mgimoreviewВестник МГИМО-УниверситетаMGIMO Review of International Relations2071-81602541-9099MGIMO Universty Press10.24833/2071-8160-2022-5-86-79-112mgimoreview-3230Research ArticleИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ СТАТЬИ. Институты лидерства в международном развитииRESEARCH ARTICLES. Institutions of Leadership for International DevelopmentВлияние координационного дискурса о «стратегическом суверенитете» Евросоюза на его институциональный балансCoordinative Discourse of Strategic Sovereignty Tilting the European Union’s Institutional BalanceРомановаТ. А.RomanovaT. A.

Романова Татьяна Алексеевна — кандидат политических наук, доцент Кафедры европейских исследований199034, Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., д. 7–9

Tatiana A. Romanova — PhD (Political Science), associate professor

7–9 Universitetskaya emb., 199034 Saint Petersburg

t.romanova@spbu.ruМазаникС. В.MazanikS. V.

Мазаник Сергей Владимирович — аспирант199034, Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., д. 7–9

Sergei V. Mazanik — PhD student

7–9 Universitetskaya emb., 199034 Saint Petersburg

sergeymazanik97@gmail.comСанкт-Петербургский государственный университетРоссияSaint Petersburg State UniversityRussian Federation20220811202215579112Copyright © Романова Т.А., Мазаник С.В., 20222022Романова Т.А., Мазаник С.В.Romanova T.A., Mazanik S.V.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/3230

Цель статьи состоит в определении того, как обсуждение и реализация институтами Европейского союза (Европейской комиссией, Европейским парламентом и Советом Европейского союза) концепции «стратегического суверенитета» («стратегической автономии») влияет на институциональный баланс между ними. Институциональный баланс представляет собой динамичный процесс, в котором институты оспаривают полномочия друг друга. Данный процесс концептуализируется в статье в терминах дискурсивного неоинституционализма как координационный дискурс, в котором идея «стратегического суверенитета» уточняется, оспаривается и обосновывается указанными выше институтами ЕС. В качестве кейсов, которые демонстрируют изменение институционального баланса при обсуждении и имплементации «стратегического суверенитета» были отобраны промышленная и торговая политика ЕС, а также общая политика безопасности и обороны. Результаты исследования показывают, что главным институциональным бенефициаром «стратегического суверенитета» становится Еврокомиссия. Скорее всего, произойдёт усиление и Совета, который оставляет за собой широкие полномочия в области кризисного управления и внешней политики. Положение Европарламента неоднозначно: усиление его институционального веса возможно, но зависит и от его инициатив, и от того, насколько успешно Еврокомиссия коммунитаризирует новые вопросы и сферы. Таким образом, полученные выводы демонстрируют, что на фоне кризисных явлений институциональный баланс ЕС продолжит склоняться в пользу наднационального уровня регулирования.

The article studies how a discursive contestation among the EU institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union) of the concept of "strategic sovereignty" ("strategic autonomy") affects the institutional balance among them. Institutional balance is a dynamic process in which institutions challenge each other's authority. This process is conceptualized in the article in terms of discursive neo-institutionalism as a coordinative discourse, which forms, challenges and justifies the idea of “strategic sovereignty”. The article uses the cases of the EU industrial, trade policy, and the common security and defense policy to demonstrate the changing institutional balance.The results of the study show that the main institutional beneficiary of "strategic sovereignty" is the European Commission. Most likely, there will be a strengthening of the Council, which reserves broad powers in crisis management and foreign policy. The position of the Parliament is ambivalent: although the growth of its institutional weight is possible, it will depend both on the Parliament’s own initiatives and on whether the European Commission will succeed at communitarizing new issues and spheres. The findings demonstrate that under crisis, the institutional balance of the EU will continue to tilt in favor of the supranational level of regulation.

Европейский союзстратегический суверенитетинституциональный балансдискурсивный неоинституционализмоткрытая стратегическая автономияEuropean Unionstrategic sovereigntyinstitutional balancediscursive neoinstitutionalismopen strategic autonomyИсследование выполнено за счёт гранта Российского научного фонда № 22-28-00682, https://rscf.ru/project/ 22-28-00682/.The study was supported by the grant of the Russian Science Foundation No. 22-28-00682, https://rscf.ru/project/22-28-00682/.ReferencesArchibugi D., Mariella V. 2021. Is a European Recovery Possible without High-Tech Public Corporations? Intereconomics. 56(3). P. 160–166. DOI: 10.1007/s10272-021-0973-xArchibugi D., Mariella V. 2021. Is a European Recovery Possible without High-Tech Public Corporations? Intereconomics. 56(3). P. 160–166. DOI: 10.1007/s10272-021-0973-xBlauberger M., Weiss M. 2013. ‘If You Can't Beat Me, Join Me!’ How the Commission pushed and pulled member states into legislating defence procurement. Journal of European Public Policy. 20(8). P. 1120–1138. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2013.781783Blauberger M., Weiss M. 2013. ‘If You Can't Beat Me, Join Me!’ How the Commission pushed and pulled member states into legislating defence procurement. Journal of European Public Policy. 20(8). P. 1120–1138. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2013.781783Brustlein C. 2018. European Strategic Autonomy: Balancing Ambition and Responsibility. Éditoriaux de l’Ifri. No. 16.Brustlein C. 2018. European Strategic Autonomy: Balancing Ambition and Responsibility. Éditoriaux de l’Ifri. No. 16.Chamon M. 2016. Institutional Balance and Community Method in the Implementation of EU Legislation Following the Lisbon Treaty. Common Market Law Review. 53(6). P. 1501– 1543. DOI: 10.54648/COLA2016141Chamon M. 2016. Institutional Balance and Community Method in the Implementation of EU Legislation Following the Lisbon Treaty. Common Market Law Review. 53(6). P. 1501– 1543. DOI: 10.54648/COLA2016141Chou M. H., Riddervold M. 2015. The Unexpected Negotiator at the Table: How the European Commission’s Expertise Informs Intergovernmental EU Policies. Politics and Governance. 3(1). P. 61–72. DOI: 10.17645/pag.v3i1.117Chou M. H., Riddervold M. 2015. The Unexpected Negotiator at the Table: How the European Commission’s Expertise Informs Intergovernmental EU Policies. Politics and Governance. 3(1). P. 61–72. DOI: 10.17645/pag.v3i1.117Craig P.P. 2011. Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance. Craig P. and de Burca G. (eds) The evolution of EU law. Oxford University Press. P. 41–84. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3748492Craig P.P. 2011. Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance. Craig P. and de Burca G. (eds) The evolution of EU law. Oxford University Press. P. 41–84. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3748492Dawson J., Hanley S. 2019. Foreground Liberalism, Background Nationalism: A Discursive-institutionalist Account of EU Leverage and ‘Democratic Backsliding’in East Central Europe. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 57(4). P. 710–728.DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12845Dawson J., Hanley S. 2019. Foreground Liberalism, Background Nationalism: A Discursive-institutionalist Account of EU Leverage and ‘Democratic Backsliding’in East Central Europe. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 57(4). P. 710–728.DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12845Dawson M., De Witte F. 2013. Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis. The Modern Law Review. 76(5). P. 817–844. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2230.12037Dawson M., De Witte F. 2013. Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis. The Modern Law Review. 76(5). P. 817–844. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2230.12037des Places S.B. 2020. Taking the Language of 'European Sovereignty' Seriously. European Papers – A Journal on Law and Integration. 2020(1). P. 287-297. DOI: 10.15166/2499-8249/392des Places S.B. 2020. Taking the Language of 'European Sovereignty' Seriously. European Papers – A Journal on Law and Integration. 2020(1). P. 287-297. DOI: 10.15166/2499-8249/392Dinan D., Nugent N., Paterson W.E. 2017. The European Union in Crisis. London: International Higher Education.Dinan D., Nugent N., Paterson W.E. 2017. The European Union in Crisis. London: International Higher Education.Everson M., Vos E. 2014. European Agencies: What about the Institutional Balance? Łazowski A. and Blockmans S. (eds) Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. P. 139–152. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2467469Everson M., Vos E. 2014. European Agencies: What about the Institutional Balance? Łazowski A. and Blockmans S. (eds) Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. P. 139–152. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2467469Fabbrini F. 2016. A Principle in Need of Renewal? The Euro-Crisis and the Principle of Institutional Balance. Centro Studi sul Federalismo. 52(1). P. 285–309.Fabbrini F. 2016. A Principle in Need of Renewal? The Euro-Crisis and the Principle of Institutional Balance. Centro Studi sul Federalismo. 52(1). P. 285–309.Fabbrini S. 2015. Which European Union? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Fabbrini S. 2015. Which European Union? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Fiott D. 2021. A Clash of Concepts? Making Sense of ‘European Sovereignty ’and ‘Strategic Autonomy’. In: Beyond Autonomy. Rethinking Europe as a Strategic Actor. Brussels: Friedrich Naumann Foundation.Fiott D. 2021. A Clash of Concepts? Making Sense of ‘European Sovereignty ’and ‘Strategic Autonomy’. In: Beyond Autonomy. Rethinking Europe as a Strategic Actor. Brussels: Friedrich Naumann Foundation.Fitch-Roy O., Fairbrass J., Benson D. 2020. Ideas, Coalitions and Compromise: Reinterpreting EU-ETS Lobbying through Discursive Institutionalism. Journal of European Public Policy. 27(1). P. 82–101. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1567573Fitch-Roy O., Fairbrass J., Benson D. 2020. Ideas, Coalitions and Compromise: Reinterpreting EU-ETS Lobbying through Discursive Institutionalism. Journal of European Public Policy. 27(1). P. 82–101. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1567573García M.J. 2022. Sanctioning Capacity in Trade and Sustainability Chapters in EU Trade Agreements: The EU–Korea Case. Politics and Governance. 10(1). P. 58–67. DOI: 10.17645/pag. v10i1.4782García M.J. 2022. Sanctioning Capacity in Trade and Sustainability Chapters in EU Trade Agreements: The EU–Korea Case. Politics and Governance. 10(1). P. 58–67. DOI: 10.17645/pag. v10i1.4782Gozi S. 2001. Does the EU Institutional Triangle Have a Future? The International Spectator. 36(1). P. 39–49. DOI: 10.1080/03932720108456901Gozi S. 2001. Does the EU Institutional Triangle Have a Future? The International Spectator. 36(1). P. 39–49. DOI: 10.1080/03932720108456901Jacqué J.P. 2004. The Principle of Institutional Balance. Common Market L. Rev. 41(2). P. 285–309.Jacqué J.P. 2004. The Principle of Institutional Balance. Common Market L. Rev. 41(2). P. 285–309.Krasner S.D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organised Hypocricy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. DOI: 10.1515/9781400823260Krasner S.D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organised Hypocricy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. DOI: 10.1515/9781400823260Kratochvíl P., Tichý L. 2013. EU and Russian Discourse on Energy Relations. Energy policy. No. 56. P. 391–406.Kratochvíl P., Tichý L. 2013. EU and Russian Discourse on Energy Relations. Energy policy. No. 56. P. 391–406.Krotz U., Schild J. 2013. Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and embedded bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to twenty-first century politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/ acprof:oso/9780199660087.001.0001Krotz U., Schild J. 2013. Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and embedded bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to twenty-first century politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/ acprof:oso/9780199660087.001.0001Kühling J., Weck T., Reinhold P. 2022. Third-Country State Aid Regulation: The European Debate on Foreign Subsidies: Necessity and Possibilities of a Reform. In: Manjiao C. et al. (eds) Asian Yearbook of International Economic Law. Springer, Cham. P. 1–13. DOI: 10.1007/16517_2021_4Kühling J., Weck T., Reinhold P. 2022. Third-Country State Aid Regulation: The European Debate on Foreign Subsidies: Necessity and Possibilities of a Reform. In: Manjiao C. et al. (eds) Asian Yearbook of International Economic Law. Springer, Cham. P. 1–13. DOI: 10.1007/16517_2021_4March J.G., Olsen J.P. 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. International organization. 52(4). P. 943–969. DOI: 10.1162/002081898550699March J.G., Olsen J.P. 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. International organization. 52(4). P. 943–969. DOI: 10.1162/002081898550699Mauro F. 2021. Europe’s Strategic Autonomy: That Obscure Object of Desire. L'Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques. Analysis No. 13. October 2021.Mauro F. 2021. Europe’s Strategic Autonomy: That Obscure Object of Desire. L'Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques. Analysis No. 13. October 2021.Meunier S., Nicolaidis K. 2019. The Geopoliticization of European Trade and Investment Policy. J. Common Mkt. Stud. 57(1). P. 103–113. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12932Meunier S., Nicolaidis K. 2019. The Geopoliticization of European Trade and Investment Policy. J. Common Mkt. Stud. 57(1). P. 103–113. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12932Miró J. 2021. In the Name of Competitiveness: a Discursive Institutionalist Analysis of the EU’s Approach to Labour Market Structural Reform, 2007–2016. Socio-Economic Review. 19(2). P. 711–733. DOI: 10.1093/ser/mwz030Miró J. 2021. In the Name of Competitiveness: a Discursive Institutionalist Analysis of the EU’s Approach to Labour Market Structural Reform, 2007–2016. Socio-Economic Review. 19(2). P. 711–733. DOI: 10.1093/ser/mwz030Parga A.H. 2015. The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective. Oxford: Oxford Studies in European Law. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714958.001.0001Parga A.H. 2015. The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective. Oxford: Oxford Studies in European Law. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714958.001.0001Peterson J., Bomberg E. 1999. Decision-making in the European Union. Basingstoke: Bloomsbury Publishing. 336 p.Peterson J., Bomberg E. 1999. Decision-making in the European Union. Basingstoke: Bloomsbury Publishing. 336 p.Pomorska K., Wessel R. A. 2021. Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP: A Solution to the Wrong Problem? European Foreign Affairs Review. 26(3). P. 351–358. DOI: 10.1177/1465116507079547Pomorska K., Wessel R. A. 2021. Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP: A Solution to the Wrong Problem? European Foreign Affairs Review. 26(3). P. 351–358. DOI: 10.1177/1465116507079547Reykers Y. 2017. EU Battlegroups: High Costs, no Benefits. Contemporary Security Policy. 38(3). P. 457–470. DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2017.1348568Reykers Y. 2017. EU Battlegroups: High Costs, no Benefits. Contemporary Security Policy. 38(3). P. 457–470. DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2017.1348568Riddervold M. 2016. (Not) in the Hands of the Member States: How the European Commission influences EU security and defence policies. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 54(2). P. 353–369. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12288Riddervold M. 2016. (Not) in the Hands of the Member States: How the European Commission influences EU security and defence policies. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 54(2). P. 353–369. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12288Sbragia A.M. 2002. Conclusion to Special Issue on the Institutional Balance and the Future of EU Governance: The Treaty of Nice, Institutional Balance, and Uncertainty. Governance. 15(3). P. 393–412. DOI: 10.1111/0952-1895.00194Sbragia A.M. 2002. Conclusion to Special Issue on the Institutional Balance and the Future of EU Governance: The Treaty of Nice, Institutional Balance, and Uncertainty. Governance. 15(3). P. 393–412. DOI: 10.1111/0952-1895.00194Scharpf F. 1998. Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States. Rhodes M. and Mény Y. (eds) The Future of European Welfare. London: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 157–177. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-26543-5_8Scharpf F. 1998. Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States. Rhodes M. and Mény Y. (eds) The Future of European Welfare. London: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 157–177. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-26543-5_8Schmidt S.K. 2000. Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission's Power Over the Council of Ministers. European Union Politics. 1(1). P. 37–61. DOI: 10.1177%2F1465116500001001003Schmidt S.K. 2000. Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission's Power Over the Council of Ministers. European Union Politics. 1(1). P. 37–61. DOI: 10.1177%2F1465116500001001003Schmidt V.A. 2008. Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse. Annual Review of Political Science. No. 11. P. 303–326. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.135342Schmidt V.A. 2008. Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse. Annual Review of Political Science. No. 11. P. 303–326. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.135342Schmidt V.A. 2010. Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘New Institutionalism’. European Political Science Review. 2(1). P. 1–25. DOI: 10.1017/S175577390999021XSchmidt V.A. 2010. Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘New Institutionalism’. European Political Science Review. 2(1). P. 1–25. DOI: 10.1017/S175577390999021XSchmidt V.A. 2015. Discursive Institutionalism: Understanding Policy in Context. Fischer F. et al. (eds) Handbook of critical policy studies: Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing. P. 171–189. DOI: 10.4337/9781783472352.00016Schmidt V.A. 2015. Discursive Institutionalism: Understanding Policy in Context. Fischer F. et al. (eds) Handbook of critical policy studies: Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing. P. 171–189. DOI: 10.4337/9781783472352.00016Schmidt V.A. 2016. Reinterpreting the Rules ‘by Stealth’ in times of crisis: a discursive institutionalist analysis of the European Central Bank and the European Commission. West European Politics. 39(5). P. 1032–1052. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2016.1186389Schmidt V.A. 2016. Reinterpreting the Rules ‘by Stealth’ in times of crisis: a discursive institutionalist analysis of the European Central Bank and the European Commission. West European Politics. 39(5). P. 1032–1052. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2016.1186389Siddi M. 2020. The European Green Deal: Assessing its Current State and Future Implementation. FIIA Working Paper. No. 114. P. 1–14.Siddi M. 2020. The European Green Deal: Assessing its Current State and Future Implementation. FIIA Working Paper. No. 114. P. 1–14.Van den Abeele E. et al. 2021. Towards a New Paradigm in Open Strategic Autonomy? ETUI Research Paper-Working Paper. No. 2021(03).Van den Abeele E. et al. 2021. Towards a New Paradigm in Open Strategic Autonomy? ETUI Research Paper-Working Paper. No. 2021(03).Wæver O. 1996. European Security Identities. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 34(1). P. 103–132. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.1996.tb00562.xWæver O. 1996. European Security Identities. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 34(1). P. 103–132. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.1996.tb00562.xWarren T. 2020. Explaining the European Central Bank’s Limited Reform Ambition: Ordoliberalism and Asymmetric Integration in the Eurozone. Journal of European Integration. 42(2). P. 263–279. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2019.1658753Warren T. 2020. Explaining the European Central Bank’s Limited Reform Ambition: Ordoliberalism and Asymmetric Integration in the Eurozone. Journal of European Integration. 42(2). P. 263–279. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2019.1658753Webber D. 2019. Trends in European Political (dis) Integration. An Analysis of Postfunctionalist and Other Explanations. Journal of European Public Policy. 26(8). P. 1134–1152. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1576760Webber D. 2019. Trends in European Political (dis) Integration. An Analysis of Postfunctionalist and Other Explanations. Journal of European Public Policy. 26(8). P. 1134–1152. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1576760Wodak R., Meyer M. 2015. Critical Discourse Studies: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology. Wodak R., Meyer M (ed.) Methods of Critical Discourse Studies. London: Sage Publications Ltd. P. 1–23.Wodak R., Meyer M. 2015. Critical Discourse Studies: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology. Wodak R., Meyer M (ed.) Methods of Critical Discourse Studies. London: Sage Publications Ltd. P. 1–23.Арбатова Н.К. и др. 2020. Стратегическая автономия ЕС и перспективы сотрудничества с Россией. Москва: ООО Издательство Весь Мир.Arbatova N.K. et al. 2020. Strategicheskaya avtonomiya ES i perspektivy sotrudnichestva s Rossiey [The EU’s Strategic Autonomy and Prospects for Cooperation with Russia]. Moscow: ООО Izdatel’stvo Ves’ Mir (In Russian).Белов В.Б. 2020. Новая промышленная стратегия Евросоюза. Институт Европы Российской академии наук. Аналитическая запискаю. No 196. С. 1–8. DOI: 10.15211/ analytics122020Belov V.B. 2020. Novaya promyshlennaya strategiya Evrosoyuza [The EU’s New Industrial Policy]. Institut Evropy Rossiyskoy akademii nauk. Analiticheskaya zapiska. No. 196. P. 1–8. DOI: 10.15211/analytics122020 (In Russian).Белов В.Б. 2019. Европейский аккумуляторный альянс. Европейский союз: факты и комментарии. No 98. С. 21–25. DOI: 10.15211/eufacts420192125Belov V.B. 2019. Evropeyskiy akkumulatorniy allians [The European Battery Alliance]. Evropeyskiy soyuz: fakty i kommentarii. No. 98. P. 21–25. DOI: 10.15211/eufacts420192125 (In Russian).Деррида Ж., Хабермас Ю. 2003. Наше обновление после войны: второе рождение Европы. Отечественные записки. No 6. С. 98–105.Derrida Zh., Habermas Yu. 2003. Nashe obnovlenie posle voyny: vtoroe rozhdenie Evropy [Our Renewal after the War: the Europe’s Second Birth]. Otechestvennye zapiski. No. 6. P. 98–105 (In Russian).Кавешников Н.Ю. 2015. Методы управления в Европейском союзе. Мировая экономика и международные отношени. No 8. С. 49–60.Kaveshnikov N.Yu. 2015. Metody upravleniya v Evropeyskom soyuze [Methods of Governance in the European Union]. Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. No. 8. P. 49–60.Кутырев Г.И. 2012. Неоинституционализм рационального выбора: преимущества и внутренние противоречия. Исторические, философские, политические и юридические науки, культурология и искусствоведение. Вопросы теории и практики. 11(1). С. 107–111.Kutyrev G.I. 2012. Neoinstitutsionalism ratsional’nogo vybora: preimushchestva i vnutrennie protivorechiya [Rational Choice Neo-institutionalism: Advantages and Internal Conflicts]. Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politivheskie i yuridicheskie nauki, kul’turologiya i iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki. 11(1). P. 107–111 (In Russian).Романова Т.А. 2021. Дискурс о суверенитете Европейского союза: содержание и последствия. Современная Европа. No 5. С. 32–44. DOI: 10.15211/soveurope520213244Romanova T.A. 2021. Diskurs o suverenitete Evropeyskogo Soyuza: soderzhanie i posledstviya [Discourse on the EU’s sovereignty: its Content and Consequences]. Sovremennaya Evropa. No. 5. P. 32–44. DOI: 10.15211/soveurope520213244 (In Russian).Шмерлина И.А. 2016. «Институциональная логика»: критический анализ направления. Социологический журнал. No 4. С. 110–138. DOI: 10.19181/socjour.2016.22.4.4812Shmerlina I.A. 2016. “Institutsional’naya logika”: kriticheskiz analiz napravleniya [“Institutional Logic”: a Critical Analysis of the Area]. Sotsiologicheskiy zhurnal. No. 4. P. 110–138. DOI: 10.19181/socjour.2016.22.4.4812 (In Russian).

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.