mgimoreviewВестник МГИМО-УниверситетаMGIMO Review of International Relations2071-81602541-9099MGIMO Universty Press10.24833/2071-8160-2017-5-56-209-232mgimoreview-680Research ArticleЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ТЕОРИЯECONOMIC THEORYСТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЕ ПРЕДОТВРАЩЕНИЕ ВХОДА ФИРМ НА РЫНОК: ОБЗОР МОДЕЛЕЙSTRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE MODELING: LITERATURE REVIEWСеливерстовД. А.SeliverstovD. A.

Селиверстов Денис Анатольевич– аспирант кафедры прикладной экономики

119454, г. Москва, проспект Вернадского, 76

Denis A. Seliverstov– PhD student of Applied Economics Department 

76, Prospect Vernadskogo, Moscow, 119454

DENIS_FP@mail.ruМосковский государственный институт международных отношений (университет) МИД РоссииРоссияMoscow State Institute of International Relations (University)Russian Federation20170511201705(56)209235Copyright © Селиверстов Д.А., 20172017Селиверстов Д.А.Seliverstov D.A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/680

В статье рассмотрены результаты ключевых исследований, посвящённых анализу стратегического поведения старожилов рынка, направленного на предотвращение входа на рынок новых фирм. Автором выделены основные направления научных исследований в данной области, позволяющие понять особенности воздействия фирм-старожилов на поведение фирм-новичков, методы и последствия политики недопущения новых фирм на рынок.

На сегодняшний день отрасли со свободным входом представляют собой редкое явление. Зачастую проникновение новых фирм на рынок сопряжено со значительными издержками входа, которые дают возможность фирмам-старожилам пользоваться преимущественным положением на рынке и получать положительную экономическую прибыль. В случае угрозы проникновения на рынок потенциальных конкурентов старожилы предпринимают стратегические действия, направленные на предотвращение входа и сохранение своего доминирующего положения. Среди наиболее эффективных стратегий можно выделить создание дополнительных издержек входа для новичков посредством установления лимитирующего объёма выпуска продукции и лимитирующей цены, инвестиций в невозвратные активы, а также дифференциации продукции. Такие действия оказывают прямое влияние на издержки и/или прибыль новичка и способны изменить ожидания потенциального конкурента относительно будущих намерений старожилов сохранить своё доминирование на рынке.

The prime focus in this article is on key findings concerning theoretical aspects of strategic behavior by incumbents to deter market entry of new firms. The author summarizes main lines of scientific research in the topic which give an insight into the patterns of the incumbent’s impact on the behavior of the entrants, the entry deterrence instruments and the consequences of these actions.

Today the free entry markets are considered to be a rare phenomenon. The market entry of new firms is associated with significant entry costs, which allow the incumbents to take advantage of their dominant position and derive positive economic profits. In case of entry threat by potential competitors the incumbents take strategic actions aimed at deterring entry and preserving their dominant position. Among the most efficient strategic actions one can emphasize the erection of additional barriers to entry for the newcomers through producing the limit output and price, investments in sunk assets, capacity expansion and product differentiation. Meanwhile by taking strategic actions the incumbents are not always trying to affect the entrant’s costs and profit directly, they often aim at changing the entrant’s expectations regarding future intentions of the incumbents to preserve dominant position.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.