mgimoreviewВестник МГИМО-УниверситетаMGIMO Review of International Relations2071-81602541-9099MGIMO Universty Press10.24833/2071-8160-2025-6-105-174-192mgimoreview-4129Research ArticleИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ СТАТЬИ. Европейский Союз в мировой политикеRESEARCH ARTICLES. European Union in World PoliticsВлияние отказа от консенсуса на скорость законодательного процесса в Европейском союзеThe Impact of Renunciation of Consensus on the Speed of Legislative Process in the European UnionКавешниковН. Ю.KaveshnikovN. Yu.

Николай Юрьевич Кавешников – кандидат политических наук, заведующий кафедрой интеграционных процессов

119454, Россия, Москва, пр-т Вернадского, 76

Nikolay Yu. Kaveshnikov – Candidate of Political Science (PhD), Head of the Department of Integration Processes

76 Vernadsky Avenue, Moscow 119454, Russian Federation

nikandrrr@mail.ruДомановА. О.DomanovA. O.

Доманов Алексей Олегович – научный сотрудник

125009, Россия, Москва, Моховая ул., дом 11, стр. 3

Alexey O. Domanov – Research Fellow, Institute of Europe

3 Mokhovaya St., Moscow 125009, Russian Federation

domanov.aleksey@gmail.comМосковский государственный институт международных отношений (университет) МИД РоссииРоссияMGIMO UniversityRussian FederationИнститут Европы РАНРоссияInstitute of Europe, Russian Academy of SciencesRussian Federation202530122025186174192Copyright © Кавешников Н.Ю., Доманов А.О., 20252025Кавешников Н.Ю., Доманов А.О.Kaveshnikov N.Y., Domanov A.O.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/4129

В настоящей работе проведено количественное эмпирическое исследование влияния порядка принятия решений в Совете министров на скорость законодательного процесса в Европейском союзе. Реформы законодательных процедур в 1990-2000-е гг. преследовали две в значительной степени конкурирующие цели – повышение легитимности и эффективности. Легитимность законодательного процесса стремились упрочить прежде всего за счёт увеличения роли Европарламента. Ключевым способом повышения эффективности (скорости) законодательного процесса традиционно считался отказ от консенсуса в Совете министров и переход к принятию решений голосованием квалифицированным большинством (ГКБ). Цель настоящей работы состоит в том, чтобы выяснить, в какой степени голосование квалифицированным большинством в Совете оказывает ускоряющий эффект на принятие законодательства. Базу эмпирических данных исследования составили директивы и регламенты вторичного права ЕС, принятые в соответствии с обычной законодательной процедурой и процедурой консультации за период с 1994 по 2019 гг. (всего 2546 документов). В отличии от предшествующих исследований такого рода, были собраны данные о фактическом методе принятия решения в Совете. Исследование проведено с использованием анализа выживаемости (модель Кокса) и дескриптивных методов анализа статистических данных (диаграммы размаха и скользящие средние). Использованные методы и дизайн исследования позволяют отделить влияние различный институциональных параметров и в чистом виде оценить эффект порядка принятия решений в Совете на скорость законодательного процесса. Исследование показало, что ускорение законодательного процесса в связи с отказом от консенсуса в Совете количественно меньше, чем его замедление в связи с увеличением полномочий Европарламента. В стремлении повысить легитимность Евросоюза пришлось в определённой степени пожертвовать эффективностью. Пределы возможного отказа от принципа консенсуса практически достигнуты, и потому мало оснований ожидать существенного увеличения эффективности принятия законодательства в ЕС. Результаты исследования имеют принципиальное значение для понимания особенностей функционирования ЕС.

This article assesses whether abandoning consensus in the Council of Ministers has, in practice, accelerated EU law-making. Institutional reforms in the 1990s–2000s pursued two partly competing objectives: strengthening legitimacy by empowering the European Parliament and improving efficiency by expanding the scope for qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council. Against the widespread expectation that QMV should shorten legislative duration, the article asks whether Council voting by qualified majority continues to have an independent accelerating effect once the EU’s evolving institutional environment is taken seriously. The analysis draws on an original dataset of EU directives and regulations adopted as secondary law under the ordinary legislative procedure and the consultation procedure between 1994 and 2019 (N = 2,546). Crucially, unlike most earlier studies that infer Council decision rules from treaty legal bases, the dataset codes the actual decision method in the Council – distinguishing between de jure QMV adopted by consensus and de jure QMV adopted by recorded vote – using Council monthly reports and voting records where necessary.

Methodologically, the article combines descriptive evidence (box plots and moving averages) with survival analysis (a Cox proportional hazards model), allowing the effect of the Council’s decision method to be separated from other determinants of legislative duration and from cross-procedure heterogeneity. The results qualify conventional accounts of “efficiency gains” from replacing unanimity with QMV. Under the ordinary legislative procedure, acts adopted by consensus are, on average, completed faster than acts adopted by qualified-majority vote – consistent with the interpretation that consensus more often reflects low underlying preference dispersion among member states, whereas recourse to voting signals deeper disagreement and more costly bargaining.

Under the consultation procedure, by contrast, mandatory unanimity substantially slows adoption compared with the legal possibility of QMV; yet where QMV is legally available, there is no meaningful difference between adoption by recorded vote and adoption by “voluntary” consensus, underscoring the continued relevance of the Council’s consensus-seeking practices.

Taken together, the findings suggest that the efficiency dividend from extending QMV has been more limited than often assumed, while the empowerment of the European Parliament has imposed larger time costs on EU law-making. The practical scope for further accelerating legislation through additional departures from consensus therefore appears constrained, which has implications for debates on the EU’s capacity to deliver policy under conditions of expanding responsibilities and heightened legitimacy requirements.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.