<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Publishing DTD v1.3 20210610//EN" "JATS-journalpublishing1-3.dtd">
<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">mgimoreview</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вестник МГИМО-Университета</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>MGIMO Review of International Relations</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2071-8160</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2541-9099</issn><publisher><publisher-name>MGIMO Universty Press</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.24833/2071-8160-2021-4-79-136-153</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">mgimoreview-2942</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ СТАТЬИ. Концептуальное измерение мировой  политики</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>RESEARCH ARTICLES. Conceptual Dimension of World Politics</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Эффективность санкций в международной  политике</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Effectiveness of Sanctions in International  Politics</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Силаева</surname><given-names>В. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Silaeva</surname><given-names>V. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Виктория Андреевна Силаева – соискатель степени кандидата политических наук на кафедре политической теории</p><p>119454, г. Москва, проспект Вернадского, д.76</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Victoria A. Silaeva – PhD student, Department of Political Theory</p><p>119454, Moscow, prospect Vernadskogo, 76</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">v1ctoriasilaeva@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Московский государственный институт международных отношений (университет) МИД России</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>08</day><month>09</month><year>2021</year></pub-date><volume>14</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>136</fpage><lpage>153</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Силаева В.А., 2021</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2021</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Силаева В.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Silaeva V.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/2942">https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/2942</self-uri><abstract><p>Несмотря на то, что в западной науке накопился большой объём эмпирических и практико-ориентированных исследований в области эффективности политики санкций, эта проблема остается дискуссионной: учёным не удаётся прийти к консенсусу и выработать единую теорию. Цель статьи состоит в том, чтобы, изучив многообразие выработанных подходов к эффективности санкционной политики, объяснить, почему исследователи приходят к противоречивым и взаимоисключающим выводам о влиянии конкретных факторов и условий на исход санкционного давления. Гипотеза заключается в том, что причины разногласий в большой степени коренятся в различных подходах к концептуализации базовых понятий – «санкций» и «эффективности». Они приводят к кодированию одних и тех же кейсов как успешных или же неэффективных и не позволяют получить одинаковые результаты посредством статистических методов анализа. Основные линии размежевания проходят между сторонниками традиционно-реалистского и расширительно-либералистского понимания санкционного инструмента. Не прекращаются споры между теми, кто придерживается идеи давления на целевую страну путём нанесения серьёзного экономического ущерба, и теми, кто выступает затаргетированные меры; между теми, кто обосновывает эффективность многосторонних санкций контролем над ресурсами, пытается понять механизмы функционирования и выявляет слабости «коалиций по случаю», или видит единственный путь к получению эффекта от санкций в поддержке со стороны международных организаций; между теми, кто фокусирует внимание на целевой стране, и теми, кого интересует давление на союзников. В статье предпринята попытка систематизировать существующие подходы к концептуализации базовых понятий и подвести под теоретические рамки политической науки вытекающие из их различий ключевые научные споры о критериях и условиях эффективности санкционного давления. Для российского научного дискурса теоретическое осмысление западных подходов к изучению причин и условий эффективности санкций может быть полезно для структурированного понимания принципов, на которых базируется политика санкций, тенденций в её развитии, а также для выработки на основе этих знаний грамотных стратегий реагирования и торга.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Even though IR literature has accumulated a large amount of empirical data and knowledge in sanctions policy effectiveness, this problem remains contested: IR has failed yet to reach a consensus and elaborate the sanctions theory. The article reviews the variety of approaches to evaluating the effectiveness of the sanctions policy and explains why researchers have come to conflicting and mutually exclusive conclusions about the impact of various factors and conditions on the outcome of sanctions pressure. It argues that the disagreement is primarily rooted in different approaches to conceptualizing basic concepts – “sanctions” and “effectiveness”. This disagreement results in coding the same cases as successful and unsuccessful and presents an obstacle to obtaining similar results using statistical analysis. The main demarcation line goes between the realist and liberal understandings of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. This is reflected in the ongoing disputes between those who adhere to the idea of inflicting severe economic damage on the target country and supporters of targeted sanctions; between those who promote multilateral sanctions as capable of causing economic effects, or try to identify weaknesses of ad hoc coalitions, or see the only way to get the effect of sanctions in support from international organizations; between those who focus their research on the target country and those who are interested in pressure on the allies.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>геополитическое пространство</kwd><kwd>империя</kwd><kwd>институциональная матрица</kwd><kwd>базовые институты</kwd><kwd>редистрибутивная экономика</kwd><kwd>рыночные отношения</kwd><kwd>кризис</kwd><kwd>точка бифуркации</kwd><kwd>интеграция</kwd><kwd>институциональные трансформации</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>Economic sanctions</kwd><kwd>sanctions policy effectiveness</kwd><kwd>factors and criteria of sanctions effectiveness</kwd><kwd>multilateral and unilateral sanctions</kwd><kwd>targeted sanctions</kwd><kwd>ad hoc coalition</kwd><kwd>initiating and target  states</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Baldwin D.A. 1985. Economic statecraft. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 409 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Baldwin D.A. 1985. Economic statecraft. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 409 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Baldwin D.A., Pape R.A. 1998. Evaluating Economic Sanctions. International Security. 23(2). P. 189–198.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Baldwin D.A., Pape R.A. 1998. Evaluating Economic Sanctions. International Security. 23(2). P. 189–198.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit3"><label>3</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Bapat N.A., Clifton Morgan T. 2009. Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data. International Studies Quarterly. 53(4). P. 1075–1094. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bapat N.A., Clifton Morgan T. 2009. Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data. International Studies Quarterly. 53(4). P. 1075–1094. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit4"><label>4</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Bapat N.A. et al. 2013. Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data. International Interactions. 39(1). P. 79–98. DOI:10.1080/03050629.2013.751298</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bapat N.A. et al. 2013. Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data. International Interactions. 39(1). P. 79–98. DOI:10.1080/03050629.2013.751298</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit5"><label>5</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Blake C.H., Klemm N. 2006. Reconsidering the Effectiveness of International Economic Sanctions: An Examination of Selection Bias. International Politics. 43(1). P. 133–149. DOI:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800137</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Blake C.H., Klemm N. 2006. Reconsidering the Effectiveness of International Economic Sanctions: An Examination of Selection Bias. International Politics. 43(1). P. 133–149. DOI:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800137</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit6"><label>6</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Chen J. 2017. Why Economic Sanctions on North Korea Fail to Work? China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies. 3(4). P. 513–534. DOI:10.1142/S2377740017500300</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Chen J. 2017. Why Economic Sanctions on North Korea Fail to Work? China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies. 3(4). P. 513–534. DOI:10.1142/S2377740017500300</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit7"><label>7</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Crozet M., Hinz J. 2020. Friendly Fire: the Trade Impact of the Russia Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions. Economic Policy. 35(101). P. 97–146. DOI:10.1093/epolic/eiaa006</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Crozet M., Hinz J. 2020. Friendly Fire: the Trade Impact of the Russia Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions. Economic Policy. 35(101). P. 97–146. DOI:10.1093/epolic/eiaa006</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit8"><label>8</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Drezner D.W. 1999. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Drezner D.W. 1999. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit9"><label>9</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Drezner D.W. 2000. Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive? International Organization. 54(1). P. 73–102. DOI:10.1162/002081800551127</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Drezner D.W. 2000. Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive? International Organization. 54(1). P. 73–102. DOI:10.1162/002081800551127</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit10"><label>10</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Drezner D.W. 2003. How Smart are Smart Sanctions? International Studies Review. 5(1). P. 107–110. DOI:10.1111/1521-9488.501014</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Drezner D.W. 2003. How Smart are Smart Sanctions? International Studies Review. 5(1). P. 107–110. DOI:10.1111/1521-9488.501014</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit11"><label>11</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Drezner D.W. 2011. Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice. International Studies Review. 13(1). С. 96-108. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01001.x</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Drezner D.W. 2011. Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice. International Studies Review. 13(1). С. 96-108. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01001.x</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit12"><label>12</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Drury A.C. 1998. Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Journal of Peace Research. 35(4). P. 497–509.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Drury A.C. 1998. Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Journal of Peace Research. 35(4). P. 497–509.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit13"><label>13</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Early B.R. 2011. Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions1: Unmasking the Black Knights. Foreign Policy Analysis. 7(4). P. 381–402. DOI:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00143.x</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Early B.R. 2011. Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions1: Unmasking the Black Knights. Foreign Policy Analysis. 7(4). P. 381–402. DOI:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00143.x</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit14"><label>14</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy. 1998. Ed. Haass R., Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 222 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy. 1998. Ed. Haass R., Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 222 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit15"><label>15</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. 2007. 3rd ed., Expanded ed. Hufbauer G.C. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 233 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. 2007. 3rd ed., Expanded ed. Hufbauer G.C. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 233 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit16"><label>16</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Galtung J. 1967. On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. World Politics. 19(3). P. 378–416.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Galtung J. 1967. On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. World Politics. 19(3). P. 378–416.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit17"><label>17</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Gilpin R. 1988. The Theory of Hegemonic War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 18(4). P. 591–613.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Gilpin R. 1988. The Theory of Hegemonic War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 18(4). P. 591–613.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit18"><label>18</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Giumelli F. 2016. The Success of Sanctions: Lessons Learned from the EU Experience. 1st ed. Routledge.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Giumelli F. 2016. The Success of Sanctions: Lessons Learned from the EU Experience. 1st ed. Routledge.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit19"><label>19</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Giumelli F., Ivan P. 2013. The Effectiveness of EU Sanctions. EPC Issue Paper. №76. Р. 1-43.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Giumelli F., Ivan P. 2013. The Effectiveness of EU Sanctions. EPC Issue Paper. №76. Р. 1-43.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit20"><label>20</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Haass R.N. 1997. Sanctioning Madness. Foreign Affairs. 76(6). P. 74.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Haass R.N. 1997. Sanctioning Madness. Foreign Affairs. 76(6). P. 74.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit21"><label>21</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kaempfer W.H., Lowenberg A.D. 1988. The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach. The American Economic Review. 78(4). P. 786–793.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kaempfer W.H., Lowenberg A.D. 1988. The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach. The American Economic Review. 78(4). P. 786–793.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit22"><label>22</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kaempfer W.H., Lowenberg A.D. 2002. Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective. International Studies Quarterly. 43(1). P. 37–58.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kaempfer W.H., Lowenberg A.D. 2002. Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective. International Studies Quarterly. 43(1). P. 37–58.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit23"><label>23</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Lacy D., Niou E.M.S. 2004. A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats. The Journal of Politics. 66(1). P. 25–42. DOI:10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Lacy D., Niou E.M.S. 2004. A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats. The Journal of Politics. 66(1). P. 25–42. DOI:10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit24"><label>24</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Lopez G. A., Cortright D. 2004. Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked. Foreign Affairs. Р. 90-103. DOI:10.2307/20034049</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Lopez G. A., Cortright D. 2004. Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked. Foreign Affairs. Р. 90-103. DOI:10.2307/20034049</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit25"><label>25</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Mayall J. 1984. The Sanctions Problem in International Economic Relations: Reflections in the Light of Recent Experience. International Affairs. 60(4). P. 631–642.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Mayall J. 1984. The Sanctions Problem in International Economic Relations: Reflections in the Light of Recent Experience. International Affairs. 60(4). P. 631–642.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit26"><label>26</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Miers A., Morgan T. 2002. Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success: Can Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth? International Interactions. 28(2). P. 117–136. DOI:10.1080/03050620212099</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Miers A., Morgan T. 2002. Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success: Can Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth? International Interactions. 28(2). P. 117–136. DOI:10.1080/03050620212099</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit27"><label>27</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Park J.S. 2014. The Key to the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle. The Washington Quarterly. 37(3). P. 199–214. DOI:10.1080/0163660X.2014.978444</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Park J.S. 2014. The Key to the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle. The Washington Quarterly. 37(3). P. 199–214. DOI:10.1080/0163660X.2014.978444</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit28"><label>28</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Taskinsoy J. 2020. Diminishing American Power: The US – China Trade War, Sanctions, and Coronavirus. SSRN Journal.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Taskinsoy J. 2020. Diminishing American Power: The US – China Trade War, Sanctions, and Coronavirus. SSRN Journal.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit29"><label>29</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Timofeev I.N. 2019. Rethinking Sanctions Efficiency. Russia in Global Affairs. 17(3). P. 86-108. DOI:10.31278/1810-6374-2019-17-3-86-108</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Timofeev I.N. 2019. Rethinking Sanctions Efficiency. Russia in Global Affairs. 17(3). P. 86-108. DOI:10.31278/1810-6374-2019-17-3-86-108</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit30"><label>30</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Morgan T.C., Bapat N., Kobayashi Y. 2014. Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES Dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 31(5). P. 541– 558. DOI:10.1177/0738894213520379</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Morgan T.C., Bapat N., Kobayashi Y. 2014. Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES Dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 31(5). P. 541– 558. DOI:10.1177/0738894213520379</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit31"><label>31</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Morgan T.C., Bapat N., Krustev V. 2009. The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 26(1). P. 92–110. DOI:10.1177/0738894208097668</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Morgan T.C., Bapat N., Krustev V. 2009. The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 26(1). P. 92–110. DOI:10.1177/0738894208097668</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit32"><label>32</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Nooruddin I. 2002. Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy. International Interactions. 28(1). P. 59–75. DOI:10.1080/03050620210394</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Nooruddin I. 2002. Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy. International Interactions. 28(1). P. 59–75. DOI:10.1080/03050620210394</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit33"><label>33</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Pape R.A. 1997. Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security. 22(2). P. 90–136.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Pape R.A. 1997. Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security. 22(2). P. 90–136.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit34"><label>34</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Pape R.A. 1998. Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work. International Security. 23(1). P. 66–77.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Pape R.A. 1998. Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work. International Security. 23(1). P. 66–77.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit35"><label>35</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Portela C., Orbie J. 2014. Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and Foreign Policy: Coherence by Accident? Contemporary Politics. 20(1). P. 63–76. DOI:10.1080/13569775.2014.881605</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Portela C., Orbie J. 2014. Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and Foreign Policy: Coherence by Accident? Contemporary Politics. 20(1). P. 63–76. DOI:10.1080/13569775.2014.881605</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit36"><label>36</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Vines A. 2012. The Effectiveness of UN and EU Sanctions: Lessons for the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs. 88(4). P. 867–877. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01106.x</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Vines A. 2012. The Effectiveness of UN and EU Sanctions: Lessons for the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs. 88(4). P. 867–877. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01106.x</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit37"><label>37</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Whang T. 2011. Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States1: Playing to the Home Crowd? International Studies Quarterly. 55(3). P. 787–801. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00668.x</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Whang T. 2011. Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States1: Playing to the Home Crowd? International Studies Quarterly. 55(3). P. 787–801. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00668.x</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit38"><label>38</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Алексеева Т.А. 2015. Современная политическая мысль (XX-XXI вв.): политическая теория и международные отношения. Москва: Аспект Пресс.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Alekseeva T.A. Sovremennaja politicheskaja mysl' (XX-XXI vv.): politicheskaja teorija i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija: uchebnoe posobie [Modern Political Thought (XX-XXI centuries): Political Theory and International Relations]. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2016. 621 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit39"><label>39</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Тимофеев И.Н. 2018. Экономические санкции как политическое понятие. Вестник МГИМО-Университета. 2(59). С. 26-42. DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2018-2-59-26-42</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Timofeev I.N. 2018. Economic Sanctions as a Concept of Power Politics [Economic Sanctions as a Concept of Power Politics]. MGIMO Review of International Relations. 2(59). P. 26–42. DOI:10.24833/2071-8160-2018-2-59-26-42</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref></ref-list><fn-group><fn fn-type="conflict"><p>The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.</p></fn></fn-group></back></article>
