
Podolia	16
Bessarabia	16
Voronezh	16
Kursk	16
Kharkov	17
Poltava	17
Volhynia	17
Kiev	18
Chernigov	18
Yekaterinoslav	22
Don Cossacks	22
Kherson	26
Tauridia	28

Source: (Рашин 1956)

Now, it is not so obvious that the Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics experienced roughly equivalent policies of *korenizatsiya*, or that the content of their schooling, which spread mainly during the Soviet period, was essentially the same (though this very well might be the case). It is thus not immediately obvious that the "mass schooling" and "Soviet bomb" theses are incorrect, that they cannot account for the Ukrainian-Belarusian divergence. However, if they were right, or if either of the other

theories were, then the divergence in levels of particularism would have occurred *during* the Soviet period – and this is contradicted by its observation *prior* to Soviet rule.

Figure 1. Percent of vote won in 1917 by Belarusian/Ukrainian national-separatist parties, percent of population speaking Belarusian/Ukrainian per the 1897 Census, and the ratio of the former to the later, by governate, amongst governates of the Russian Empire/Republic in which at least 10% of the population was (per the 1897 Census) Belarusian/Ukrainian-speaking

Source: Work of the author, based on data from the 1897 Russian census and on the results of the 1917 Russian elections: (Тройницкий 1905: 20-21, 36-37, 38-39, 54-55; Radkey 1990: 148-151, 157, 160)

In the autumn of 1917, elections were conducted throughout the Russian Republic. They were *mostly* free and fair and, unlike their predecessors under Romanov rule,

had universal suffrage (Radkey 1990). As the first and last such elections to occur before 1989, they offer an excellent window into the political and ideological leanings of the peoples of the Russian Empire, *prior* to Soviet rule and all its attendant transformations. They reveal a high level of support in Ukraine, particularly western Ukraine, for separatism from Russia, but no such support in Belarus.

The map (Figure 1) summarizes the level of support received by Belarusian and Ukrainian nationalist-separatist parties, and the Table 3 provides more detailed data.

Governates are colored on a white-to-blue or white-to-red scale, with full blue/red indicating that the fraction of Ukrainian/Belarusian nationalist-separatist support in a governate is equal to the fraction that is ethnically Ukrainian/Belarusian – that is, that the entire Ukrainian/Belarusian population of the given governate supports Ukrainian/Belarusian nationalism-separatism.

Note that Ukrainians and Ukrainian separatist parties are not considered in Belarusian governates, nor are Belarusians or Belarusian separatist parties considered in Ukrainian governates. Note also that red is essentially not visible on the map, because support for Belarusian nationalist/separatist parties was so low. Furthermore, elections were not conducted in the majority-Belarusian governates of Grodno and Vilnius (light gray), due to their occupation by Germany. Lastly, votes for joint lists including Ukrainian nationalist-separatist parties are counted as votes for Ukrainian nationalism-separatism – except in Kharkov and Kherson. There, the proportion of such votes is so large that whether one makes this assumption or not completely changes the results for the governates. (In other governates, the difference is only 1% or, in Poltava, 17%). Therefore, the two governates are colored yellow, and their figures with and without the joint lists are presented.

I follow Radkey in his identification of Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalist-separatist parties (Radkey 1990). The first category consists of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Federalists, the Ukrainian Democratic Farmers' Party (he calls it the "Ukrainian Toilers' List"), the Ukrainian National Republican Party, and certain non-partisan independents and middle-class parties that Radkey considers to be Ukrainian nationalist (Radkey is supported by Soldatenko in his identification of Ukrainian nationalist-separatist parties: Soldatenko writes that, by 1917, the most influential such parties were the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Federalists, the Ukrainian Party of Autonomist Socialists, and the Ukrainian Democratic Farmers' Party[20] (Солдатенко 2009: 37)). The second group consists of the Belarusian Socialist Gromada (Minsk Governate), the Vitebsk Belarusian People's Union (Vitebsk Governate), and "Belarusian organizations" (Mogilev Governate, electoral list no. 8).

[20] The actual names of these parties are: Украинская партия социалистов-революционеров (УПСР), Украинская социал-демократическая рабочая партия (УСДРП), Украинская партия социалистов-федералистов (УПСФ), Украинская партия самостийников-социалистов (УПСС), Украинская хлеборобско-демократическая партия (УХДП).

Table 3. Support for Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalist-separatist parties in the 1917 election



Source: Based on the research of O. Radkey (Radkey 1990: 148, 151, 157, 160)

There is, however, a question of interpreting votes for these parties. Were they actually nationalist-separatist, rather than just focused on a region, or on some degree of national autonomy? If they were nationalist, then in what manner, and how did their nationalism translate into practical programs and actions? This question is actually irrelevant with regard to the virtually nonexistent Belarusian parties, but I argue not only that the major Ukrainian parties were nationalist, but that this nationalism translated into programs ranging from maximal autonomy to outright independence.

Soldatenko writes that the "socio-political movement in Ukraine… had its own unique tasks… the liberation and revival of the Ukrainian nation…" and that the programs of the abovementioned Ukrainian nationalist parties "had the goal of transforming the ethnic community of Ukrainians into a full, modern political nation. The critical aspect of movement in that direction… was the creation of [Ukraine's] own statehood" (Солдатенко 2009: 36-37). By far the most popular of the abovementioned parties was the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (Radkey 1990), a party that split from the Socialist Revolutionaries in March 1917. Radkey writes that the party, which "had by far the largest following in the Ukraine", "was more extreme in the nationalist than in the socialist sense" (Radkey 1990: 147).

Initially, the nationalists largely demanded "wide national-territorial autonomy for Ukraine within the federative democratic republic of Russia" with only foreign policy, defense, the monetary system, and intra-federal infrastructure delegated to Moscow (Солдатенко 2009: 38). However, soon after the 1917 elections, on 12 January 1918, the Ukrainian People's Republic, which had already proclaimed autonomy, declared full independence.

Now, it should be noted that this occurred in the context of a quasi-war between the UPR and the Bolsheviks, who both sought control over the entirety of Ukraine. However, independence was not, in this situation, the obvious choice for a group that was seeking autonomy and socialism for Ukraine and was opposed to the Bolsheviks. For one thing, the Constituent Assembly elected in 1917 had not yet been disbanded (indeed, it had not yet convened), and it would be dominated by the very party that the foremost Ukrainian nationalist party, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, had separated from less than a year earlier: the Socialist Revolutionaries. Furthermore, even if the Constituent Assembly could not oppose the Bolsheviks (which would turn out to be the case), there were other forces that could: namely, the Whites. Moreover, even if Ukraine could successfully attain independence from Russia, this would not guarantee its independence in general. Indeed, Central Powers forces would overrun the Ukrainian People's Republic within weeks of its independence, reducing it to a protectorate headed by the reactionary Hetman Skoropadskiy.

Thus, independence was hardly the obvious choice for a movement trying to achieve autonomy and social justice for Ukraine while resisting the Bolshevik dictatorship. Its selection is therefore easier understood as an end than as a means. Indeed, the Rada may not have waited for the Constituent Assembly to convene precisely because,

if it *were* successful in establishing its authority in opposition to the Bolsheviks, this would reduce the necessity and legitimacy of Ukrainian independence.

It is true that Belarusian independence was eventually declared, but this happened only in late March – after the Germans had occupied Belarus and the Bolsheviks had themselves ceded it – rather than early January. Even more importantly, independence was declared by an assembly of representatives from the three abovementioned nationalist parties – which had received virtually no support in the 1917 election – rather than by parties that had won majority support throughout much of the land. Thus, there is reason to believe that independence was opposed, or at least not supported, by the vast majority of the Belarusian population, and the Belarusian People's Republic is best viewed as a collaborationist government drawing its power almost entirely from the support (or at least semi-benign neglect) of its German conquerors, who were interested in a Belarusian protectorate as a buffer state.

The nationalist-separatist nature of the Ukrainian parties is further supported by the identity of their leader. On March 17, Mikhaylo Hrushevskiy – a historian of Ukraine – became speaker of the Central Rada of the Ukrainian People's Republic, which was still an autonomous part of the Russian Republic at the time. A member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, it was under his leadership that the UPR would proclaim full independence ten months later, and he was its first and only leader before the Germans turned it into the protectorate Ukrainian State. His positions, therefore, are important for understanding both the UPSR and the other Ukrainian nationalist parties that, together with the UPSR, pursued the UPR's independence.

A 1903 article written by Hrushevskiy clearly sets out the views relevant to this study (Грушевский 1903):

> *"We know that the Kievan state, and Kievan law and culture, were the creation of a single people, the Ukrainian-Rusian (украинско-руськая), and that the Vladimir-Muscovite state, law, and culture were the creation of another, the Great Russian…*
>
> *The Kievan period led not into the Vladimir-Muscovite, but into the Galician-Volhynian period of the 13th century, and then into the Lithuanian-Polish period of the 14-16th centuries. The Vladimir-Muscovite state was not an heir or a successor of the Kievan, but grew from its own roots, and the relation of the Kievan state to it is more analogous to the relation of the Roman state to its Gallic provinces, than it is to the continuity of two periods in the political and cultural life of France. Law, culture, and forms of socio-political structure that had all been developed within the historical life of Kiev were transplanted by the Kievan government onto Great Russian lands, but the Kievan state must not be included in the history of the Great Russian people on such grounds…*
>
> *Ultimately, "common Russian" (общерусская) history cannot exist, because there is no "common Russian" people. There can be only a history of the "Rusian peoples", as some are inclined to call them, or rather a history of the Eastern Slavs…*

The Ukrainian-Rusian people has for centuries lived without a national state, under the influence of different state organizations…"

In short, Hrushevskiy argued that Ukrainians were a people entirely separate from (and perhaps superior to) the other Rusian peoples (i.e. Great Russians and Belarusians), and in dire need of its own "national state".

In sum, a vote for one of the nationalist parties was a vote for parties with programs ranging from maximal autonomy to outright independence, for parties that would proclaim the latter only a few months after the 1917 elections, and for parties whose leadership espoused textbook nationalist positions that viewed the Ukrainian nation as an organism entirely distinct from other Rusian peoples. This is especially clear given that the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries differed from the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party from the Social Democratic Labor Party, only in their Ukrainian nationalism – and the all-Russian SRs and SDs themselves already supported federalism, which was indeed established *de jure* by the short-lived Constituent Assembly that the SRs dominated (Морозов 2017).

Thus, in 1917, Ukrainians in western-central Ukraine voted largely for separatist parties, indicating that they not only possessed a strong national identity, but that this identity was particularist and anti-Russian separatist. Belarusians did not vote for separatist parties, but it is impossible to conclude from this whether they had little national identity, or whether that identity simply promoted integration with the other Rusian nations.

As mentioned above, the arguments of Gellner, Anderson, and Darden seem applicable only once modernization intensified under Soviet rule, which is contradicted by the Ukrainian nationalism evident in the 1917 election. Moreover, insofar as socio-economic modernization and the expansion of schooling *had* occurred by 1917, they would have taken place within a unitary Russian Empire pursuing assimilationist policies, and Gellner, Anderson, and Darden would all predict the development of national consciousness in Belarus and Ukraine that was compatible with or identical to (Great) Russian national identity. In Ukraine, this is clearly not what happened. It was not only Austrian Galicia that, as Darden argues, developed a separatist Ukrainian national identity: much of the Ukrainian people had developed (or retained) such an identity, and the attendant political aspirations, by 1917 – *while under Imperial Russian rule.* None of the abovementioned theories can account for this. In the rest of this paper, I try to find something that can.

Was western Ukraine always on a different path?

First, though, we must address the possibility that western Ukrainian national identity was always particularist and exclusive of (Great) Russians. If it were, we would no longer have to explain a transformation in it, though we would, ideally, explain

why it was different in the first place. However, there is little reason to believe that the nature of national identity in western Ukraine differed greatly, in the medieval period, from that in eastern Ukrainian lands, in Belarus, or in modern Russia.

In *The Origins of the Slavic Nations,* Serhii Plokhy posits two types of Rusian identity: a narrow one and a broad one. The former referred to the core of the Rus proto-state, centered on Kyiv, and the latter to the entire realm, extending all the way north to Novgorod. However, neither identity – by its presence of its absence – offers a basis for some sort of particularistic Ukrainian national identity that was strongest in western-central Ukraine.

Plokhy writes that, despite the existence of the narrow Rusian identity, it is impossible to discern any notion of a coherent southern Rusian (Ukrainian) group or nation, distinct from other Rusian populations (Plokhy 2006: 46-47). His "rereading of the sources shows no sign of an identity that might define the population of what is now Ukrainian territory… as a single entity in opposition to a "non-Ukrainian" other. No such identity existed at the time" (Plokhy 2006: 47). To some degree, this was inevitable, because narrow Rus comprised the principalities of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereyaslavl (Plokhy 2006: 38). About one third of these lands are around modern-day Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol in the Russian Federation – which are mostly or entirely ethnically (Great) Russian and which evidenced little to no desire to separate from Russia in 1917. It also *excludes* most of modern Ukraine: its entire southeast, as well as everything west of Zhytomyr and Vinnytsya Oblasts (Plokhy 2006: XV). Thus, any legacy of the narrow Rusian identity would be focused on, and presumably located in, central Ukraine and southwestern Russia. It would not be focused on the whole of modern Ukraine, or held most strongly in the country's center and especially its west. Furthermore, even if a regional identity overlapping with modern Ukraine *did* exist, this would still not explain why it was stronger than other regional identities, or why it alone led to a particularist national identity. After all, the Rusian core was not the only part of Rus with a strong local identity: "even [the] political loyalty [of Rusian elites]… was [foremost] to their lands of Rus, Suzdal, Novgorod, Polatsk, and so on, not to the Rurikid realm" (Plokhy 2006: 47). Overall, then, it is impossible to see the narrow Rusian identity as equivalent to, or the basis for, a particularist Ukrainian nationalism.

As for the broad Rusian identity, it "endowed [the elites of the Rusian core] with a sense of common identity extending beyond the boundaries of the Rus Land in the narrow sense" (Plokhy 2006: 48). Insofar as it was held, such an identity would inherently preclude any southern Rusian, southwestern Rusian, or Galician particularistic national identity. And scholarship of the 20th and 21st centuries has asserted the (at least partial) formation and endurance of such an all-Rusian (*общерусское*) identity within the medieval Rusian state (Кучин, 2015). And it was probably the core Rusian elites who held this broad, all-Rusian identity more strongly than anyone else. After all, they were its primary beneficiaries: it supported the "unity project of the Kyivan political and intellectual elites" (Plokhy 2006: 39), under whose rule the non-core principalities frequently chafed, resisting the "economic exploitation" and "political and

cultural 'Rusification'" that attended it (Plokhy 2006: 40-41). In sum, it is difficult to see why the core of the Rus State, the primary beneficiary of its unity, would have held an all-Rusian identity less strongly than its provincial subjects did. If anything, the reverse would likely have been the case.

Overall, then, it is impossible to identify an unusually strong particularist identity, in the west and center of modern Ukraine, in the medieval period. It is equally impossible to identify an unusually weak all-Rusian identity in the territory of modern Ukraine – if anything, it was perhaps unusually *strong* in the country's center. There is consequently no basis for assuming that western-central Ukraine had an especially particularist version of national identity during the period of the medieval Rusian State, and we must look later in history to find the origins of that version.

The Polish fork in the historical road

My argument, in short, is that the particularistic variant of Ukrainian national identity is a consequence of Polish rule. From the 1300's, increasingly large portions of Galicia were conquered by Poland, and in 1569, the Union of Lublin joined Lithuania and Poland into a Commonwealth – and, crucially, transferred to Poland all of the territory ruled by Lithuania that today lies within Ukraine. As a result, Poland ruled over the various parts of western-central Ukraine for many centuries, while the Grand Duchy of Lithuania retained what is today Belarus, and southeastern Ukraine and ethnically-Ukrainian territories that today lie within Russia were either unsettled by Rusians or ruled by Russia.

Polish rule, I argue, differed significantly from Lithuanian rule, in that Poland more or less consistently pursued a strongly assimilationist policy. This, obviously, ultimately failed to endow the southern Rusian people or elites with a Polish identity, but it *did* alter the nature of their Rusian identity. By westernizing them, partial Polonization made southern Rusians (modern Ukrainians) perceive themselves as different from non-Westernized Rusians, and thus regard the Ukrainian nation as entirely separate from the other Rusian peoples – perhaps separated by a Huntingtonian civilizational divide (Hungtington 1996). This particularist version of Ukrainian national identity, in turn, is expressed in – and the cause of – nationalist-separatist voting in Ukraine in 1917, and the pro-Atlantic/anti-Russian sentiment of the majority of Ukrainians in the modern day.

In this section, I present the distinctions between Polish and Lithuanian rule over Rusian territories, with regard to issues of culture and national identity, and some evidence that a westernized Ukrainian identity exists and has endured to the present day.

First, with regard to language, it is notable that the Rusian/Ruthenian language (related to modern Belarusian and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainian) held a very high status within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for the first centuries of its rule over Rusian lands. It was the language of administration, law, and the court, and it served as the Grand Duchy's lingua franca (Danylenko 2017: 33-34). This began to change in the

territories retained by Lithuania after the 1569 Union, but it did so slowly. The Lithuanian elite – of Lithuanian and Rusian ethnicity – was initially resistant to the spread of Polish and Latin (Danylenko 2017: 35), and Ruthenian remained a lingua franca and a major official language within the Duchy until the end of the 17th century (Bednarczuk 2013: 24; Danylenko 2017: 34; Plokhy 2006: 309). At this point, some scholars mark the "total victory" of Polish over it (Иванов 2003), but others note that – outside of the chancellery and the highest ranks of the Lithuanian nobility – Ruthenian's "vernacular variety even gained new ground at the [expense] of Lithuanian, since Ruthenian… never ceased to be a lingua franca until 1795, when Lithuanian came to be used in printing… Polonization brought about the disappearance of the standard variety of Ruthenian in the milieu of the local elite, while the commoners and landed gentry remained diglossic in practicing local varieties of non-standard Ruthenian in combination with either Polish or Lithuanian" (Danylenko 2017: 41). Essentially, linguistic Polonization of Lithuania required the adoption of Polish (and/or Latin) by an elite that was still largely (and jealously) in control of its own country and already in possession of other spoken (Lithuanian and Ruthenian) and written (Ruthenian) languages. To be sure, Polonization was nevertheless to some degree eventually accomplished, but the process was slow and limited.

This was not the case in Ukraine, where the abovementioned factors did not hold after 1569. With Ukraine's transfer to the Kingdom of Poland, it became part of a polity whose only two official languages were Polish and Latin (though local administrations, in some cases, continued at least partially using Rusian for some time). A process that would take more than 150 years to complete in Belarus took place essentially overnight in Ukraine. As a result, by the early 1600's, even the Orthodox clergy of Ukraine had largely converted to the use of Polish (Snyder 2003: 107). And, of course, in the Galician territories that had been Polish since the 14th century, all this had happened more than two centuries earlier.

The situation was similar with regard to religion: Polonization in both Belarus and Ukraine, but slower and less complete in the former, still under Lithuanian rule. The 16th century Lithuanian elite was substantially Protestant and, thanks to the Grand Duchy's autonomy, was able to secure religious freedom greater than that which existed under the Polish Crown. The 1563 Privilege of Vilnius lifted all restrictions on the Orthodox (as well as Protestants) (Kempa 2010: 38). Though it only survived until 1596 (Kempa 2010: 38), religious freedom remained substantially greater in Lithuania than in Poland for decades to come, protected by the Third Lithuanian Statute of 1588. "Protestantism, especially Calvinism, became a manifestation of Lithuanian autonomy", and "Lithuanian deputies in parliament" thus "often made common cause with Eastern Orthodox nobles", thereby protecting the status of Protestantism, Orthodoxy, and the Grand Duchy itself (Stone 2001: 216).

This stood in contrast to the situation in the Polish Crown, where the religious-freedom-guaranteeing Warsaw Confederation was undermined even as provisions similar to its own were being implemented in the Third Lithuanian Statute (Kempa

2010: 39). Overall, "the 'golden era' of religious tolerance did not last as long in the majority of Crown cities as it did in Lithuanian cities" (Kempa 2010: 40). Indeed, the Ukrainian nobility that remained after the 1569 transfer largely abandoned Orthodoxy almost immediately (Subtelny 1994: 95).

This said, religious tolerance had largely ended in Lithuania, and Orthodoxy entered into rapid retreat there, by the second half of the 17th century (Kempa 2010: 57, 59). But, as with language, there was still a major difference between Ukraine and Belarus in both the timing and the intensity of assimilation – one that is detectable even in the modern era.

Soviet data are obviously not useful on questions of religion. 1897 Imperial Russian data are also not ideal, as they do not cover Galicia and do not distinguish between speakers of (Great) Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian. Interwar Polish censuses, on the other hand, depict a sharp contrast between the religious identities of Belarusians and Ukrainians (the 1921 and 1931 censuses provide near-identical results). At the time, Poland held about half of Belarus, and just under half of west-central Ukraine. And the 1931 census reports that, while 94% of Belarusians were Orthodox, only 31% of Ukrainians were[21]. "Locals" ("tutejszy") are here considered to be Belarusians, as they were peasants in the Polesie Voivodeship (modern Belarus) who spoke a dialect of Belarusian. "Ruthenians", conversely, are considered Ukrainians, as they were almost entirely recorded as living in modern-day Ukraine.

Now, to be clear, this very low figure for Ukrainians is not representative of Ukrainians as a whole, or even of Ukrainians in west-central Ukraine in particular. While the Ukrainians of the Galician voivodeships reported almost unanimous adherence to Roman or Greek Catholicism, those of the Volhynian Voivodeship were virtually all Orthodox. And central Ukraine was probably far more like Volhynia than Galicia. Nevertheless, the point stands that about a third of long-time-Polish Ukraine (and precisely the fraction that was under Polish rule for the longest) was, even in the 20th century, largely assimilated to (Greek) Catholicism, while almost no Belarusians were.

Aside from linguistic and religious assimilation, Polonization also took a more direct route: the settlement of Poles in Rusian territories. But, in Lithuania, its extent was limited by "protectionist barriers against Polish settlement" (Stone 2001: 225). The "gentry were able to use the executive power they retained after 1569 to protect their landholdings, and in any case the Lithuanian Statutes remained the highest law. The 1588 Statute of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was designed in part to protect native Lithuanian landholders" (Snyder 2003: 111-112).

After Ukraine's transfer to the Polish Crown, however, no such defenses remained there (Snyder 2003: 111-112). This allowed "a few Polish families [to gain] enormous landholdings in Ukraine" in the decades after 1568, and soon "thousands of petty Pol-

[21] "Drugi Powszechny Spis Ludnosci, z dn. 9.XII 1931 r.". Glowny Urzad Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. URL: http://statlibr.stat.gov.pl/exlibris/aleph/a18_1/apache_media/VUNVGMLANSCQQFGYHCN3VDLK12A9U5.pdf (accessed 24.02.2021)

ish nobles…followed to work for [them]" (Snyder 2003: 111-112). By the eve of the Khmelnitsky Uprising, "about two-thirds of all 'super-magnates' [in the Kiev Palatinate] were [Polonized] Volhynian, [Polonized] Red Ruthenian, and Polish", as were a third of all the nobles in the Palatinate (Borzecki 1996: 55-56, 59). The colonists "mixed with the local Ruthenian nobility, transforming it from the Lithuanian nobility of Russian tradition… into a Polish nobility" (Stone 2001: 225), and soon, "even the local Kievan magnate families were often non-Orthodox and Polonized" (Borzecki 1996: 55-56). Ukrainian nobles "abandoned the faith of their forefathers in droves and embraced Catholicism along with Polish language and culture", a catastrophic "decapitation" of the Ukrainian people (Subtelny 1994: 95-96). With the nobility came Polish soldiers and administrators (Snyder 2003: 111-112), as well as burghers; Rusian urbanites soon found themselves outnumbered and discriminated against by Poles and other foreigners (Borzecki 1996: 57). In general, colonization "accelerated the process of Polonization" in Ukraine (Stone 2001: 225), facilitating the import of Polish civilization via the courts of magnates. "Less than a century after 1568, we find enormously wealthy estates in Ukraine whose guardians were as Polish as the Poles, if not more so. Ukraine provided new summits for Polish high culture…" (Snyder 2003: 111-112).

Another major difference between Lithuania and Poland is that Rusians comprised the overwhelming majority of the Grand Duchy's population, and had relatively high status within Lithuania. These facts are partly reflected by the abovementioned position of the Ruthenian language in Lithuania, but another illustration is provided by the large role that Rusians played in the administration of the Lithuanian capital itself, where they were guaranteed half the seats on the city council (Kempa 2010: 40). This was obviously not the case in Warsaw or Krakow. Rusians' position as a high-status majority, rather than a low-status minority subject to foreign colonization, enhanced their ability to resist Polonization in Lithuania.

In sum, while Ukraine had been "a source of high culture in medieval Lithuania", it became "the target of civilizers in early modern Poland". Early modern Ukraine "beg[an] with a connection to Warsaw" (Snyder 2003: 106). Polonization advanced in Lithuania, too, but it was retarded and limited by the sheer size of the Rusian majority; by the high status that Rusian culture, language, and even religion had previously held in Lithuania; by the initially non-Polish identity of the Lithuanian nobility; by the fear of Polish political (and perhaps cultural) domination that was held by that nobility; by the religious heterogeneity of Lithuania that was protected by the Grand Duchy's autonomy; by the blocks on Polish colonization that (if nothing else) were motivated by the economic interests of the Lithuanian nobility; and more. Thus, while the Union of Lublin opened all of Ruthenia to Polonization, the Polish-incorporated territories were particularly affected (Borzecki 1996: 60-61). After the Union, "the Belarusian lands remained within the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, while Polish-annexed southern Rus (Ukraine) was subjected to intensive colonization and Polonization" (Петкевич 2005: 79).

The consequence of this Polonization, as stated earlier, was obviously not the ultimate adoption of a Polish national identity by most Ukrainians, even the Ukrainian

elite. But it clearly did affect their culture, as the Polish language, religion, political thought, *Latinitas*, and other cultural elements were transmitted to the Ukrainian people and especially elite. Insofar as these elements embedded themselves, they changed Ukrainian culture and national identity, Polonizing and westernizing them. The Ukrainian nation was then, consequently, seen to have more in common with Poland and/or the West and less in common with other Rusian nations (in particular the (Great) Russian).

This view, and its concentration precisely in those areas that were under Polish rule longest, is illustrated by a 2018 survey that includes questions on whether Ukrainians view their country as having more in common with Western Europe or Russia. While there is little cross-regional variation in Ukrainians' views of their country's similarity to Russia versus Western Europe in terms of things like its social welfare programs, employment and quality of life, and even development of democracy, there are *sharp* differences with respect to Ukraine's civilizational "essence". Central and especially western Ukrainians view Ukraine has having much more in common with Western Europe and less in common with Russia, in terms of its morality, values, and culture, relative to their compatriots in the south and east (Figure 2, Figure 3).



Figure 2. Perception of Ukraine's proximity to Western Europe versus Russia, by answer, characteristic, and region

Source: Динаміка суспільно-політичних поглядів в Україні, 13-31 березня 2018. Conducted by Соціологічна група "Рейтинг" for the Center for Insights in Survey Research, International Republican Institute. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20190425060159/http://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/2018_03-national_ua-official.pdf (accessed 24.02.2021)



Figure 3. Average perception of Ukraine's proximity to Western Europe versus Russia, by characteristic and region

Source: Динаміка суспільно-політичних поглядів в Україні, 13-31 березня 2018. Conducted by Соціологічна група "Рейтинг" for the Center for Insights in Survey Research, International Republican Institute. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20190425060159/http://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/2018_03-national_ua-official.pdf (accessed 10.01.2021)

This perception of Ukraine as distinct from non-westernized Rusian nations, in turn, entailed a particularist national identity that saw Ukraine as properly separate from those other nations, as a nation in need of a nation-state (as e.g. Hrushevskiy argued) that ought to have little or nothing to do with those of non-westernized Rusian nations.

Statistical confirmation of the Polish hypothesis

If this argument is correct, then the weight of Polish rule over an area ought to be positively correlated with Ukrainian or Belarusian particularist nationalism in that area. And, indeed, I find a very strong correlation between length of time that a territory spent under Polish rule and the support that its Ukrainians and Belarusians expressed, in the 1917 elections, for Ukrainian or Belarusian separatism. But first, we must establish those lengths of time. The Table 4 records the political histories of the territories comprising the governates that, in 1897, had large Ukrainian or Belarusian populations (or, more precisely, large Ukrainian- and Belarusian-speaking populations). That is, by whom they were ruled, when.

Table 4. Historical control of governates with large Ukrainian-/Belarusian-speaking populations



Source: Compiled by the author according to existing data: Николаев В. 2003. Атлас всемирной истории. URL: http://historyatlas.narod.ru (accessed 24.02.2021); Ganse A. World History at Korean Minjok Leadership Academy Historical Atlas. URL: https://www.zum.de/whkmla/ (accessed 24.02.2021); (Gilbert 2007)

Table 5. Nationalism-separatism in 1917, and durations of past control by different powers, by governate, amongst governates with large Ukrainian/Belarusian populations

	% nationalist vote / % Belarusian or Ukrainian	notes	dates under heavy Rus settlement from 1000	total years under Rus settlement	dates under Poland before 1917	total years under Poland before 1917	proportion Rus-settled years under Poland before 1917	dates under Poland or Lithuania before 1917	total years under Poland or Lithuania before 1917	proportion Rus-settled years under Poland or Lithuania before 1917	dates under imperial Russia before 1917	total years under imperial Russia before 1917	proportion Rus-settled years under imperial Russia before 1917
Galicia	-	Austrian rule											
Volhynia	1.01		1000-1917	917	1569-1794	225	0.25	1340-1362 (.67), 1362-1794	447	0.49	1794-1917	123	0.13
Podolia	0.98		1000-1917	917	1366-1485 (.25), 1485-1569 (.5), 1569-1793	296	0.32	1364-1793	429	0.47	1812-1917	105	0.11
Bessarabia	0.08		1812-1917	105	-	0	0.00	-	0	0.00	1812-1917	105	1.00
Kiev	0.91	(.90 without joint-list)	1000-1917	917	1569-1793	224	0.24	1362-1793	431	0.47	1793-1917	124	0.14
Kherson	-	.17 without joint-list, .90 with											
Chernigov	0.79	(.77 without joint-list)	1000-1917	917	1569-1618 (.5), 1618-1648	55	0.06	1359-1503, 1503-1618 (.5), 1618-1648	232	0.25	1503-1618 (.5), 1667-1917	307.5	0.34
Poltava	0.90	(.71 without joint-list)	1000-1917	917	1569-1648	79	0.09	1362-1648	286	0.31	1667-1917	250	0.27
Tauridia	0.28		1783-1917	134	-	0	0.00	-	0	0.00	1783-1917	134	1.00
Yekaterinoslav	0.68		1415-1648 (.5), 1648-1917	385.5	1569-1648 (.5)	40	0.10	1415-1648 (.5)	117	0.30	1734-1917	183	0.47
Kharkov	-	.01 without joint list, 1.06 with											
Kursk	0.00		1000-1917	917	-	0	0.00	1360-1503	143	0.16	1503-1917	414	0.45
Voronezh	0.03	(0 without joint-list)	1575-1917	342	-	0	0.00	-	0	0.00	1575-1917	342	1.00
Don Cossacks	0.00		1575-1917	342	-	0	0.00	-	0	0.00	1575-1917	342	1.00
Kuban	0.00		1793-1917	124	-	0	0.00	-	0	0.00	1793-1917	124	1.00
Stavropol	0.00		1625-1917	292	-	0	0.00	-	0	0.00	1625-1917	292	1.00
Minsk	0.00		1000-1917	917	-	0	0.00	1333-1774	441	0.48	1774-1917	143	0.16
Mogilyov	0.01		1000-1917	917	-	0	0.00	1333-1775	441	0.48	1774-1917	143	0.16
Vitebsk	0.03		1000-1917	917	-	0	0.00	1333-1776	441	0.48	1774-1917	143	0.16
Vilnius	-	German occupation											
Grodno	-	German occupation											

Source: Made by the author

Based on this information, we can draw up the Table 5, containing the level of the 1917 nationalist-separatist vote in each governate, plus the length of time that each was ruled by Poland, plus – to check rival hypotheses – the length of time that each was ruled by Poland *and/or* Lithuania, and the length of time that each was ruled by the Russian Empire (perhaps rule by any non-Rusian power yields nationalism-separatism, or perhaps rule by the Russian Empire diminishes nationalism-separatism that is otherwise 'naturally' occurring).

Additionally, given that certain governates received substantial Rusian settlement much later than others, we can calculate the time that each spent under Polish, Polish/Lithuanian, and Imperial Russian rule *as a proportion of the duration for which they were settled by Rusians.*

Note that, when a territory was only partly controlled by a certain power for a period of time, the duration of that power's control is calculated by multiplying the length of time in which the territory was partly controlled by the fraction of the territory that was controlled. For instance, Poland controlled roughly one-quarter of Podolia in 1366-1485, half of it in 1485-1569, and all of it in 1569-1793. It is therefore considered to have been ruled by Poland for 295.75 years: 0.25(1485-1366) + 0.5(1569-1485) + (1793-1569).

In calculating periods of Rusian settlement, I more or less arbitrarily begin counting from the year 1000, shortly after the Baptism of Rus and as the Rusian state was really coming into existence across the greatest range of territory. An earlier start date could have been selected, conceivably as much as several centuries earlier, but I am already uncertain about the Rusian settlement dates that I have assigned to some of the governates: the southern Ukrainian governates were repeatedly ravaged by nomadic invaders, and their Rusian settlers were often only loosely subject to the control of a state, making it difficult to judge the point at which lasting heavy settlement began. Pushing the start date further back would only intensify these problems. Ultimately, the selection of the 1000 start date makes no difference to my conclusions. It affects proportional Polish rule only in the Yekaterinoslav governate. And, as we will see, Polish/Lithuanian and Imperial Russian rule, in absolute or proportional terms, all perform very badly as predictors – so badly that small modifications to their proportional measures could not make a real difference.

Having determined how long each governate spent under Polish, Polish/Lithuanian, and Imperial Russian rule, we can now correlate these lengths of time with the governates' behavior in the 1917 election (note that all relative values are displayed as percentages, while the x-axis measures years when it is referring to absolute durations of rule) (Figures 4-9).



Figure 4. Governates with significant Belarusian-/Ukrainian-speaking populations, by duration of past Polish rule (x-axis) and level of Belarusian/Ukrainian nationalism-separatism in 1917 (y-axis)

Source: Made by the author



Figure 5. Governates with significant Belarusian-/Ukrainian-speaking populations, by duration of past Polish rule relative to duration of Rusian settlement (x-axis) and level of Belarusian/Ukrainian nationalism-separatism in 1917 (y-axis)

Source: Made by the author



Figure 6. Governates with significant Belarusian-/Ukrainian-speaking populations, by duration of past Polish/Lithuanian rule (x-axis) and level of Belarusian/Ukrainian nationalism-separatism in 1917 (y-axis)

Source: Made by the author



Figure 7. Governates with significant Belarusian-/Ukrainian-speaking populations, by duration of past Polish/Lithuanian rule relative to duration of Rusian settlement (x-axis) and level of Belarusian/Ukrainian nationalism-separatism in 1917 (y-axis)

Source: Made by the author



Figure 8. Governates with significant Belarusian-/Ukrainian-speaking populations, by duration of past Imperial Russian rule (x-axis) and level of Belarusian/Ukrainian nationalism-separatism in 1917 (y-axis)

Source: Made by the author



Figure 9. Governates with significant Belarusian-/Ukrainian-speaking populations, by duration of past Imperial Russian rule relative to duration of Rusian settlement (x-axis) and level of Belarusian/Ukrainian nationalism-separatism in 1917 (y-axis)

Source: Made by the author

It is visually obvious that Polish/Lithuanian and Imperial Russian rule, in absolute and proportional terms, predict 1917 nationalism-separatism poorly – but that Polish rule, on the other hand, predicts it far better, and really quite well. When nationalism-separatism is correlated with Polish rule, the only outliers are Chernigov, Poltava, and (for *absolute* Polish rule) Yekaterinoslav, which display levels of nationalism-separatism that are substantially higher than their predicted values.

To confirm this, I performed linear regressions of 1917 nationalism over the various rule durations. These regressions (n=16 for each) had the results, visualized in Table 6.

Table 6. Linear regressions of 1917 Belarusian/Ukrainian nationalism over duration of past rule by various states, by governate, amongst governates with significant Belarusian-/Ukrainian-speaking populations

IV	cons.	IV coef.	95%	CIs	IV p-value	model r^2
Polish rule (in years)	12.0	0.42	0.29	0.55	.000	.78
Polish rule (as % of Rus-settlement)	11.0	3.68	2.59	4.77	.000	.79
Polish rule (0 y-intercept) (in years)	0.0	0.49	0.37	0.60	.000	.72
Polish rule (0 y-intercept) (as % of Rus-settlement)	0.0	4.19	3.22	5.16	.000	.74
Polish/Lithuanian rule (in years)	12.2	0.11	-0.00	0.21	.053	.24
Polish/Lithuanian rule (as % of Rus-settlement)	10.2	1.01	0.06	1.95	.038	.27
Russian rule (in years)	57.9	-0.11	-0.34	0.12	.329	.07
Russian rule (as % of Rus-settlement)	66.7	-0.60	-1.12	-0.09	.025	.31

Source: Made by the author

In the latter two models based on Polish rule, the constant is eliminated. That is, the y-intercept is set to zero (I do not test fixed-constant variants of the Polish/Lithuanian and Imperial Russian models; they perform badly enough as it is). This inevitably worsens the model's predictive power to some degree, but it is what follows, strictly speaking, from the theory behind it. I argue that Ukrainian/Belarusian separatism-nationalism is a consequence of Polish rule, and do not offer any alternative sources of it. Therefore, where Polish rule has been entirely absent, nationalism-separatism ought to be, also. That said, this may be setting the bar unnecessarily high: substantial migration between regions that had and had not experienced Polish rule had taken place by 1917, as a result of which even governates that had entirely lacked it would still be home to people who *had* been "treated" by it. This could account for the (relatively small) y-intercepts that the first two Polish rule models estimate: 12% for the absolute model, and 11% for the proportional one. Regardless, the fixed-constant models do not perform much worse than the estimated-constant ones.

Also, I should note that I have made a slight modification to the Polish rule IVs. As can be seen in the first two scatter-plots, relative national-separatism essentially reaches its maximum possible value (100%) in the Kiev and Volhynia Governates, where the duration of Polish rule is roughly 225 years and 25% of Rus-settled years. And yet there is another governate, Podolia, where the duration of Polish rule is even greater, yet

nationalism-separatism obviously is not, because it had already reached its theoretical limit in Kiev and Volhynia. Therefore, Podolia's nationalism-separatism falls below the estimated line of best fit (Figure 10).



Figure 10. Figure 4 (governates with significant Belarusian-/Ukrainian-speaking populations, by duration of past Polish rule (x-axis) and level of Belarusian/Ukrainian nationalism-separatism in 1917 (y-axis)) with line of best fit indicated

Source: Made by the author

To deal with this problem, I "taper" the absolute and proportional duration of Polish rule when incorporating them into regressions. Duration observations that exceed the point at which governates begin consistently achieving maximal nationalism-separatism (in these regressions, 225 years and 25% of Rus-settled years), are calculated as 225+√(actual value-225) (for the absolute duration model) and 25%+√(actual value-25%) (for the percent-of-Rusian-settlement model). The result and purpose of this is that the line of best fit effectively becomes asymptotic at the highest y-value possible, at the x-value beyond which that y-value is consistently achieved (Figure 11).

With these intricacies out of the way, we can proceed to the results. They indicate that – unlike the other two IVs – Polish rule, however it is measured, is indeed a quite good predictor of 1917 nationalism-separatism. After all, it explains nearly four-fifths of the variation in nationalism-separatism (if one accepts that, by 1917, governates entirely lacking in a history of Polish rule still had levels of nationalism-separatism averaging about 10%, due to migration from governates that *had* experienced Polish rule).

Indeed, Polish rule appears an even more impressive predictor when one considers that it began in some areas as many as 570 years before the 1917 election, and eve-

rywhere ended at least 122 years before it, and that substantial migration would have occurred between areas with more, less, and no Polish rule over the course of more than five centuries. This would obscure the effects of Polish rule, as my analysis is at the level of the governate and thus essentially assumes zero migration between different governates: such migration would essentially convey the effects of more Polish rule into governates that had less of it, and the effects of less Polish rule into those that had more of it, in a manner undetectable by my study.



Figure 11. Figure 4 (governates with significant Belarusian-/Ukrainian-speaking populations, by duration of past Polish rule (x-axis) and level of Belarusian/Ukrainian nationalism-separatism in 1917 (y-axis)) with artificial line of best fit indicated
Source: Made by the author

The way in which I measure partial control is another factor that likely reduces the Polish rule models' predictive power. I measure partial control on a strictly geographic basis – e.g. when half of a governate is controlled, the duration of that control is weighted at 50% – when weighting really ought to be based on the fraction of the governate's *population* (rather than land) that is controlled. However, a lack of good demographic data probably makes that not only labor-intensive, but outright impossible.

Also, my approach does not account for the qualitative intensity of Polish rule. Some areas were surely subjected to more intensive assimilation and colonization than others were, but I simply note whether an area was ruled by Poland or not. Again, though, the ideal approach here would be not only labor-intensive (requiring an extraordinarily detailed investigation of Polish rule throughout its Ukrainian territories), but probably impossible, in part simply because actually quantifying the intensity of rule would be inevitably subjective in many respects.

Finally, our data on the 1917 elections are not perfect, and random distortions of them to some degree likely obscure whatever relationships exist between the results and the factors producing them, including the one that is of interest to us.

The resolution of these issues is probably impossible but, if it were somehow accomplished, it would likely raise the predictive power of the Polish rule models still further.

Modern-day performance of the theory

The 1917 election is a quite good test of my Polonization theory: it precedes most of the calamities that Ukraine and Belarus suffered, and the socio-economic modernization that they underwent, in the 20th century, as well as the extensive intra-Ukrainian and intra-Belarusian migration that took place during the Soviet period and continues to this day. This is not to argue that no such migration occurred prior to 1917; over the course of many centuries, much migration certainly did occur. However, it did *not* have the intensity that it would acquire in the 20th century, as a result of invasions, revolutions, famines, deportations, collectivization, urbanization, and socioeconomic and technological development. For these same reasons, modern-day elections cannot be expected to reflect the effects of Polonization as clearly as the 1917 one did. The effects of Polonization upon a particular region will have been diffused into others, via the emigration of its residents, and their transmission of Polonization's effects (1) to their descendants and (2) more generally to the communities to which they migrated.

Furthermore, assimilation and migration have greatly reduced the share of ethnic Ukrainians in the territories that once formed the Don Cossack, Kuban, Kursk, Stavropol, and Voronezh Governates of the Russian Empire, and now comprise part or all of the Belgorod, Rostov, Kursk, Volgograd, and Voronezh Oblasts of the Russian Federation[22]. Additionally, the near-absence of political competition within Belarus on the subject of relations with Russia means that Belarusians' understanding of Russia, and attitude towards it, cannot be easily derived from their elections. This leaves only elections *within modern Ukraine* as a viable gauge of how Russia features within national identity, and thereby as a means of testing how Polish rule and Polonization relate to variation within that identity.

However, such tests would omit (for reasons that are, from the perspective of the study, arbitrary) many of the observations that in 1917 provided the strongest support for the Polonization theory. Indeed, it was the near absence of nationalism-separatism within Belarus that inspired me to develop the Polonization theory in the first place.

[22] While the Don Cossack, Kuban, Kursk, Stavropol, and Voronezh Governates were 28%, 47%, 22%, 37%, and 36% Ukrainian in 1897, only 3%, 2%, 1%, 1%, and 2% of Belgorod, Rostov, Kursk, Volgograd, and Voronezh Oblasts identified their nationality as Ukrainian in the 2010 Russian census. See: Национальный состав населения по субъектам Российской Федерации. Федеральная служба государственной статистики России. URL: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/per-itog/tab7.xls (accessed 24.02.2021)

And when the 1917 election regression's sample is restricted to the governates comprising modern-day Ukraine, its fit indeed worsens, with r^2 declining from .78 to .67 for the absolute-Polish-rule model, and from .79 to .66 for the Polish-rule-relative-to-Rusian-settlement model.



Figure 12. (Former) oblasts of Ukraine, by percent of population claiming Ukrainian ethnicity (x-axis) and percent of population claiming Ukrainian as native language (y-axis), according to the 2001 (most recent) Ukrainian census
Source: Made by the author

Nevertheless, despite these problems, I do regress the results of certain modern Ukrainian elections over measures of Polish rule, to see how well it continues to predict national identity and policy with regard to Russia. Note, however, that a low correlation would not disprove or even really contradict the Polonization theory. It *could* mean that the effects of Polonization existed but have been overwhelmed by the passage of time, by socioeconomic modernization, by Soviet policies of nation-building, by the formation of Ukraine as an independent state, etc. But, alternatively, it could also mean simply that the effects are enduring but have become disassociated from ter-

ritory by intra-Ukrainian migration, or even by intra-Ukrainian communication that diffuses variants of national identity without their bearers having to physically carry them anywhere.

With these caveats out of the way, we can proceed to a discussion of the modern-day tests. I chose the second rounds of Ukraine's 1994, 2004, and 2010 presidential elections, because these features clear, mutually exclusive choices between candidates who are differentiated principally by their positions on an "east-west", Russia-Atlantic axis (note that the **re-run** of the 2004 election's second round is used). Other presidential races were either defined more by economic (1999) or economic-corruption-populist (2019) issues or did not make it into a second round at all (1991, 2014). Parliamentary elections, on the other hand, are never entirely defined by the east-west axis, with some parties focusing more on other issues and/or taking a more neutral position.

Also, while the dependent variable in the 1917 tests was support for nationalism-separatism relative to proportion of the population with Ukrainian/Belarusian as its native language, the modern-day tests' dependent variable is support for the pro-Atlantic/anti-Russian candidate relative to proportion of the population that reports Ukrainian *ethnicity*. There are two reasons for this. First, native language was the only option available for the 1917 test, since the 1897 Imperial Russian census did not report ethnicity. Second, while native language is available in the modern day, it is not appropriate for use in this study, because many of the ethnic Ukrainians ideologically and culturally closest to Russia continue to report their ethnicity as Ukrainian but give (Great) Russian as their native language, as can be seen in the following scatterplot (Figure 12).

While there is a 1:1 correlation between Ukrainian ethnicity and native language in Ukraine's west and center, the relationship begins to break down in the southeast, and a large fraction or even outright majority of the ethnically-Ukrainian population identifies (Great) Russian as its native language in the (former) parts of Ukraine that are generally understood to be the most Russophile: Lugansk, Donetsk, and Crimea. Defining Ukrainian identity by native language rather than by given ethnicity, and qualifying electoral behavior by it, would therefore exaggerate ethnic Ukrainians' support for anti-Russian candidates, *especially* in areas that are more pro-Russian. It would essentially amount to including attitude towards Russia in both the independent and dependent variables of the regression. Thus, I use ethnicity as reported in the 2001 Ukrainian census (the one most recently conducted), even though I used native language in the 1917 election's analysis.

The timeline (Table 7-8) contains the history of political control over the various oblasts that comprise(d) modern-day Ukraine.

Table 7. Historical control of Ukraine's (former) oblasts

	column 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Zakarpattya	by 1000: Hungary												1918: Czechoslovakia	1944: USSR
L'viv	by 1000: Rus	1340: northern 1/3 Lithuania; 1340-1349: southern 2/3 Poland	1377: northern 1/6 Lithuania, southern 5/6 Poland		late 1400s: Poland						1772: Austria		1921: Poland	1944: USSR
Volyn	by 1000: Rus	1340: Lithuania			late 1400s: western 1/4 Poland, eastern 3/4 Lithuania		1569: Poland				1795: Russia		1921: Poland	1944: USSR
Ivano-Frankivsk	by 1000: Rus	1349: Poland									1772: Austria		1921: Poland	1944: USSR
Ternopil'	by 1000: Rus	1349: northern 1/5 Lithuania, southern 4/5 Poland			late 1400s: northern 1/3 Lithuania, southern 2/3 Poland		1569: Poland				1772: southern 7/8 Austria, northern 1/8 Poland; 1793: northern 1/8 Russia		1921: Poland	1944: USSR
Rivne	by 1000: Rus	1336-1340: Lithuania					1569: northern 1/5 Lithuania, southern 4/5 Poland				1793-1795: Russia		1921: Poland	1944: USSR
Chernivtsi	by 1000: Rus	1349: western 1/3 Poland, middle 1/3 Moldavia, eastern 1/3 Rus	1359: western 1/3 Poland, eastern 2/3 Moldavia		late 1400s: Moldova						1775: western 1/2 Austria, eastern 1/2 Moldova	1812: western 1/2 Austria, eastern 1/2 Russia	1918: Romania	1944: USSR
Khmel'nyts'kyy	by 1000: Rus	1340: northern 1/2 Lithuania, southern 1/2 Rus	1366: northern 3/5 Lithuania, southern 2/5 Poland				1569: Poland				1793: Russia		1921: USSR	
Zhytomyr	by 1000: Rus		1362: Lithuania				1569: Poland				1793: Russia		1921: USSR	
Vinnytsya	by 1000: northern third Rus		1363: western 1/10 Poland, eastern 9/10 Lithuania		late 1400s: western 1/8 Poland, eastern 7/8 Lithuania		1569: Poland				1793: Russia		1921: USSR	
Kyiv	by 1000: Rus		1362: Lithuania				1569: Poland		1648: western 2/3 Poland, eastern 1/3 independent then Russia in 1667		1793: Russia		1921: USSR	
City of Kyiv	by 1000: Rus		1362: Lithuania				1569: Poland		1648: independent then Russia in 1667				1921: USSR	
Cherkasy	by 1000: northern half Rus		1363: Lithuania				1569: Poland		1648: western 3/4 Poland, eastern 1/4 independent then Russia in 1667		1793: Russia		1921: USSR	
Chernihiv	by 1000: Rus		1356-1362: Lithuania			1503: northern 1/2 Russia, southern 1/2 Lithuania	1569: northern 1/2 Russia, southern 1/2 Poland	1618: Poland	1648: independent then Russia in 1667				1921: USSR	

Source: Made by the author according to existing data: Compiled by the author according to existing data: Николаев В. 2003. Атлас всемирной истории. URL: http://historyatlas.narod.ru (accessed 24.02.2021); Ganse A. World History at Korean Minjok Leadership Academy Historical Atlas. URL: https://www.zum.de/whkmla/ (accessed 24.02.2021); (Gilbert 2007; Freeman, Bury 1903).

Table 8. Historical control of Ukraine's (former) oblasts, continued

Source: Made by the author according to existing data: Compiled by the author according to existing data: Николаев В. 2003. Атлас всемирной истории. URL: http://historyatlas.narod.ru (accessed 24.02.2021); Ganse A. World History at Korean Minjok Leadership Academy Historical Atlas. URL: https://www.zum.de/whkmla/ (accessed 24.02.2021); (Gilbert 2007; Freeman, Bury 1903).

Table 9. Historical control of Ukraine's oblasts and their modern support for pro-western/anti-Russian candidates

	dates under heavy Rus settlement from 1000	weighted years under heavy Rus settlement	dates under Poland	weighted years under Poland	as % of weighted Rus-settled years	% Ukrainian nationality	% for Kravchuk in 1994 2nd round	% Kravchuk / % Ukrainian nationality	% for Yushhenko in 2004 3rd round	% Yushhenko / % Ukrainian nationality	% for Timoshenko in 2010 second round	% Timoshenko / % Ukrainian nationality	average % anti-Russian support	average % anti-Russian support / % Ukrainian ethnicity
Zakarpattya	1000-1991	991	-	0	0	81	71	88	67	84	52	64	63	79
L'viv	1000-1991	991	1475-1772, 1921-1939	315	32	95	94	99	94	99	86	91	91	96
Volyn	1000-1991	991	1475-1569 (.25), 1569-1795, 1921-1939	268	27	97	84	87	91	94	82	84	85	88
Ivano-Frankivsk	1000-1991	991	1349-1772, 1921-1939	441	45	98	94	97	96	98	89	91	93	95
Ternopil'	1000-1991	991	1349-1475 (.8), 1475-1569 (.67), 1569-1772, 1772-1793 (.13), 1921-1939	388	39	98	95	97	96	98	88	90	93	95
Rivne	1000-1991	991	1569-1794 (.8), 1921-1939	198	20	96	87	91	85	88	76	79	83	86
Chernivtsi	1000-1991	991	1349-1475 (.33)	42	4	75	62	82	80	106	66	89	69	92
Khmel'nyts'kyy	1000-1991	991	1366-1569 (.4), 1569-1793	305	31	94	57	61	80	86	70	74	69	74
Zhytomyr	1000-1991	991	1569-1793	224	23	90	56	62	67	74	58	64	60	66
Vinnytsya	1000-1991	991	1363-1475 (.1), 1475-1569 (.13), 1569-1793	247	25	95	54	57	84	89	71	75	70	74
Kyiv	1000-1991	991	1569-1648, 1648-1793 (.67)	176	18	93	58	63	83	89	70	75	70	76
City of Kyiv	1000-1991	991	1569-1648	79	8	82	59	72	78	95	65	79	68	82
Cherkasy	1000-1991	991	1569-1648, 1648-1793 (.75)	188	19	93	51	55	79	85	65	70	65	70
Chernihiv	1000-1991	991	1569-1648 (.5), 1618-1648	70	7	94	25	27	71	76	64	68	53	57
Poltava	1000-1991	991	1569-1648	79	8	91	37	41	66	72	54	59	53	57
Sumy	1000-1991	991	1618-1648 (.75)	23	2	89	29	33	79	89	63	71	57	64
Kirovohrad	1362-1425 (.17), 1425-1991	577	1569-1648, 1648-1793 (.33)	127	22	90	46	51	63	70	55	61	55	61
Odessa	1774-1812 (.5), 1812-1991	198	-	0	0	63	29	47	27	44	20	31	25	40
Nikolayev	1425-1783 (.25), 1783-1991	298	1569-1648 (.25)	20	7	82	45	55	28	34	23	28	32	39
Kherson	1425-1783 (.17), 1783-1991	269	1569-1648 (.17)	13	5	82	32	39	43	53	34	41	36	44
Crimea	1783-1991	208	-	0	0	37	9	24	15	42	17	47	14	37
Sevastopol'	1783-1991	208	-	0	0	24	7	28	8	34	10	44	8	35
Dnepro	1425-1569 (.25), 1569-1991	458	1569-1648	79	17	79	30	37	32	40	29	37	30	38
Zaporozh'ye	1569-1783 (.25), 1783-1991	262	1569-1648 (.25)	20	8	71	27	38	25	35	22	31	25	35
Kharkov	1425-1503 (.17), 1503-1550 (.33), 1550-1991	470	1550-1648 (.33)	32	7	71	26	37	26	37	22	32	25	35
Donetsk	1625-1774 (.33), 1774-1991	266	-	0	0	57	18	32	4	7	6	11	10	17
Lugansk	1575-1625 (.5), 1625-1991	391	-	0	0	58	10	17	6	11	8	13	8	14
						* include 12.6% and 1.2% Tatars, who are considered to be potential supporters of pro-Atlantic/anti-Russian platforms along with ethnic Ukrainians themselves									

Source: made by the author according to: Всеукраинская перепись населения 2001 "Национальный состав населения, гражданство". Государственный комитет статистики Украины. URL: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/nationality_population/nationality_popul1/ (accessed 24.02.2021); Kireev A. Украина. Президентские выборы 1994. Electoral Geography. URL" https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/ru/countries/u/ukraine/ukraine-presidential-election-1994.html (accessed 24.02.2021); Центральна виборча комісія України, results of the repeated second round of 2004 presidential election, % of voters supporting Yushchenko. URL: https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011 (accessed 24.02.2021); Центральна виборча комісія України, results of the second-round of 2010 presidential election, % of voters supporting Timoshenko, URL: https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP0011.html (accessed 24.02.2021)

Based on this information, we can draw up the following table (Table 9), similar to the one describing Imperial Russian governates, which contains the length of time that each oblast was settled by Rusians and ruled by Poland, the share of ethnic Ukrainians in each oblast's population, and the degree of support (in absolute terms, and relative to the ethnically-Ukrainian population) that each oblast provided to the pro-Atlantic/anti-Russian candidates Kravchuk, Yushchenko, and Timoshenko in the second rounds of the 1994, 2004, and 2010 elections, and the average of those three levels of support.

Based on the above data, the following scatterplots (Figures 13-16) depict the relationship of Polish rule (measured in absolute terms) to support for each of the three pro-Atlantic/anti-Russian candidates, and to average support for all three. The cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol' – which are/were administratively distinct from Kyiv Oblast and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea – are omitted, because the majorities of their populations are drawn from residents of other regions or the descendants thereof, and the geography-based approach that I use could therefore not be expected to predict their electoral behavior: most of their residents will have received a "treatment" that is different from that of the cities' actual territories.



Figure 13. (Former) Ukrainian oblasts, by duration of Polish rule (x-axis) and level of support for Kravchuk in the second round of the 1994 elections relative to the ethnically-Ukrainian portion of the population (y-axis)

Source: Made by the author



Figure 14. (Former) Ukrainian oblasts, by duration of Polish rule (x-axis) and level of support for Yushchenko in the 'third' round of the 2004 elections relative to the ethnically-Ukrainian portion of the population (y-axis)

Source: Made by the author



Figure 15. (Former) Ukrainian oblasts, by duration of Polish rule (x-axis) and level of support for Timoshenko in the second round of the 2010 elections relative to the ethnically-Ukrainian portion of the population (y-axis)

Source: Made by the author



Figure 16. (Former) Ukrainian oblasts, by duration of Polish rule (x-axis) and average level of support for the three nationalist candidates (Kravchuk, Yushchenko, and Timoshenko) relative to the ethnically-Ukrainian portion of the population (y-axis)
Source: Made by the author

In the above plots, the effect of Polish rule largely appears to hold. The only real outliers are Zakarpattya, Chernivtsi, and (in 2004 and 2010) Sumy. While the Polonization theory cannot account for this, I would offer some tentative explanations for the behavior of Zakarpattya and Chernivtsi that are also not contradictory to it (I have no justification for the case of Sumy; unless it was subject to an inordinately large amount of migration from areas of historical Polish rule, it appears to be an outlier whose behavior is incompatible with the Polonization theory).

First, Zakarpattya and Chernivtsi are unique in Ukraine for having large populations that are neither Ukrainian nor (Great) Russian: 20% of Chernivtsi's population identified itself as Moldovan or Romanian in the 2001 census, and 15% of Zakarpattya's identified itself as Romanian or Hungarian[23]. Insofar as these Romanians, Moldovans, and Hungarians vote for pro-Atlantic/anti-Russian parties, this will raise the measured support of Chernivtsi and Zakarpattya for those forces, and the model will erroneously interpret this as indication of *Ukrainians*' support for them, and thus of their possession of a particularist national identity – even though it is Romanian/Moldovan/Hungarian national identity, and/or other factors that are entirely irrelevant to the Polonization theory, that is actually producing the results. All that said, this expla-

[23] Всеукраинская перепись населения 2001. Национальный состав населения, гражданство. *Государственный комитет статистики Украины.* URL: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/nationality_population/nationality_popul1/ (accessed 24.02.2021)

nation cannot entirely account for the divergence of Chernivtsi and Zakarpattya: even if the entirety of their Romanian, Moldovan, and Hungarian populations voted for anti-Russian candidates, this would account for only 20% and 15% of the oblasts' support for those candidates (assuming that the minorities had the same rates of participation as the rest of the population). Removing that support would reduce the oblasts' average support for anti-Russian candidates (relative to ethnic Ukrainians) to 72% and 64%, respectively, eliminating about half of their divergences from the trend line.

A second explanation, though, points to the fact that Chernivtsi and Zakarpattya are unique in a second respect: they are the only oblasts whose Rusian population was ruled by non-Rusian, non-Russian, non-Lithuanian, non-Polish states for a long period of time. As depicted in the above timeline, Zakarpattya was ruled by Hungary (sometimes under the Habsburgs) for more than 900 years, and much or all of Chernivtsi was ruled by Moldova (sometimes under the Ottomans), and the Habsburgs for almost 600 years. Now, the Polonization theory is built on a distinction between the effects of Polish rule and those of local, Lithuanian, and Russian rule. It does not actually assume or require that Polonization and its effects are an entirely unique phenomenon. If Hungarian, Moldovan, or even just Habsburg rule share more similarities with Polish rule than they do with local, Russian, or Lithuanian rule, then this would entirely account – in a manner that is besides the point of Polonization theory but fully compatible with it – for the large pro-Atlantic/anti-Russian vote that we observe in Chernivtsi and Zakarpattya despite the lack of Polish rule there.

On the basis of the above, I offer two sets of regressions, one that omits the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol', and one that omits them as well as Chernivtsi and Zakarpattya. I believe that the latter set provides a better test of the Polonization theory – mainly because, as stated above, the theory simply does not deal with the effects of Hungarian, Moldovan, Ottoman, or Habsburg rule (after all, areas subject to such rule did not participate in the 1917 elections). The theory's predictions of the behavior of Chernivtsi and Zakarpattya are thus indeterminate, and the strength or weakness of their behavior's relationship with Polish rule would neither support nor undermine the theory's validity.

These regressions also make use of tapered IV values. As in the 1917 regressions, I taper absolute and proportional rule beyond the point at which it begins consistently producing DV values that are about as high as they can go. In these cases, that point is L'viv. Absolute Polish rule in excess of 315 years, and relative Polish rule in excess of 31.8% of Rus-settled years, is thus square-rooted, a procedure that affects Ternopil' and Ivano-Frankivsk, both of which would otherwise fall far below their predicted levels of anti-Russian voting, despite displaying levels of it (95%) that could – practically or theoretically – hardly be any higher.

The results of the regressions are presented in Table 10.

Table 10. Linear regressions of modern-day support for Ukrainian nationalist presidential candidates over duration of historical Polish rule, amongst Ukrainian oblasts

		w/o the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol' (*n* =25)						also w/o Chernivtsi & Zakarpattya (*n* =23)					
DV	type of Polish rule as IV	cons.	coef.	95% CIs		IV p-value	r^2	cons.	coef.	95% CIs		IV p-value	r^2
Kravchuk	absolute	39.26	0.13	0.08	0.19	.000	.51	30.88	0.18	0.13	0.22	.000	.75
	proportional	37.71	1.30	0.69	1.90	.000	.46	27.41	1.81	1.29	2.32	.000	.72
Yushhenko	absolute	47.91	0.16	0.09	0.24	.000	.47	40.33	0.19	0.13	0.25	.000	.66
	proportional	46.98	1.53	0.69	2.37	.001	.38	37.57	1.90	1.18	2.62	.000	.59
Timoshenko	absolute	40.17	0.15	0.10	0.21	.000	.57	34.50	0.18	0.13	0.22	.000	.73
	proportional	39.13	1.45	0.78	2.12	.000	.47	32.02	1.73	1.15	2.31	.000	.65
average	absolute	42.23	0.15	0.10	0.21	.000	.57	35.23	0.18	0.14	0.22	.000	.81
	proportional	41.08	1.46	0.80	2.13	.000	.48	32.33	1.81	1.31	2.31	.000	.73

Source: Made by the author

These results confirm that, depending on whether Chernivtsi and Zakarpattya are omitted, Polish rule predicts modern-day Ukrainian electoral behavior either moderately worse, or moderately better, than it does electoral behavior in 1917 (recall that the 1917 models, when limited to the governates that today comprise modern Ukraine, have r^2 values of .67 (absolute rule) and .66 (proportional rule).

The regressions also raise two other points of interest.

First, while absolute and proportional-to-Rus-settlement Polish rule performed equally well in the 1917 regressions, absolute Polish rule consistently performs substantially better in the modern-day regressions.

Second, while the Polish-rule-based 1917 regressions had constants (that is, y-intercepts) of 11 and 12, their modern-day counterparts have constants of 38 to 50. Moreover, while 1917 models still retained fairly high r^2 values even when their constants were fixed at zero, their modern-day successors perform extremely badly when this is done – so badly that I do not even present those models in the above table. (For instance, while the average-vote-over-proportional-Polish-rule model has an r^2 value of .73, as listed above, this falls to .06 when its constant is fixed to zero.) This could be regarded as problematic for the Polonization theory: even if anti-Russian vote increases in close proportion with duration of Polish rule, why would it start out so high in the first place? However, I believe that this is not actually much of a problem. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, one of the main issues with running modern-day tests is that a huge amount of migration occurred in the 20th century between areas with more and less Polish rule. This intermixing could have produced a relatively high average anti-Russian vote even in areas that entirely lack a history of Polish rule – for instance, the 42% y-intercept of the average-anti-Russian-vote-over-absolute-Polish-rule model – just as a lesser amount of it could have produced the 12% y-intercept of the 1917 nationalist-separatist-vote-over-absolute-Polish-rule model.

Conclusion

Belarusians, southeastern Ukrainians, and western-central Ukrainians have consistently supported very different policies with regard to Russia for over a century now, at least. The differences are not explicable by common materialist explanation of international affairs, but they also predate the areas' treatment by the factors that are most commonly held to produce nationalism. Instead, they appear to be the products of different national identities that formed before the modern period – specifically, between 1350 and 1800. Areas of Ukraine that were ruled by Poland for longer were subjected to greater Polonization, which failed to endow their residents with Polish identities, but did Polonize and westernize those residents' Ukrainian identities. This, in turn, led to the perception of non-westernized Rusian nations as totally foreign, and thus drove and drives a preference for separation from Russia (and alignment with western Europe). In contrast, Belarus and those areas of Ukraine that were briefly or not at all ruled by Poland were subject to far less Polonization, and their non-westernized national identities continued to view other non-westernized Rusian nations (specifically Russia) as kindred peoples, promoting a preference for alignment with Russia. This argument is borne out by statistical tests, which find relatively strong relationships between duration of Polish rule over Ukrainian and Belarusian areas, on the one hand, and their support (in 1917 and the modern day) for separating and distancing their countries from Russia, on the other.

If correct, this theory solves several puzzles: why the east-west faultline in Ukraine exists, and lies where it does, and why Belarusian foreign and cultural policies have been so different from Ukraine's since the USSR collapse. It also greatly complicates our understanding of nationalism, focusing not on the degree to which it exists, but on its actual content, and placing the formation of national identities far earlier than most conventional theories of nationalism would. Indeed, this theory is based on the *longue durée* (in the broadest sense of the term), and it forces the analyst to look far back into history to trace the processes that produced national identities that are clearly identifiable only recently, but may have existed much earlier.

Actually, I have only done this to a very limited extent in this paper – more work on the links between Polish rule and Polonization, and between Polonization and the adoption of a westernized national identity, is necessary. In addition, the theory set forth in this article would benefit from work examining the diffusion of the westernized version of Ukrainian identity from the west and center of the country into its south and east – both via the physical movement of Ukrainians (as mentioned a few paragraphs above) and via the spread of this identity throughout the Ukrainian body politic (probably with the assistance of both Soviet korenizatsiya and, later, the independent Ukrainian government).

But the argument and evidence presented in these pages are, I hope, at least a good foundation.

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Роль полонизации в формировании национальной идентичности Украины и Беларуси

Дилан Пэйн Ройс
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После обретения независимости Украина и Беларусь стали проводить противоположные политические курсы в отношении России. В значительной степени это было обусловлено не материальными стимулами (так как они схожи), а расходящимся представлениями о национальном самосознании среди украинских и белорусских народов и элит, что привело к утверждению различных убеждений относительно того, как эти нации связаны с Россией, и каким образом они должны выстраивать с ней свои отношения.

Данные различия начали формироваться в XVI-XVII вв., когда южные земли Великого княжества Литовского (являющиеся территорией современной западно-центральной Украины) были переданы Королевству Польскому, а затем были завоеваны Россией, в то время как Беларусь оставалась в пределах Великого Княжества Литовского вплоть до присоединения литовских владений к России. Продолжительность польского господства значительно отличается для разных украинских и белорусских территорий, так же как и его характер: от полного господства на одних (западно- и центрально-украинских) до фактического отсутствия контроля на других (белорусских) территориях. Учитывая, что общерусской культуре в начальный период в Великом Княжестве Литовском был определён особый важный статус, и, что полонизация, естественно, происходила в Королевстве Польском более интенсивно, чем в Великом Княжестве, следует, что чем дольше территория находилась под польской властью, тем сильнее она подвергалась полонизации; чем сильнее она подвергалась полонизации, тем сильнее там развивалось западно-европейское самосознание; чем интенсивнее западноевропейское самосознание сливалось с украинским и белорусским национальными идентичностями,

тем больше они становились отчуждёнными от невестернизированных руських наций и национальных идентичностей, в первую очередь от великорусской/российской; чем значительнее отчуждено от России национальное самосознание, тем активнее его носители стремятся отдалиться от неё.
В данной статье доказывается, что чем дольше регион находился под властью Польши, тем сильнее его население впоследствии стремилось и стремится к отдалению от России. Украинские территории, особенно на западе и в центре страны, длительное время находились под польским владычеством и, соответственно, отличаются антироссийскими настроениями, которые царили уже столетие назад. С другой стороны, Беларусь, территорией которой Польша никогда не владела, а лишь контролировала опосредованно через Великое Княжество Литовское, и в настоящее время продолжает политику сближения и дружественных отношений с Россией.

Ключевые слова: полонизация, Украина, Беларусь, национальная идентичность, Россия, Польша, СССР, Великое Княжество Литовское, Королевство Польское, национализм

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