The rise of China as a political and economic actor in the Balkans marks a new stage in the region’s international relations. Through bilateral initiatives with Balkan states, the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and participation in the China–Central and Eastern European Countries (China–CEEC) cooperation framework (formerly the “17+1” platform), Beijing has gained a visible degree of influence – primarily through infrastructure loans, direct investments, and instruments of cultural diplomacy. Considering that less than two decades ago China’s involvement in the region was virtually non-existent, this transformation is significant.

Yet, after an initially ambitious phase, China’s influence has evolved unevenly across the Balkans. This divergence reflects shifting attitudes within the United States, NATO, and the European Union toward China. The steady deterioration of U.S.–China relations– and, to a lesser extent, EU–China relations–has constrained Chinese investments, loans, and acquisitions in the region. The article examines China’s completed and ongoing projects, the causes of suspended or abandoned initiatives, and the evolving policies of Balkan governments toward Beijing.

Grounded in structural realism, the study argues that the global balance of power directly shapes regional dynamics in the Balkans. Within an anarchic international system, where power is concentrated among major states, smaller countries possess limited agency and must adapt to systemic constraints. Thus, despite evident economic incentives for cooperation with China, many Balkan states avoid deeper engagement, as the potential political costs–particularly the risk of straining relations with the United States and the European Union–outweigh the anticipated economic gains.

The article examines the evolution and institutional design of economic diplomacy systems in three post-socialist Central European (CE) countries – Hungary, Poland, and Czechia. Understanding the institutional network potential underlying these countries’ presence in foreign markets is particularly relevant in the context of their adaptation to EU strategic initiatives aimed at expanding economic cooperation with the Global South. The development trajectories of these systems differ: while the Czech model of foreign economic promotion emerged in the 1990s, the Hungarian and Polish systems took shape only in the 2010s, defining the chronological scope of this study. Employing a historical–institutional and systemic approach, the article analyzes national models of foreign economic representation and interest promotion at both institutional and organizational levels.

Despite shared socialist legacies and comparable economic structures, the three countries have adopted divergent governance architectures. Czechia illustrates a decentralized model of institutional interaction; Poland applies a dualistic structure, dividing authority between diplomatic institutions and the Polish Development Fund; Hungary operates a vertical, centralized system dominated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The analysis demonstrates that all three countries have shifted toward microeconomic diplomacy as a prevailing trend, emphasizing business-level internationalization and SME support mechanisms. Special attention is given to institutional reforms, instruments for SME internationalization, and the role of domestic political contexts in shaping governance within support institutions. The study finds that the political evolution of each country has significantly influenced the configuration of its economic diplomacy system: Prague’s pluralistic environment encouraged institutional decentralization and the emergence of multiple coordination mechanisms, whereas the hybrid regimes of Budapest and Warsaw – formed amid processes of democratic backsliding – favored the concentration of economic diplomacy within single, specialized entities. The findings contribute to understanding network-based support systems for SME internationalization in small and medium-sized EU member states and provide a foundation for further research on the institutional network capacities that sustain the external economic engagement of Central European countries.

This article examines the substantive and organizational dimensions of transboundary cooperation and urban paradiplomacy in addressing climate change adaptation. It explores how cities establish international linkages and employ multi-level governance mechanisms to anticipate and respond to climate-related risks. The study is motivated by the growing prominence of climate paradiplomacy, the intensification of regional adaptation policies in Russia, and the increasing vulnerability of coastal cities to the impacts of a changing climate.

Empirical analysis focuses on adaptation strategies and action plans from nine coastal cities of the Baltic region, encompassing ten countries. Applying a comparative matrix-based discourse analysis, the study traces how international and regional organizations, along with city networks such as the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, the Union of the Baltic Cities, and ICLEI Europe, shape local adaptation frameworks and implementation practices. The findings show that while all examined cities have entered the implementation phase of adaptation policy, the degree of institutionalization varies considerably. EU cities operate within an established multilevel governance system supported by European policy instruments, whereas Russian cities follow nationally prescribed methodologies within a more centralized administrative structure.

The results demonstrate that adaptation to climate change has become a central driver of transboundary cooperation and a defining dimension of urban international engagement in the Baltic region. A typological convergence of adaptation strategies is observed, driven by the influence of supranational institutions and the embedding of cities in transnational networks. This convergence reveals a persistent tension between locally grounded priorities and the imperative for coordinated action at regional and global levels. The study concludes that effective adaptation requires interconnected, multi-scalar collaboration among cities and regions, positioning transboundary cooperation not only as a platform for knowledge exchange but also as a structural condition for achieving urban climate resilience.

The article examines burning issues of the formation of an international regime in the field of ensuring international information security in the context of geopolitical transformations and turbulence. The theory of international regimes developed by Russian and foreign researchers is used as a theoretical and methodological basis for the study.

Based on the classical definition of the international regime, the authors focus on the norms and principles in the field of international information security. The norms and principles in the field of international information security as the rules of responsible behavior in the global information space were first proposed by Russia and its SCO partners in 2011 as part of a discussion of the UN General Assembly. However, Russian initiatives met with resistance from the United States, resulting in a fragmentation of the existing regulatory regime in the field of international information security. Currently, the relevant norms and principles, which are based on the fundamental principles of international law, enshrined in the UN Charter, are presented in the resolutions of the UN General Assembly, and are also enshrined in the reports of the Group of Governmental Experts on achievements in the field of informatization and telecommunications in the context of international security.

The norms fixed in the documents are not mandatory, but they make an important contribution to ensuring international stability by structuring the expectations of various actors in the field of information security. However, the lack of formal consolidation and institutionalization of these norms within the framework of international treaties reduces their legitimacy.

: The Second World War laid the groundwork for a new system of international relations in which the United Nations assumed a central coordinating role. Within this framework, the UN became responsible not only for questions of war and peace but also for an expanding spectrum of specialized cooperation—from agriculture to global health. To that end, the member states created a number of specialized agencies, forming the institutional “family” of the United Nations. International civil aviation was among the fields incorporated into this emerging multilateral order. The rapid growth of the aviation industry during the war, the construction of air infrastructure, and the anticipated postwar increase in air traffic generated new opportunities for the Allied powers. The Soviet Union took an active part in the negotiations to elaborate the regulatory framework and establish the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) but ultimately declined to join it upon its creation.

This article examines Moscow’s diplomatic activity in the sphere of multilateral aviation diplomacy between 1943 and 1945. It argues that the Soviet Union sought to participate in postwar civil aviation cooperation but viewed full control over its airspace as a non-negotiable “red line,” which directly contradicted the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom. The inability to reach a compromise—compounded by procedural delays by the U.S., U.K., and Canada in issuing conference invitations and by changes in the composition and agenda of the negotiations unfavorable to the USSR—eventually led Moscow to abstain from joining ICAO.

The study draws on documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF) as well as published collections of U.S. and British diplomatic materials. This archival base allows for a detailed reconstruction of the Soviet logic of decisionmaking and its perception of multilateral diplomacy at the dawn of the UN system. The findings reveal the early contours of the USSR’s approach to international institutions—an approach that would later shape its policy toward other specialized agencies of the United Nations.

The article delves into the genesis of the “knowledge economy” concept as a prime exemplification of the scholarly community's engagement in international politics, facilitated by organizations possessing both scientific and international prominence, such as the OECD. From its inception, the OECD has evolved into an intellectual hub, generating influential documents that exert a substantial impact on the national economic policies of a diverse array of countries, irrespective of their membership status within the organization. This study undertakes an assessment of the evolution of the “knowledge economy” concept within the OECD, employing a dual analytical framework that encompasses intellectual history and international political economy (IPE), with a predominant focus on the neo-Gramscian school of thought within the IPE paradigm.

Our recourse to the neo-Gramscian branch of IPE serves the purpose of delineating the role played by the “knowledge economy” within the broader context of power dynamics and the competing interests of influential groups capable of wielding political and economic influence. Conversely, the intellectual history perspective is instrumental in elucidating the role of the “knowledge economy” in advancing the intellectual pursuits of the scholarly communities actively involved in its conceptual development. When viewed through this lens, the trajectory of the “knowledge economy” from its emergence within the OECD's discourse in the early 1990s to the contemporary era can be characterized as a self-contained cycle. Grounded in the tenets of the “new growth theory,” the “knowledge economy” proffered a perspective that envisaged sustained and intensive non-industrial growth predicated on the development of the electronic sector of the economy, inextricably linked to the academic realm. This nexus, in turn, served as the cornerstone of the “historical bloc” that crystallized as a consequence of the transition of OECD economies into post-industrial states, exercising considerable sway over the policy decisions of these nations. The “knowledge economy” concept, championed by the OECD, thus became emblematic of the vested interests of this historical bloc.

The OECD's documentation in the 2000s, with its pronounced emphasis on the application of lessons gleaned from the electronic sector—demonstrating rapid transitions from research and development outcomes to commercially viable products—across diverse economic sectors, is indicative of the escalating influence wielded by this specific historical bloc. Nevertheless, the practical scope of this experiential transfer ultimately fell short of the expansive initial aspirations associated with the promotion of the “knowledge economy.” Consequently, the “knowledge economy” progressively receded from the purview of OECD documents in the 2010s, giving way to the emergence of the concept of the “digital economy.”

Review of the monograph: Pechatnov V.O., Pechatnov V.V. 2025. The Russian Orthodox Church in America: Essays on History, 1867–1917. Moscow: Aspect Press. 448 p. ISBN 978-57567-1369-5