Measuring Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector

Abstract

The article discusses quantitative methods of assessing systemic risk of the financial sector and the possibilities of their practical application. Systemic risk, which is manifested in the failure of financial services provision and deterioration of the financial system, is a complex concept that can be realized in several forms: the risk of infection, exogenous shock, leading to a simultaneous decline in all financial institutions, and the risk of «financial fragility accumulation". The main causes of the imbalances in the system are unjustified loose standards of risk assessment during economic booms, procyclical behavior of economic agents and asymmetric information. The spread of the risk is associated with the financial accelerator mechanism. Realization of systemic risk in the financial sector leads to serious negative consequences for the real sector not only in the national economy, but also abroad. Quantitative methods of risk assessment provide national authorities with useful information for macroprudential supervision aimed at maintaining financial stability. At the same time it is very important that the data used by the regulator is accurate and reliable. After 2008 crisis, a large number of qualitative approaches appeared, but they all reflect only certain aspects of the risk. The article focuses on stress tests, early-warning indicators, network models, VaR- methods and specific indices. According to research, different assessment methods produce different results. In addition, due to insufficient statistical database existing models are good at predicting crises with hindsight, but cannot identify stressful episodes ex-ante. Thus model results should be treated with caution and require further scrutiny. To get a holistic understanding of the systemic risk regulating authorities should apply different quantitative methods together with qualitative approaches and expert judgement.