<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Publishing DTD v1.3 20210610//EN" "JATS-journalpublishing1-3.dtd">
<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">mgimoreview</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вестник МГИМО-Университета</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>MGIMO Review of International Relations</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2071-8160</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2541-9099</issn><publisher><publisher-name>MGIMO Universty Press</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.24833/2071-8160-2024-4-97-83-100</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">mgimoreview-3740</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ СТАТЬИ. Теоретические вопросы посредничества и дипломатии</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>RESEARCH ARTICLES. Theoretical issues of mediation and diplomacy</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Динамика достижения консенсуса в международных переговорах</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Time to Consensus in International Negotiations</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0251-1958</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Аронов</surname><given-names>И. З.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Aronov</surname><given-names>I. Z.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Аронов Иосиф Зиновьевич – доктор технических наук, профессор кафедры «Торговое дело и торговое регулирование»</p><p>119454, Москва, проспект Вернадского, 76</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Iosif Z. Aronov – Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor, Department “Trade and Trade Regulation”</p><p>76 Prospect Vernadskogo, Moscow, Russia, 119454</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">aronoviz48@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0569-8650</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Максимова</surname><given-names>О. В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Maksimova</surname><given-names>O. V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Максимова Ольга Владимировна – кандидат технических наук, ведущий научный сотрудник Института глобального климата и экологии имени академика Ю.А. Израэля; доцент кафедры математики Университета науки и технологий</p><p>107258, Москва, ул. Глебовская, д. 20Б; 119049, Москва, Ленинский пр-т, 4</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Olga V. Maksimova – Ph.D. in Technical Sciences, Leading Research Fellow, Y.A. Izrael Institute of Global Climate and Ecology; Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics, National University of Science and Technology;</p><p>20B Glebovskaya Str., Moscow, Russia, 107058; 4 Leninsky Pr., Moscow, Russia, 119049</p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>МГИМО МИД России</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>MGIMO University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Институт глобального климата и экологии им. Ю.А. Израэля; НИТУ МИСИС</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Yu.A. Izrael Institute of Global Climate and Ecology (IGCE); National University of Science and Technology «MISIS»</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2024</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>10</day><month>09</month><year>2024</year></pub-date><volume>17</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>83</fpage><lpage>100</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Аронов И.З., Максимова О.В., 2024</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2024</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Аронов И.З., Максимова О.В.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Aronov I.Z., Maksimova O.V.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/3740">https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/3740</self-uri><abstract><p>Современные международные отношения, основанные на принципах многополярности, предполагают использование консенсуса как ключевого механизма принятия решений, подчёркивающего уважительное отношение к участникам переговоров и учёт мнений всех сторон на равноправной основе. В настоящее время принцип консенсуса лежит в основе деятельности многих международных организаций. Однако, в ряде случаев, таких как Всемирная торговая организация (ВТО), он всё чаще подвергается критике за низкую эффективность и значительные временные затраты. Это подчёркивает необходимость исследования факторов, влияющих на время, требуемое для достижения консенсуса.В данной статье с использованием формального математического моделирования на основе доработанной модели ДеГроота исследуется влияние различных факторов, таких как размер группы переговорщиков, уровень авторитарности её членов, доминирование в группе и формирование коалиций, на время достижения консенсуса в переговорном процессе. Результаты исследования показывают, что увеличение размера группы само по себе приводит лишь к незначительному увеличению времени, необходимого для достижения консенсуса, и становится значимым фактором только при высоком уровне авторитарности участников. В то же время, наличие авторитарного члена в группе существенно увеличивает время принятия решений даже в малых группах, а формирование коалиций (например, в случае присутствия нескольких абсолютно авторитарных членов) делает консенсус невозможным. Применение правила «консенсус минус k» для выхода из тупиковой ситуации оказывается неэффективным для международных организаций с большим числом участников, имеющих разнородные интересы. В иерархических структурах консенсус достигается путём проведения предварительных переговоров в подгруппах, что дополнительно увеличивает время, необходимое для принятия решения.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Contemporary international relations, anchored in the principles of multipolarity, frequently employ consensus-based decision-making, which prioritizes respect for all negotiating parties and ensures that the views of all participants are considered equally. While consensus remains a core mechanism for many international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), it has increasingly come under criticism for its inefficiency and substantial time requirements. This highlights the importance of examining the factors that influence the time needed to reach consensus. Utilizing formal mathematical modeling based on a modified DeGroot model, this article explores how variables such as the size of the negotiating group, the level of authoritativeness, dominance dynamics within the group, and coalition formation affect the time required to achieve consensus. The findings indicate that an increase in group size, on its own, results in only a minor increase in the time needed to reach consensus, becoming a significant factor only when paired with high levels of authoritativeness among the participants. Conversely, the presence of a highly authoritative member within a negotiating group significantly prolongs decision-making time, even in smaller groups, and the formation of coalitions (e.g., due to multiple highly authoritative members) can make reaching consensus impossible. The "consensus minus k" rule, intended to break deadlocks, is found to be ineffective for international organizations with numerous participants and divergent interests. In hierarchical structures, consensus is typically achieved through preliminary negotiations within subgroups, which further prolongs the consensusbuilding process.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>принятие решений</kwd><kwd>консенсус</kwd><kwd>время достижения консенсуса</kwd><kwd>авторитарность</kwd><kwd>коалиции</kwd><kwd>переговоры</kwd><kwd>немаваши</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>decision-making</kwd><kwd>consensus</kwd><kwd>time to reach consensus</kwd><kwd>authoritativeness</kwd><kwd>negotiation</kwd><kwd>coalitions</kwd><kwd>nemawashi</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Avery M., Auvine B., Streibel B., Weiss L. 1981. Building United Judgment: A handbook for consensus decision making. Madison: The Center for Conflict Resolution. 124 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Avery M., Auvine B., Streibel B., Weiss L. 1981. Building United Judgment: A handbook for consensus decision making. Madison: The Center for Conflict Resolution. 124 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Brinton H.H. 1964. Friends for 300 Years. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Pendle Hill Publications. 240 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Brinton H.H. 1964. Friends for 300 Years. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Pendle Hill Publications. 240 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit3"><label>3</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Bolewski W.2008 Diplomatic Processes and Cultural Variations: The Relevance of Culture in Diplomacy. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations. (Winter/Spring). P. 145-160.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bolewski W.2008 Diplomatic Processes and Cultural Variations: The Relevance of Culture in Diplomacy. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations. (Winter/Spring). P. 145-160.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit4"><label>4</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Charnysh V., Lloyd P., Simmons B.A. 2015. Frames and consensus formation in international relations: The case of trafficking in persons. European Journal of International Relations. 21(2). P. 323-351.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Charnysh V., Lloyd P., Simmons B.A. 2015. Frames and consensus formation in international relations: The case of trafficking in persons. European Journal of International Relations. 21(2). P. 323-351.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit5"><label>5</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">DeGroot M.H. 1974. Reaching a consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association. 69(345). P. 118-121.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">DeGroot M.H. 1974. Reaching a consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association. 69(345). P. 118-121.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit6"><label>6</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Gavrilets S., Auerbach J., van Vugt M. 2016. Convergence to consensus in heterogeneous groups and the emergence of informal leadership. Scientific Reports. № 6. DOI: 10.1038/srep29704</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Gavrilets S., Auerbach J., van Vugt M. 2016. Convergence to consensus in heterogeneous groups and the emergence of informal leadership. Scientific Reports. № 6. DOI: 10.1038/srep29704</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit7"><label>7</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Footer M.E. 1997. The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-Making. Northwestern Journal of International Law &amp; Business. 17(1). P. 653-680.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Footer M.E. 1997. The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-Making. Northwestern Journal of International Law &amp; Business. 17(1). P. 653-680.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit8"><label>8</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Gould E. R. 2016. What consensus?: Explaining the rise of consensus decision-making in international organizations.10-th Annual Conference on Political Economy of International Organizations. Bern. February 12-14. URL: https://www.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Gould-PEIO-2.2.pdf (accessed: 03.08.2024)</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Gould E. R. 2016. What consensus?: Explaining the rise of consensus decision-making in international  organizations.10-th Annual Conference on Political Economy of International Organizations. Bern. February 12-14. URL: https://www.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Gould-PEIO-2.2.pdf (accessed: 03.08.2024)</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit9"><label>9</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Haghirian P. 2016. Routledge Handbook of Japanese Business and Management. NY: Taylor&amp;Francis. 403 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Haghirian P. 2016. Routledge Handbook of Japanese Business and Management. NY: Taylor&amp;Francis. 403 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit10"><label>10</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Häge F.M. 2013.Coalition Building and Consensus in the Council of the European Union. British Journal of Political Science. 43(3).P. 481-504. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123412000439.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Häge F.M.  2013.Coalition Building and Consensus in the Council of the European Union. British Journal of Political Science. 43(3).P. 481-504. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123412000439.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit11"><label>11</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hüffmeier J., Freund P.A., Zerres A., Backhaus K., Hertel G. 2011. Being Tough or Being Nice? A Meta-Analysis on the Impact of Hardand Softline Strategies in Distributive Negotiations. Journal of management. 40(3). P.866-892.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Hüffmeier J., Freund P.A., Zerres A., Backhaus K., Hertel G. 2011. Being Tough or Being Nice? A Meta-Analysis on the Impact of Hardand Softline Strategies in Distributive Negotiations. Journal of management. 40(3). P.866-892.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit12"><label>12</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Jedruch J. 1998. Constitutions, Elections, and Legislatures of Poland, 1493-1993: A Guide to Their History. NYC: Hippocrene Books.487 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Jedruch J. 1998. Constitutions, Elections, and Legislatures of Poland, 1493-1993: A Guide to Their History. NYC: Hippocrene Books.487 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit13"><label>13</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kameda N. 2014. Japanese Business Discourse of Oneness: A Personal Perspective. International Journal of Business Communication. 51(1). P. 93–113.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kameda N. 2014. Japanese Business Discourse of Oneness: A Personal Perspective. International Journal of Business Communication. 51(1). P. 93–113.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit14"><label>14</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kawashima Yu. 2003. Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.163 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kawashima Yu. 2003. Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.163 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit15"><label>15</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kerr N. 1989. Illusions of efficacy: The effects of group size on perceived efficacy in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Vol. 25. P. 287–313.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kerr N. 1989. Illusions of efficacy: The effects of group size on perceived efficacy in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Vol. 25. P. 287–313.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit16"><label>16</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Klimek P., Hanel R., Thurner S. 2009. To how many politicians should government to be left? Physica A: Statistical Mechanisms and its Applications. 388(18). P. 3939-3947.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Klimek P., Hanel R., Thurner S. 2009. To how many politicians should government to be left? Physica A: Statistical Mechanisms and its Applications. 388(18). P. 3939-3947.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit17"><label>17</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kudish S., Cohen-Chen S., Halperin E. 2015. Increasing support for concession-making in intractable conflicts: The role of conflict uniqueness. Peaceand Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology. 21(2). P. 248–263.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kudish S., Cohen-Chen S., Halperin E. 2015. Increasing support for concession-making in intractable conflicts: The role of conflict uniqueness. Peaceand Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology. 21(2). P. 248–263.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit18"><label>18</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Lawler E.J.,Ford R., Large M.D. 1999. Unilateral Initiatives as a Conflict Resolution Strategy. Social Psychology Quarterly. 62(3). P. 240-256.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Lawler E.J.,Ford R., Large M.D. 1999. Unilateral Initiatives as a Conflict Resolution Strategy. Social Psychology Quarterly. 62(3). P. 240-256.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit19"><label>19</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Moscovici S., Doise W. 1994. Conflict and Consensus: A general theory of collective decisions. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. 224 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Moscovici S., Doise W. 1994. Conflict and Consensus: A general theory of collective decisions. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. 224 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit20"><label>20</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Noorderhaven N. G., Benders, J. G. J. M., Keizer A. B. 2007.Comprehensiveness versus pragmatism; Consensus at the Japanese-Dutch interface. Journal of management studies. 44(8). P. 13491370.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Noorderhaven N. G., Benders, J. G. J. M., Keizer A. B. 2007.Comprehensiveness versus pragmatism; Consensus at the Japanese-Dutch interface. Journal of management studies. 44(8). P. 13491370.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit21"><label>21</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Onuoha A., Nnubia O.C. 2023. The Consensus Principle of the World Trade Organization and the Interests of Developing Countries: A Legal Evaluation. Achievers University Law Journal. 3(2). P.175-193.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Onuoha A., Nnubia O.C. 2023. The Consensus Principle of the World Trade Organization and the Interests of Developing Countries: A Legal Evaluation. Achievers University Law Journal. 3(2). P.175-193.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit22"><label>22</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Riker W. 1962. The theory of political coalitions. New Haven, L.: Yale University press. 300 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Riker W. 1962. The theory of political coalitions. New Haven, L.: Yale University press. 300 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit23"><label>23</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Rumison K.C. 1998. Unanimity as a rule for group consensus: a review of the theoretical and experimental literature on the use of unanimity in group decision making. Modern Psychological Studies. 6(1). P. 9-24.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Rumison K.C. 1998. Unanimity as a rule for group consensus: a review of the theoretical and experimental literature on the use of unanimity in group decision making. Modern Psychological Studies. 6(1). P. 9-24.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit24"><label>24</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Sagi S. 2015. “Nemawashi” A Technique to Gain Consensus in Japanese Management Systems: An Overview. International Journal of Arts, Humanities and Management Studies. 1(4). P. 23-27.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Sagi S. 2015. “Nemawashi” A Technique to Gain Consensus in Japanese Management Systems: An Overview. International Journal of Arts, Humanities and Management Studies. 1(4). P. 23-27.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit25"><label>25</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kwon S., Weingart L.R. 2004. Unilateral Concessions from the Other Party: Concession Behavior, Attributions, and Negotiation Judgments. Journal of Applied Psychology. 89(2). P. 263-278.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kwon S., Weingart L.R. 2004. Unilateral Concessions from the Other Party: Concession Behavior, Attributions, and Negotiation Judgments. Journal of Applied Psychology. 89(2). P. 263-278.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit26"><label>26</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Slantchev B. L. 2005. Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium. Security Studies. 14(4). P. 565-606. DOI: 10.1080/09636410500468792.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Slantchev B. L. 2005. Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium. Security Studies. 14(4). P. 565-606. DOI: 10.1080/09636410500468792.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit27"><label>27</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Suh Y., Choe Y.-Y.A. 2010. Negotiators as Mediators: The Case of 1987–1995 Korea-United States Bilateral Trade Negotiations. Negotiation Journal. 26 (4). P. 435–452. DOI: 10.1111/j.1571-9979.2010.00283.x</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Suh Y., Choe Y.-Y.A. 2010. Negotiators as Mediators: The Case of 1987–1995 Korea-United States Bilateral Trade Negotiations. Negotiation Journal. 26 (4). P. 435–452. DOI: 10.1111/j.1571-9979.2010.00283.x</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit28"><label>28</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Wiltermuth S., Tiedens L.Z., Neale M. 2015. The Benefits of Dominance Complementarity in Negotiations, Negotiation and Conflict Management Research. 8(3). 194-209.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Wiltermuth S., Tiedens L.Z., Neale M. 2015. The Benefits of Dominance Complementarity in Negotiations, Negotiation and Conflict Management Research. 8(3). 194-209.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit29"><label>29</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Zampetti A. B., Low P., Mavroidis P. C. 2021. Consensus Decision-Making and Legislative Inertia at the WTO: Can International Law Help? World Trade. 56(1). P. 1-26.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Zampetti A. B., Low P., Mavroidis P. C.  2021. Consensus Decision-Making and Legislative Inertia at the WTO: Can International Law Help? World Trade. 56(1). P. 1-26.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit30"><label>30</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Zazhigalkin A.V., Aronov I.Z., Maksimova O.V., Papic L. 2019. Control of consensus convergence in technical committees of standardization on the basis of regular Markov chains model. International Journal of Systems Assurance Engineering and Management. 10(S1). P. 29-36. DOI:10.1007/s13198-019-00765-1</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Zazhigalkin A.V., Aronov I.Z., Maksimova O.V., Papic L. 2019. Control of consensus convergence in technical committees of standardization on the basis of regular Markov chains model. International Journal of Systems Assurance Engineering and Management. 10(S1). P. 29-36. DOI:10.1007/s13198-019-00765-1</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit31"><label>31</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Аронов И.З., Максимова О.В.2021.Моделирование достижения консенсуса в условиях доминирования в социальной группе. Компьютерные исследование и моделирование. 13(5). С. 161-171.DOI: 10.20537/2076-7633-2021-13-5-1067-1078.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Aronov I.Z., Maksimova O.V. 2021. Modelirovaniye dostizheniya konsensusa v usloviyakh dominirovaniya v sotsial'noy gruppe [Modeling the achievement of consensus under conditions of dominance in a social group]. Computer Research and Modeling. 13(5). P. 161-171. (In Russian) DOI: 10.20537/2076-7633-2021-13-5-1067-1078</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit32"><label>32</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Аронов И. З., Максимова О. В. 2022. Математическая модель консенсуса в социальной группе при наличии лидера и руководителя. Информационно-экономические аспекты стандартизации и технического регулирования. 2(66). С. 12–21.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Aronov I. Z., Maksimova O. V. 2022. Matematicheskaya model' konsensusa v sotsial'noy gruppe pri nalichii lidera i rukovoditelya [A mathematical model of consensus in a social group in the presence of a leader and a leader]. Informatsionno-ekonomicheskiye aspekty standartizatsii I tekhnicheskogo regulirovaniya. 2(66). P. 12-21. (In Russian)</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit33"><label>33</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Барахвостов П.А. 2021. Институциональные особенности интеграции земель Речи Посполитой в состав Российской и Австрийской империй. Вестник МГИМО-Университета. 14 (4). С.51-69.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Barakhvostov P.A. 2021. Institutsional'nyye osobennosti integratsii zemel' Rechi Pospolitoy v sostav Rossiyskoy i Avstriyskoy imperiy [Institutional features of the integration of the lands of the Commonwealth into the Russian and Austrian empires]. MGIMO Review of International Relations. 14 (4). P.51-69. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit34"><label>34</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Гильбоа И. 2022. Как принять наилучшее решение? Теория принятия решений. М: Издательский дом «Дело». 286 с.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Gilboa I. 2022. Kak printyat' nailuchsheye reshenie? Teoriya prinyatiya resheniy [How to make the best decision? Decision-making theory] Moscow: Izdatel'skidom «Delo». 286 p. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit35"><label>35</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kaveshnikov N. Yu. 2021. Obychnayazakonodatel'nayaprotsedura v YES kak primer kooperativnykhpraktik [Regular legislative procedure in the EU as an example of cooperative practices]. MGIMO Review of International Relations. 14(1). P. 126-147. (In Russian)</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kaveshnikov N. Yu. 2021. Obychnayazakonodatel'nayaprotsedura v YES kak primer kooperativnykhpraktik [Regular legislative procedure in the EU as an example of cooperative practices]. MGIMO Review of International Relations. 14(1). P. 126-147. (In Russian)</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit36"><label>36</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kaveshnikov N.Yu., Domanov A.O. 2022. Skorost’ zakonodatel’nogo protsessa v Evropeiyskom Soyuze [Factors behind legislative duration in the European Union]. Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. Vol. 20. No 1(68). P. 80-108. (In Russian)</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kaveshnikov N.Yu., Domanov A.O. 2022. Skorost’ zakonodatel’nogo protsessa v Evropeiyskom Soyuze [Factors behind legislative duration in the European Union]. Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. Vol. 20. No 1(68). P. 80-108. (In Russian)</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit37"><label>37</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Portansky A.P. 2021. Mirovaya torgovaya systema: vyzovy XXI veka. [World trading system: challenges of the 21st century]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. 208 p. (In Russian).</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Portansky A.P. 2021. Mirovaya torgovaya systema: vyzovy XXI veka. [World trading system: challenges of the 21st century]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. 208 p. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit38"><label>38</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Romanova E.V. 2016. Traktovki «Evropeyskogo koncerta» vbritanskoy I amerikanskoy istoriografii. [Interpretations of the «European concert» in British and American historiography]. MGIMO Review of International Relations. 1(46). P.7-17. (In Russian).</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Romanova E.V. 2016. Traktovki «Evropeyskogo koncerta» vbritanskoy I amerikanskoy istoriografii. [Interpretations of the «European concert» in British and American historiography]. MGIMO Review of International Relations. 1(46). P.7-17. (In Russian).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit39"><label>39</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Tabarovskaya M.A. 2017. Koalitsii kak instrument economicheskoy diplomatii v ramkakh Vsemirnoy Torgovoy Organizatsii. [Coalitions as a tool of economic diplomacy within the World Trade Organization] Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchenoy stepeni kandidata economicheskikh nauk. Sankt-Peterburg. 24 p. (In Russian)</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Tabarovskaya M.A. 2017. Koalitsii kak instrument economicheskoy diplomatii v ramkakh Vsemirnoy Torgovoy Organizatsii. [Coalitions as a tool of economic diplomacy within the World Trade Organization] Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchenoy stepeni kandidata economicheskikh nauk. Sankt-Peterburg. 24 p. (In Russian)</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit40"><label>40</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Tcibulina A.N., Kaveshnikov N. YU. 2022. Dinamika zakonotvorcheskogo protsessa v oblasti Edinogo vnutrennego rynka Evropeyskogo soyuza. [Dynamics of the legislative process in the field of the Single Internal Market of the European Union] Politicheskaya nauka. № 3. P. 256–275.  (In Russian)</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Tcibulina A.N., Kaveshnikov N. YU. 2022. Dinamika zakonotvorcheskogo protsessa v oblasti Edinogo vnutrennego rynka Evropeyskogo soyuza. [Dynamics of the legislative process in the field of the Single Internal Market of the European Union] Politicheskaya nauka. № 3. P. 256–275.  (In Russian)</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref></ref-list><fn-group><fn fn-type="conflict"><p>The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.</p></fn></fn-group></back></article>
