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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">mgimoreview</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вестник МГИМО-Университета</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>MGIMO Review of International Relations</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2071-8160</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2541-9099</issn><publisher><publisher-name>MGIMO Universty Press</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.24833/2071-8160-2019-3-66-17-41</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">mgimoreview-961</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЕ СТАТЬИ. Международные санкции</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>RESEARCH ARTICLES. International Sanctions</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>«Санкционное таргетирование»: инструмент внешней политики, нечестной конкуренции или глобального социального инжиниринга?</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Targeted Sanctions: a Tool of Foreign Policy, Unfair Competition or Global Social Engineering?</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Фитуни</surname><given-names>Л. Л.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Fituni</surname><given-names>L. L.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>член-корреспондент РАН, д.э.н., профессор; заместитель директора по научной работе Института Африки РАН; заведующий Центром глобальных и стратегических исследований ИАфРАН; профессор РУДН, МГУ и СПбГУ</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr.Sc. (Economics), Professor; Deputy Director, Institute of African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; Professor at PFUR, Moscow State University and StPetersburg State University</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">africa.institute@yandex.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">Институт Африки РАН Российский университет дружбы народов;&#13;
ИСАА МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова;&#13;
Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет<country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">Institute of African studies;&#13;
Peoples ' friendship University of Russia;&#13;
ISAA MGU im. M. V. Lomonosov;&#13;
St. Petersburg state University;<country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2019</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>28</day><month>07</month><year>2019</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>3(66)</issue><fpage>17</fpage><lpage>41</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Фитуни Л.Л., 2019</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2019</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Фитуни Л.Л.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Fituni L.L.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/961">https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/961</self-uri><abstract><p>В последние десятилетия качественно новую масштабность и системность приобрело использование асимметричных и гибридных мер на мировой арене, которые в наши дни переросли в одну из ведущих форм внешнего давления и принуждения, зачастую превосходящую по эффективности угрозу потенциального применения силы и почти равную в этом отношении реальным силовым действиям. В этом комплексе мер страны Запада сегодня отводят едва ли не ключевую роль международному санкционному давлению. Статья посвящена критическому анализу некоторых распространённых подходов к исследованию проблематики «таргетированных» санкций в теории и практике международных отношений. Анализ ведётся в ракурсе использования санкционных механизмов для достижения геостратегических задач, включая такие грандиозные, как социальное конструирование в страновых, региональных и глобальных масштабах. Особое внимание уделено в статье вкладу Томаса Бирстекера в разработку теории и практического дизайна «таргетированных санкций» в международных отношениях, а также полемике с ним по вопросам эффективности их воздействия на различные слои таргетируемых обществ. На основе созданной автором схемы-матрицы санкционного воздействия на элиты и возможных пределов ответных реакций в статье формулируются принципы сегментирования национальной элиты как с точки зрения выявления её слоёв, наиболее восприимчивых к санкционному давлению, так и поиска групп наиболее эффективных, с точки зрения практической имплементации в стране целей и задач санкционного давления извне.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Through the recent decades, the use of asymmetric and hybrid measures in international relations has acquired a qualitatively new scale and system. Today such measures have turned into one of the leading forms of external pressure and subsequent coercion, often exceeding the effectiveness of such straightforward instruments as the threat of potential use of force and almost equal to real power actions. Arguably, among those asymmetric and hybrid measures, Western countries assign a key role to the pressure of international sanction upon competitor nations and uncooperative actors on the world arena. The article is devoted to a critical analysis of some common approaches to the study of the problems of «targeted» sanctions in the theory and practice of international relations and the use of sanctions as a means of achieving geostrategic objectives, including such ambitious ones as social constructivism and social engineering on national, regional and global scales. Particular attention is paid to the contribution of Thomas Biersteker to the development of the theory and of practical designs of «targeted sanctions» in international relations. The author disputes with him over some issues related to the effectiveness of targeted sanctions and the impact they produce upon various sectors of the targeted societies. Based on the author’s schematic matrix of sanctional influences upon national elites and possible limits of their responses, the article formulates the principles of segmentation of the national elites both for the purposes of identifying the layers most susceptible to sanctional pressure and singling out most effective and capable strata from the point of view of practical implementation of the indented outcomes of the undertaken pressure from the outside.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>санкции</kwd><kwd>рестриктивные правовые практики</kwd><kwd>международные отношения</kwd><kwd>социальный конструктивизм</kwd><kwd>элиты</kwd><kwd>политические режимы</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>sanctions</kwd><kwd>restrictive legal practices</kwd><kwd>international relations</kwd><kwd>social constructivism</kwd><kwd>elites</kwd><kwd>political regimes</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group xml:lang="ru"><funding-statement>Исследование выполнено при финансовой поддержке РФФИ в рамках научного проекта РФФИ 19-014-00019 «Санкционное и регулятивное таргетирование национальных элит как инструмент глобального управления и международной конкуренции».</funding-statement></funding-group><funding-group xml:lang="en"><funding-statement>The study was carried out with the financial support of RFBR as part of the RFBR research project 19-014-00019 "Sanctions and regulatory targeting of national elites as a tool of global governance and international competition".</funding-statement></funding-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Абрамова И.О., Фитуни Л.Л. 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