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ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ СТАТЬИ

Russian Science Diplomacy at a Crossroads: Positive and Normative Analysis

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Abstract: Nowadays, science diplomacy tends to be one of the most relevant and essential fields of applied research in International Relations. In general, it is a functional expression of both foreign and science policy conducted by states and non-state actors in the world arena. The emergence of the modern concept of science diplomacy has been taking place since the second half of the 2000s linking research and diplomatic practices. Still, most of the existing literature can be described as somewhat fragmentary and focusing on specific case studies without providing a holistic picture of national science diplomacy models, including the Russian one. The article casts light upon the critical features of the Russian science diplomacy complex based on a systematic approach. It looks into its three main elements, i.e., "science in diplomacy," "diplomacy for science," and "science for diplomacy." In this context, the article analyses the activity of the Russian science diplomacy main stakeholders in positive and normative terms. The synthesis of the respective results reveals structural drawbacks of the system in question, which in 2020 have become even more acute than they used to be before. The outlined trends and tendencies infer that the ongoing pandemic did hardly bring on new problems but speeded up processes, which have already around this field. Working from these premises, the author formulates several policy recommendations to optimize current practices, which decision-makers can use in science diplomacy and foreign affairs.

Key words: science diplomacy, Russian foreign policy, science policy, science attaché, scientific diaspora, Rossotrudnichestvo, Pugwash movement

At present, science diplomacy becomes one of the main areas of international cooperation. Most experts agree that this phenomenon is typical for the modern system of international relations that has emerged in the 20th century and is characterized, firstly, by the entry into the world arena of new, mainly non-state actors, and secondly, by the close intertwining of research and diplomatic practices (Lord, Turekian 2007; Fedoroff 2009). Thus, in the subject field of science diplomacy,

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which is consecutively taking shape, it has become common practice to distinguish three main subareas:

– elaboration of recommendations within the framework of international policy goals by scientists and scholars (**"science in diplomacy"**);

– facilitation of international scientific cooperation by diplomats (**"diplomacy for science"**).

– establishing and strengthening scientific alliances by scientists, scholars, and diplomats in order to improve bilateral and multilateral relations between countries (**"science for diplomacy"**) (New frontiers in science diplomacy 2010: 4).

Closely related to each other and depending on the general cultural context (Romanova 2015b), activities in the above subareas pursue the common goal of science diplomacy. The latter was traditionally perceived as promoting the state interests in the international arena by national actors (scientists, diplomats, and politicians). Currently, this sphere, both in terms of goal-setting and tools used to solve specific problems, seems to undergo qualitative transformation.

At the same time, Russian sociological and other humanitarian studies dedicated to these issues are few and somewhat sporadic. In one of the largest Russian repositories, the *Scientific Electronic Library,* the number of deposited materials in which the term "science diplomacy" appears accounts for less than 100 units[1]. Speaking about the "pioneers" of this research subfield, it is worth mentioning the works of a scholars group headed by A.V. Shestopal (Shestopal, Litvak 2016; Litvak 2020).

On the other hand, within the framework of Western studies, it is already customary to single out science diplomacy as an independent construct of science and foreign policy, subject to both theoretical and applied analysis (Ruffini 2017: 11-12). To provide a comparative reference, international databases, like *Scopus* and *Web of Science,* host more than 500 related materials published in recent (2015-2020) years[2].

However, works dealing with the Russian practices in science diplomacy, which are present in the domestic and foreign discourse, can be considered to a certain extent fragmentary. Most of them, while stipulating the existence of a specific model of Russian science diplomacy (Ruffini 2017: 70; Krasnyak 2020a), focus on limited cases and phenomena, such as bilateral cooperation with single countries (Lubrano 1981; Sher 2019) or specific projects (Krasnyak 2020b). In general, these materials' corps hardly provide a genuinely holistic perception of the Russian science diplomacy complex. They tend to lack a systematic approach that gives ground for a concise description and analysis of the issues. Therefore, modeling the Russian science diplomacy as a system of interrelated structural elements while now-casting (Bańbura et al. 2013) their transformations represents a relevant scientific task (Turekian 2012), which the author tries to handle in the present article.

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[1] eLibrary. URL: https://elibrary.ru/ (accessed 17.04.2021)

[2] Web of Science. URL: https://www.clarivate.ru/products/web-of-science/ (accessed 17.04.2021); Scopus. URL: https://www.scopus.com/home.uri (accessed 17.04.2021)

Given that this direction has become a full-fledged item of the international agenda relatively recently (starting from the second half of the 2000s), it is appropriate to say that some practices associated with it took place earlier (Haas 1992; Torkunov 2019). Historically, these might include, for instance, the interaction of Russian scientific and diplomatic professional communities in the 19th century – in particular, at the Imperial Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum in 1811-1843, as well as at the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages in 1827-1921 (Kuznetsov 2014). In USSR, the Diplomatic Academy (est. 1934), Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO, est. 1944), and Peoples' Friendship University (RUDN, est. 1960) became centers for science diplomacy *ante litteram* (Zonova 2014). Nevertheless, initially, the primary mission of these institutions was the professional training of personnel for the foreign service. At the same time, scientific work and international relations within it were at first somewhat limited.

Since the second half of the 1950s, research institutes with international and regional focus were established within the Department of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, i.e., the World Economy and International Relations Institute (est. 1956), Institutes of Africa (est. 1959), Latin America (est. 1961), The Far East (est. 1966), United States and Canada (est. 1967) and Europe (est. 1987). From the beginning of their functioning, the institutions aimed to strengthen and develop scientific and diplomatic relations with the countries of the respective regions. In 2010, at the initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov and Academician E.M. Primakov, these institutes, which made up the Section of International Relations of the Department for Social Sciences, were merged into a new independent structural unit – the Department for Global Problems and International Relations (DGPIR) of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

Of course, other institutes of the Academy of Sciences, universities, and hubs of the research infrastructure, both in social and natural sciences, have also carried out international activities. However, these organizations explicitly specialized on the first ("science in diplomacy") and third ("science for diplomacy") vectors of science diplomacy. This group also includes non-profit partnerships founded in the early 2010s, particularly the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund (est. 2010), the Russian International Affairs Council (est. 2011), and several others, helping stimulate international scientific and technological cooperation.

Main trends and recent tendencies

The main actors of Russian science involved in diplomacy make three functional groups:

– **"university"**, which is carried out by higher educational institutions, including both "bastions of scientific diplomacy" with established traditions (MGIMO, the Diplomatic Academy, RUDN) (Torkunov 2019), and those which have relatively recently entered the international scene;

– **"academic"** – research institutes and centers, both historically specializing in science diplomacy issues (DGPIR of RAS), and those for which international cooperation is not a core area of functioning;

– **"expert"** – non-profit partnerships and associations, "think tanks," and fora, for example, the Valdai Discussion Club (Flink, Schreiterer 2010).

From the point of view of the functioning mechanisms, "expert" science diplomacy by its nature appears to be more multilateral than "university" and "academic" science diplomacy. In this regard, the work of such multilateral platforms as the Global Research Council (GRS), its regional meetings (European – EuroHORC, Asian – AsiaHORC), the framework program of the European Union "Horizon 2020" (Wedlin, Nedeva 2015), the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) and others seems essential. Russia's participation in these organizations (perhaps, except JINR (Krynzhina et al. 2020)), despite some intensification in recent years (in particular, the Moscow GRS summit in 2018), is still quite limited. It is carried out primarily through the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), with a relatively low level of media coverage and awareness about the respective initiatives of the scientists' and diplomats' target audience. Still, it is worth noting that another leading domestic stakeholder, the Russian Science Foundation (RSF), is practically not involved in GRS and similar alliances. In contrast, many other entities (for example, the Skolkovo Innovation Center) also tend to remain somewhat aloof from them.

At the same time, the named science foundations are actively strengthening the existing scientific and diplomatic ties alongside establishing new ones. Each of them has specialized subdivisions (departments of international relations) responsible for this area of work. Since the second half of the 2010s, competitions implying the joint work of Russian scientists with foreign colleagues have been increasing in number, while the geography of such projects is steadily expanding.

A significant share of foreign scholars receiving grants from the RFBR, RSF are from the Russian diaspora. This fact makes working with the Russian-speaking diaspora a relevant vector of Russian "science for diplomacy." Despite a significant potential for interaction with Russian-speaking and "Russian-thinking" compatriots living abroad and working in the R&D sector, there are still many obstacles to its full unleashing (Dezhina et al. 2016).

There are general questions: who is a member of the Russian "scientific diaspora," should there be a priority for researchers within the framework of "academic" science diplomacy or rather the teaching staff within the framework of "university" science diplomacy. There are also technical questions like consular and visa issues. Russia supported all types of alliances – from global (GRS, JINR) and regional (EuroHORC, AsiaHORC, cooperation with the EU) ones to local and those determined by state and/or linguistic boundaries (work with the "Russian World scientific diaspora" in a specific country) (Davis, Patman 2015: 116).

As for the second vector of Russian science diplomacy ("diplomacy for science"), its institutional form lags behind the other two. The Federal Agency for the Common-

wealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), like its forerunners[3] has been traditionally giving priority to bringing forward cultural rather than scientific ties. Despite the name of most of its representations abroad – *Russian Centers for Science and Culture* (RCSC)[4] – in their practical work, culture is given the first place, science – at best, the second. In such scientifically and technologically advanced countries as China and Israel, science is absent on the signboard of Rossotrudnichestvo offices. In contrast, in some others (Great Britain, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Japan), its presence is limited to a representative in the respective embassy.

Besides, it is characteristic that among the heads and senior management staff of Rossotrudnichestvo and its predecessor bodies, there have been very few people for whom, despite a specific experience in this area, academic degrees and titles, research would be the central sphere of professional activity. Alongside prominent cultural figures, they were Communist party functionaries in the Soviet times and high-ranking officials in the post-Soviet period. Moreover, in the organizational structure of the body, science appears in the name of only one of the departments. At the same time, judging by the description of this unit, the better part of its work falls on educational and not actually research projects[5].

The same is true about the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). As of June 2020, according to the official website, international cooperation in the field of science and technology was supervised by the Department for New Challenges and Threats (DNCT), then as of October 2020, it does not figure in the description of any of the divisions' activities[6]. The issue of establishing special science attachés offices at representations of the MFA abroad (embassies and consulates) has been repeatedly raised at policy-making and expert levels. However, despite statements about the necessity of such innovations, this project has not yet been implemented regularly (Reinhardt, Mozebakh 2017).

After the death of the Academician E.M. Primakov in 2015, a founding father of modern Russian science diplomacy (Reinhardt 2020), the only member of the Council for Science and Education under the President of the Russian Federation directly related to institutional foreign policy is the rector of MGIMO, Academician

[3] All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS, 1925-1958), Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD, 1958-1994), Russian Center for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation under the Government of Russia (Roszarubezhtsentr, 1994-2002), Russian Center for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (2002-2008)

[4] As of October 2020, Rossotrudnichestvo encompasses 92 representations abroad, of which 58 RCSCs, 11 RCSC branches, 17 representatives within embassies, two deputy representatives within consulates general, two cultural centers, and two information and cultural centers: Contacts. *Rossotrudnichestvo.* URL: http://rs.gov.ru/en/contacts (accessed 17.04.2021)

[5] Activity. *Rossotrudnichestvo.* URL: http://rs.gov.ru/en/activities (accessed 17.04.2021)

[6] Compare Reinhardt R. Tweets vs. the Oficialese: How the Language of Russian Diplomacy Is Changing amid the Global Transition. *Valdai Paper.* №114. P.12. Valdai Discussion Club. 22.06.2020. URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers/tweets-vs-the-oficialese-how-the-language/ vs. Central Office. *MFA of Russia*. URL: https://www.mid.ru/en/about/structure/central_office (accessed 17.04.2021)

A.V. Torkunov. Of course, very few people have such authority in both the professional diplomatic community and the scientific and expert community, as well as a complex, unquestionable understanding of scientific and diplomatic problems. However, it appears indicative that representatives of the MFA and structures subordinate to it (Rossotrudnichestvo, the Diplomatic Academy) have never been among the members of the above Council and its precursors[7].

Thus, based on the combination of the factors described, it is now appropriate to speak of "diplomacy for science" as the institutionally weakest link in the Russian science diplomacy complex. Among the key trends and structural problems of "science in diplomacy" and "science for diplomacy," it would be relevant to stress the following:

– maintaining the positions of institutions and organizations that traditionally specialize in these subareas (MGIMO, the Diplomatic Academy, RUDN);

– gradual emergence of new participants in "university" and "expert" science diplomacy, to a lesser extent – in "academic" science diplomacy;

– insufficient work in these subareas, including the popularization of science in general (Romanova, 2015a) and the very concept of science diplomacy, in several leading organizations that have objective prerequisites for this (Moscow State University, Higher School of Economics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration and others);

– strong personification (the predominance of the scientist's personality factor over institutional factors);

– low involvement of Russian scientists in international projects: according to the results of empirical research based on surveys, no more than 50%;

– to a lesser extent, scientifically and other formalized indicators confirm the closed character of the scientific and expert circle with weak communication between its members at all levels (Reinhardt, Yurevich 2020).

The listed phenomena testify to structural difficulties of the institutional development of the Russian scientific community as an agent of international scientific and technological cooperation (ISTC) at the current stage. At the same time, a significant share of the scholar and expert contingent still has a rather vague idea about science diplomacy *per se,* as well as the meaning attributed to it by other ISTS participants – be it colleagues, administrators, or decision-makers in the field of science policy (Frickel, Moore 2006: 292).

At the official (legislative) level, the definition of science diplomacy was introduced only within the framework of the Concept of the ISTC of the Russian Federation, approved by the Government on February 8, 2019[8].

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[7] Council for Science and High Technology (2001-2004), Council for Science, Technology, and Education (2004-2012).

[8] Concept of the International Scientific and Technological Cooperation of the Russian Federation. URL: https://france.mid.ru/upload/iblock/7f8/7f8aadb5de45b3a58103046d70eabef2.pdf (accessed 17.04.2021). I deliberately restrain from its critical analysis and specify existing science diplomacy definitions, having already provided it and partially covered this issue in previous works (Reinhardt 2020).

The analysis of the preceding regulatory documents in the field of science policy[9], on the one hand, and foreign policy[10], on the other hand, allows distinguishing two stages of this term's conceptual evolution. The first stage (1996 – the mid-2000s) was characterized by the transition from the liberal paradigm of ISTC to the realistic one, a specific politicization, alongside putting national interests at the forefront. The second stage (the mid-2000s – late 2010s) inferred a reorientation to the economic dimension of ISTC with a precise formation of science diplomacy as a concept in its modern form (Reinhardt 2020).

The *annus horribilis* of 2020 can be considered a milestone in developing the Russian science diplomacy complex for at least two reasons. Firstly, in connection with the beginning of the ISTC Concept 2019 implementation. Secondly, due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which can be interpreted in terms of the so-called "big challenges" of the specified ISTC Concept[11].

Short-term transformations of science diplomacy

Changes in the forms and mechanisms of science diplomacy under the influence of the named "big challenge" began to be observed since the end of February 2020. One of the first "calls" was the news about the postponement of the 63rd Pugwash Conference of Scientists, scheduled for March 1-5, to spring 2021[12]. Within the framework of this event, it was planned to discuss regional conflicts and nuclear risks. The previous Pugwash conference was held in 2017, and given the current dynamics of the epidemiological situation, there is no guarantee that the next one can take place in 2021.

The Pugwash Movement of Scientists for Peace, Nuclear Disarmament, and International Security, launched in 1955, represents a classic case of "science for diplomacy" (Sher 2019: 10). The USSR joined this movement from the very beginning, creating a national Pugwash Committee in 1957 and awarding the Pugwash ideologue Cyrus Eaton the International Lenin Prize "For Strengthening Peace Among Nations" in 1960. During the Soviet period, Russian scientists took an active part in the work of this organization, while the USSR provided a platform for its annual conferences three times (in 1960, 1969, and 1988). However, since the 1990s, Russia's involvement has

[9] The doctrine of the Development of Russian Science (1996), Concept of Reforming Russian Science for the Period 1998-2000 (1998), Concept of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of ISTS (2000), Strategy for the Development of Science and Innovation in the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2015 (2006), Strategy for the Innovative Development of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2020 (2011), Strategy of Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation (2016)

[10] Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation of 1993, 2000, 2008, 2013 and 2016

[11] "Objectively requiring a response from the state, a set of problems, threats, and opportunities, the complexity, and scale of which are such that they cannot be resolved, eliminated or implemented solely by increasing resources" – ISTC Concept 2019 / Op. cit., p. 19.

[12] Pugwash document on the NPT Review Conference Postponement and Risks after the Pandemic. *Pugwash*. 06.05.2020. URL: https://pugwash.org/2020/05/06/pugwash-statement-on-the-npt-review-conference-postponement-and-risks-after-the-pandemic/ (accessed 17.04.2021)

been somewhat decreasing. The country no longer hosted the meetings of nuclear scientists – even though in 1995, the Pugwash movement and one of its founders, Joseph Rotblat, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

The latest transformations of "science for diplomacy" show the following. Firstly, the past few years could be characterized by a decline in the Pugwash movement's activity, mainly due to the absence of conferences previously held annually. Secondly, the pandemic did not entail its adaptation to new conditions: the transition to an online format. While most universities and even schools, not to mention research centers, continued to work in the digital space during the period of quarantines and self-isolation, leading nuclear physicists (!) opted for a wait-and-see attitude.

Such behavior may indirectly indicate that the problem hardly boils down to the "big challenge" of the pandemic, but rather to a certain rigidity of the actor itself. Extrapolating these tendencies and analysis on other issues (Russian and foreign agents of "university", "academic" and "expert" science diplomacy, as well as their associations), shows that this "big challenge" *per se* did not bring on new problems, but acts as a catalyst for the processes already observed therein earlier.

Furthermore, here, in contrast to the controversial topic of general measures, "prophylaxis" and "therapy" seem obvious. First and foremost, **digitalization** implying a further development of online and hybrid forms of interaction between members of the research and expert communities. Those of them who even before had a penchant for this kind of innovation has already gained a significant and even capitalized competitive advantage. Others, with less adaptive capacity, need support from science policy-makers as well as colleagues in the broader sense. Hence, the main priorities of science diplomacy soon appear to be changing the forms of work organization and interaction with partners and providing assistance in this process to these partners, including foreign ones.

This immediately leads to another essential item of the current agenda – **international information security** (Zinovieva 2018). At the lowest level, many scientists and scholars participating in online conferences have already faced such a commonplace phenomenon as joining uninvited guests. Of course, this is only the tip of the iceberg. The more complex and significant the processes within the framework of science diplomacy interaction are, the more attention and resources are required to ensure the proper level of their securitization. While previously this topic used to be one of the theoretical and practice-oriented research, it directly affects their conduct. In economic terms, this essentially becomes an expenditure item for R&D. The most straightforward way to reduce it in the fundamental dimension can be considered the task of "science in diplomacy"; in the applied dimension – the mission of "science for diplomacy" and partially "diplomacy for science."

Finally, the third direction of restructuring science diplomacy at the present stage involves a gradual **shift from its geopolitical perception** as an instrument of influence and defense of national interests. As practice shows – especially during the pandemic – unilateral decisions in critical situations have limited effectiveness. In the

current unprecedented conditions, not *competition* presupposing confrontation (even with recourse to "soft power" or "smart power" tools), but *cooperation* between states in the face of an acute global problem seems to be critical. By and large, the development and systemic introduction of vaccines are unthinkable without "scientific diplomats." In this context, the current prospects of Russian vaccines penetrating the European market despite the well-known geopolitical tensions might be deemed the first signs giving ground for a moderate degree of optimism. Not to put too fine a point on it, finding a *modus vivendi* option to speak at least the same healthcare language for those who seem unable to come to terms on the overall security level might directly bring the pandemic crisis closer to its termination.

Such a junctural, possibly temporary, but an objective change of paradigms had already been indicated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov in April 2020.[13] Paradoxically as it may sound, this implies a complete revision of the fundamental principles of the ISTC Concept 2019 in the "Pugwash spirit" of the late 1950s (Sher 2019: 11). To be more precise, the ultimate goal of "vaccine diplomacy," even if utopic at first glance, consists in overcoming the remaining lack of confidence in areas not directly linked to world politics and, especially, the logic of "vaccine races." In other words, depoliticizing and internationalizing the already existing anti-COVID drugs and tools appears to be just as important as developing new ones.

It seems helpful to formulate several recommendations for policymakers in science and its diplomatic support. Such recommendations can only be efficient when transgressing the whole science diplomacy matrix ("science in diplomacy," "diplomacy for science" and "science for diplomacy"; "university," "academic," and "expert").

The most challenging block from the perspective of a potential reform tends to be **"diplomacy for science"**. Its optimization requires a set of interrelated measures concerning several state structures and federal executive bodies. First, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov, "the MFA is not involved in orchestrating scientific ties."[14]. The same logic applies to other federal executive authorities, with their role being reduced to the administrative and technical support of scientific contacts and eliminating barriers for ISTC. In other words, they should perform not a regulatory or coordinating but an auxiliary function. For its practical execution, the following measures can be considered relevant:

– establishment of specialized divisions in the MFA, Rossotrudnichestvo, as well as in their representations abroad that would regularly supervise science diplomacy, including Russia's participation in international scientific alliances (GRS, JINR, EuroHORC, AsiaHORC, etc.);

[13] Лавров считает, что научная дипломатия при пандемии перестает быть инструментом влияния [Lavrov reckons that science diplomacy during the pandemic stops to be an instrument of influence]. *TASS*. 21.04.2020. URL: https://tass.ru/politika/8294685 (accessed 17.04.2021)

[14] Ibid.

– introduction of science attaché offices at foreign missions of these bodies to intensify their work with "scientific diasporas";

– inclusion of representatives of the MFA and organizations subordinate to it (Rossotrudnichestvo, the Diplomatic Academy) into the Council for Science and Education under the President of the Russian Federation;

– establishment of an internal "Council of science diplomats" at the MFA – by analogy with the Council of Young Diplomats[15], which can also participate in specialized projects of the former;

– systematic connection to the decision-making process in the studied area of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MSHE), as well as the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media (MDD).

The latter is crucial in terms of ensuring international information security. In this field, the respective department created within the MFA in December 2019 can act as the connecting link on its part. It is the well-coordinated work within the framework of the aforementioned federal executive authorities (MFA-MSHE-MDD) that can give tangible results in the development and implementation of projects such as, for example, the introduction of a "scientist's passport" – by analogy with a "fan passport" during the FIFA World Cup 2018[16]. At the same time, it makes no sense to limit this direction to consular and visa issues, but it is necessary to expand it to the digital space.

"Science in diplomacy" and "science for diplomacy" with an emphasis on the **"university"** part appear to be more flexible in terms of the innovation process. Among the specific measures in these subareas, it is relevant to highlight:

– elaboration and launch of unique educational products (MBA, Master programs) for the preparation of science attachés based on MGIMO, the Diplomatic Academy, and RUDN, following the example of the program for the training of agricultural attachés, which is successfully being implemented by the MGIMO School of Business and International Proficiency[17];

– introduction of targeted online postgraduate study programs for full-time employees of the MFA, which would include specialized courses in science diplomacy training, followed by the defense of Ph.D. theses; attracting leading foreign specialists, scientists, and scholars to participate in such defenses;

– founding based on leading universities a *Network Research Center for Science Diplomacy Problems* as a coordinative body for a substantive and operational communication of members of the Russian scientific and expert community.

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[15] Council of Young Diplomats of the MFA of Russia. URL: https://smd-mid.ru/ (accessed 17.04.2021)

[16] Р.О. Райнхардт: «Научная дипломатия как площадка для диалога физиков и политиков» [R.Reinhardt: Science diplomacy as a platform for dialogue between physicians and politicians]. *MGIMO-University.* 13.05.2020. URL: https://mgimo.ru/about/news/inno/raynkhardt-nauchnaya-diplomatiya-kak-ploshchadka-dlya-dialoga-fizikov-i-politikov/ (accessed 17.04.2021)

[17] МГИМО выпускает первых сельхозатташе [Graduation of MGIMO's first agricultural attachés]. *MGIMO Business School.* 29.06.2020. URL: https://mba.mgimo.ru/news/mgimo-vypuskaet-pervykh-selkhozattashe (accessed 17.04.2021)

Taken together, these measures and the selective use of "best practices" can help optimize the sector's work and give ground for revising the fundamental principles of the ISTC Concept 2019, which, as noted above, is still in force but no longer standing up to the challenges Russia is facing.

To conclude, the above qualitative analysis and modeling of Russian science diplomacy demonstrate that in 2020, exposed to the overall external pandemic shock, it has reached a point of bifurcation. Its further development will depend on the general course of policy-makers in both science and foreign affairs. Will they adapt the current practices to the new crisis and post-crisis reality, what shapes might these adaptations take, and how it will affect the already used mechanisms – these are crucial questions. In any case, recommendations described in this article appear applicable within most scenarios of reforming and optimizing the modern institutional framework of all three science diplomacy subareas. Nevertheless, such changes can hardly be effective without a holistic perception of the present science diplomacy goals. In this context, it should once again be emphasized that today science diplomacy can and should be regarded not as a means of "soft" or "smart power" but a multilateral cooperation mechanism in science and technology. This new value paradigm might contribute to the fight of the international community against the pandemic and its repercussions.

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Российская научная дипломатия на распутье: позитивный и нормативный анализ

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В настоящее время научная дипломатия представляется одной из наиболее важных и значимых областей прикладных международных исследований. В целом, её целесообразно рассматривать как функциональное выражение внешней политики, с одной стороны, и научной политики, с другой стороны, проводимой государствами и негосударственными акторами на международной арене. Возникновение концепта научной дипломатии в его современном виде допустимо отнести ко второй половине 2000-х гг. Отличительной чертой данного периода стало тесное переплетение научно-исследовательских и дипломатических практик. Вместе с тем большинство существующих исследований в данной области как в России, так и за рубежом уместно охарактеризовать как в значительной мере фрагментарные и сосредоточенные на конкретных примерах, при этом не дающие целостного представления о национальных моделях научной дипломатии, в том числе российской. Исходя из этого, автор статьи рассматривает ключевые особенности российского научно-дипломатического комплекса на основе системного подхода, делая акцент на трёх его основных элементах: «науке в дипломатии», «дипломатии для науки» и «науке для дипломатии». В данном контексте он анализирует деятельность основных субъектов российской научной дипломатии в позитивном (как оно есть) и нормативном (как оно должно или могло бы быть) ключе. Обобщение соответствующих результатов позволило выявить структурные недостатки рассматриваемой системы, которые в 2020 г. стали ещё более острыми, чем ранее. В то же время описанные тренды и тенденции позволяют сделать вывод о том, что продолжающаяся пандемия едва ли привела к возникновению новых проблем в рассматриваемой области, но может скорее рассматриваться как катализатор процессов, которые наблюдались в ней и прежде. Принимая во внимание данное обстоятельство, автор формулирует ряд прикладных и практико-ориентированных рекомендаций, направленных на оптимизацию существующей системы, которые могут найти применение в деятельности лиц, принимающих решения в российской научной и внешней политике.

Ключевые слова: научная дипломатия, внешняя политика России, научная политика, атташе по науке, научная диаспора, Россотрудничество, Пагуошское движение

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