Алексей Сергеевич Лебедев – старший советник, руководитель группы экономики Посольства России в ФРГ
The article analyzes the discrepancy between the declared goals of sanctions against Russia and their practical effects. The author puts forward a hypothesis according to which the real purpose of the anti-Russian sanctions imposed after the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine is not to change the foreign policy of the Russian Federation but to weaken the country as much as possible by causing economic damage to it and destabilizing the domestic political situation. Under these conditions, it is reasonable to consider sanctions as an "economic war," which raises the question of the goals of such a war, the choice of optimal methods for its conduct, and ways to minimize damage to the national economy. The author distinguishes between "defensive" and "offensive" methods of economic warfare. The article argues that a country that has become the object of large-scale sanctions is unable to successfully resist them in the long term, relying solely on "defensive" mechanisms (for example, measures to support the economy). It must resort to "offensive" tools as well, for instance to the embargo for the export of goods that are of key importance for the stability of the economic model of the countries that initiated the sanctions.
В статье анализируется расхождение между декларируемыми целями санкций против России и их практическими эффектами. Автор выдвигает гипотезу, согласно которой действительной целью антироссийских санкций, введённых после начала специальной военной операции России на Украине, является не изменение внешней политики РФ, а максимальное ослабление страны посредством нанесения ей экономического ущерба и дестабилизации внутриполитической ситуации. В этих условиях обоснованно рассматривать санкции как «экономическую войну», в связи с чем встаёт вопрос о целях такой войны, выборе оптимальных методов её ведения и определении путей минимизации ущерба национальной экономике. Автор разграничивает «оборонительные» и «наступательные» методы ведения экономической войны, относя к последним и весь спектр санкционных мер. В статье утверждается, что страна, ставшая объектом масштабных санкций, в долгосрочной перспективе неспособна успешно противостоять им с опорой исключительно на «оборонительные» механизмы (например, меры поддержки экономики), что обусловливает необходимость обращения к «наступательному» инструментарию, в частности, к эмбарго на экспорт товаров, имеющих ключевое значение для стабильности хозяйственной модели стран – инициаторов санкций.
The article analyzes the discrepancy between the declared goals of sanctions against Russia and their practical effects. The author puts forward a hypothesis according to which the real purpose of the anti-Russian sanctions imposed after the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine is not to change the foreign policy of the Russian Federation but to weaken the country as much as possible by causing economic damage to it and destabilizing the domestic political situation. Under these conditions, it is reasonable to consider sanctions as an "economic war," which raises the question of the goals of such a war, the choice of optimal methods for its conduct, and ways to minimize damage to the national economy. The author distinguishes between "defensive" and "offensive" methods of economic warfare. The article argues that a country that has become the object of large-scale sanctions is unable to successfully resist them in the long term, relying solely on "defensive" mechanisms (for example, measures to support the economy). It must resort to "offensive" tools as well, for instance to the embargo for the export of goods that are of key importance for the stability of the economic model of the countries that initiated the sanctions.
The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.