Военное сдерживание против иностранного вмешательства? Опыт Холодной войны

В исследовательской литературе наблюдается серьёзный скепсис относится роли военного сдерживания в противодействии невоенным и непрямым формам давления. Парадокс стабильности-нестабильности предполагает, что возрастание разрушительной мощи вооруженных сил (особенно с появлением ядерного оружия) снижает их полезность для предотвращения ограниченных войн, опосредованных конфликтов или экономических санкций. Растущие опасения относительно рисков иностранного вмешательства во внутреннюю политику в значительной степени опираются на ту же логику – они позиционируют такого рода операции как замену военного противоборства. В настоящей статье делается попытка углубить понимание связи между военно-политическим сдерживанием и иностранным вмешательством во внутренние дела на основе изучения опыта начала Холодной войны с 1948 года по середину 1950-х годов. Проведённый анализ свидетельствует, что опасения относительно советского военного потенциала оказали сдерживающее воздействие на политику США. Соединённые Штаты демонстрировали большую осторожность при проведении подрывных операций против СССР по сравнению с их кампаниями, направленными против более слабых в военном плане государств. Этот исторический опыт показывает, что военно-политическое сдерживание более успешно в ограничении вмешательства, чем других видов давления. В отличие от иных способов принуждения вмешательство порождает экзистенциальную опасность для политических лидеров государства-объекта, провоцируя исключительно жёсткий ответ с их стороны. В этой связи подрывные действия создают значительные риски эскалации, когда они предпринимаются против великой державы. Вмешательство обостряет противостояние даже между государства, которые заранее уверены во враждебности друг друга. Хотя военный потенциал не предоставляет непосредственной защиты от подрывных действий, он существенно демотивирует потенциальных инициаторов вмешательства. Полученные выводы не связаны с конкретными формами вмешательства. Они указывают, что увязывание сдерживания в различных областях соперничества может быть более успешным, чем предполагает парадокс стабильности-нестабильности.

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