mgimoreviewВестник МГИМО-УниверситетаMGIMO Review of International Relations2071-81602541-9099MGIMO Universty Press10.24833/2071-8160-2022-olf4mgimoreview-3255Research ArticleИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ СТАТЬИ. Уроки Холодной войныRESEARCH ARTICLES. Lessons from the Cold WarВоенное сдерживание против иностранного вмешательства? Опыт Холодной войныMilitary Deterrence vs Foreign Interference? Record of the Cold WarИстоминИ. А.IstominI. A.

Игорь Александрович Истомин – кандидат политических наук, и.о. заведующего Кафедрой прикладного анализа международных проблем; в.н.с. Центра перспективных американских исследований ИМИ

119454, Россия, Москва, проспект Вернадского 76

Igor A. Istomin – Candidate of Political Sciences, Acting Chair, Department of Applied International Political Analysis; Lead Research Fellow, Center for Advanced American Studies, Institute for International Studies

76 Prospekt Vernadskogo, Moscow, Russia, 119454

iaistomin@gmail.comМосковский государственный институт международных отношений (Университет) МИД РоссииРоссияMGIMO UniversityRussian Federation202313122022161106129Copyright © Истомин И.А., 20232023Истомин И.А.Istomin I.A.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/3255

В исследовательской литературе наблюдается серьёзный скепсис относится роли военного сдерживания в противодействии невоенным и непрямым формам давления. Парадокс стабильности-нестабильности предполагает, что возрастание разрушительной мощи вооруженных сил (особенно с появлением ядерного оружия) снижает их полезность для предотвращения ограниченных войн, опосредованных конфликтов или экономических санкций. Растущие опасения относительно рисков иностранного вмешательства во внутреннюю политику в значительной степени опираются на ту же логику – они позиционируют такого рода операции как замену военного противоборства. В настоящей статье делается попытка углубить понимание связи между военно-политическим сдерживанием и иностранным вмешательством во внутренние дела на основе изучения опыта начала Холодной войны с 1948 года по середину 1950-х годов. Проведённый анализ свидетельствует, что опасения относительно советского военного потенциала оказали сдерживающее воздействие на политику США. Соединённые Штаты демонстрировали большую осторожность при проведении подрывных операций против СССР по сравнению с их кампаниями, направленными против более слабых в военном плане государств. Этот исторический опыт показывает, что военно-политическое сдерживание более успешно в ограничении вмешательства, чем других видов давления. В отличие от иных способов принуждения вмешательство порождает экзистенциальную опасность для политических лидеров государства-объекта, провоцируя исключительно жёсткий ответ с их стороны. В этой связи подрывные действия создают значительные риски эскалации, когда они предпринимаются против великой державы. Вмешательство обостряет противостояние даже между государства, которые заранее уверены во враждебности друг друга. Хотя военный потенциал не предоставляет непосредственной защиты от подрывных действий, он существенно демотивирует потенциальных инициаторов вмешательства. Полученные выводы не связаны с конкретными формами вмешательства. Они указывают, что увязывание сдерживания в различных областях соперничества может быть более успешным, чем предполагает парадокс стабильности-нестабильности.

Academic literature is largely skeptical regarding the role of military deterrence in addressing low-level coercion. The stability-instability paradox suggests that increasing destructiveness of the armed forces (especially with the emergence of nuclear weapons) diminishes their utility in response to limited wars, proxy conflicts or economic sanctions. Recent debates often extend the same logic to foreign interference in internal affairs, as they position it as a supplement for forcible rivalries. This article seeks to advance understanding of the linkage between military deterrence and foreign interference in internal politics by exploring the record of the early Cold War starting from 1948 to the mid-1950s. The analysis attests that concern over the Soviet military capabilities had a major restraining effect on Washington. As a result, the US pursued more cautious activities against the Soviet Union in comparison to the campaigns targeting less capable states. This historical record reveals that interference is more amenable to military deterrence than other types of low-level coercion. It differs from them, as covert operations produce an existential danger to the political leaders of a target state, inciting overreaction on their behalf. Therefore, they create escalation risks when threatening a great power. Interference exacerbates confrontation even between adversaries that perceived each other as malign beforehand. Apart from signaling hostile intentions, it aggravates a sense of urgency on finding a response. Although military capabilities do not provide a direct solution to political threats, they serve as a repellent against potential subversive activities. These conclusions do not depend on the specific type of interference pursued by external agents. The findings of the article demonstrate that cross-domain deterrence is more prevalent than stability-instability paradox envisages.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.