Effectiveness of Sanctions in International Politics
https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2021-4-79-136-153
Abstract
Even though IR literature has accumulated a large amount of empirical data and knowledge in sanctions policy effectiveness, this problem remains contested: IR has failed yet to reach a consensus and elaborate the sanctions theory. The article reviews the variety of approaches to evaluating the effectiveness of the sanctions policy and explains why researchers have come to conflicting and mutually exclusive conclusions about the impact of various factors and conditions on the outcome of sanctions pressure. It argues that the disagreement is primarily rooted in different approaches to conceptualizing basic concepts – “sanctions” and “effectiveness”. This disagreement results in coding the same cases as successful and unsuccessful and presents an obstacle to obtaining similar results using statistical analysis. The main demarcation line goes between the realist and liberal understandings of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. This is reflected in the ongoing disputes between those who adhere to the idea of inflicting severe economic damage on the target country and supporters of targeted sanctions; between those who promote multilateral sanctions as capable of causing economic effects, or try to identify weaknesses of ad hoc coalitions, or see the only way to get the effect of sanctions in support from international organizations; between those who focus their research on the target country and those who are interested in pressure on the allies.
About the Author
V. A. Silaeva
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Victoria A. Silaeva – PhD student, Department of Political Theory
119454, Moscow, prospect Vernadskogo, 76
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Review
For citations:
Silaeva V.A. Effectiveness of Sanctions in International Politics. MGIMO Review of International Relations. 2021;14(4):136-153. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2021-4-79-136-153
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