The 16th–first half of the 17th century was a vital period for the emergence of international law, sovereignty, and the modern international system. European sovereigns also started considering at that time what today would be termed humanitarian issues in foreign policy. They relied in this mostly on the contemporary theological thought and the nascent “Law of Nations,” which fostered a discourse opposing the extremes of government (tyranny). The article analyzes one of the most vivid examples of such humanitarian foreign policy – foreign intervention by the Lord Protector of the English Republic, Oliver Cromwell, in the Duchy of Savoy in 1655 to protect the Waldensian Protestants, who suffered persecution there. Contrary to the modern historiography, the article argues that Cromwell did not abandon all other state considerations in questioning the conclusion of the Anglo-French alliance against Spain to stop the repression against the Waldensians. Cromwell’s humanitarian policy was carried out in line with Realpolitik. Aware of the complicated domestic political situation in France and of the goals of French foreign policy, he was sure that Prime Minister Cardinal Mazarin was unlikely to give up the alliance with London in response to the London’s support of the Protestant subjects of the Duke of Savoy. Cromwellian Foreign Policy in SavoyPiedmont demonstrates one of the most significant cases of implementing the humanitarian principles in international relations. At the same time, Oliver Cromwell did not infringe upon the interests of his own country. On the contrary, despite the financial costs of maintaining special embassies and a fleet in the Mediterranean and creating the Waldensian Relief Fund, the support of the persecuted in Piedmont demonstrated the strength and authority of the English state.

The article studies the tradition of exchanging gifts during diplomatic negotiations for marriage using a historical reconstruction of the trip of the English Prince Charles Stuart to Madrid in 1623 to negotiate his marriage with the Spanish Infanta Maria as a crucial case. The heir to the English throne personally arrived in Madrid «incognito» to speed up the negotiations. These circumstances created problems for the Spanish side because the reception ceremony was not developed for such a case. Besides, the «incognito» trip complicated the question of exchanging gifts. Later, such trips of monarchs would become a common practice. However, this case was one of the first precedents which forced the existing ceremonial procedure of gift exchange to undergo modifications. The article focuses on functions of exchanging gifts during marriage negotiations and studies the effects of an «incognito» trip on the course of the negotiations.

The research is based on the letters of king James and his son Charles and eyewitness reports from the English and Spanish sides. The article claims that Prince Charles’ trip «incognito» changed the traditional procedure of exchanging gifts: the exchange happened before the prince’s departure and was initiated by the Spanish side. Nevertheless, this ritual has not lost its symbolism and significance in the rhetoric of negotiations. Gifts were used as a means of communication, an indicator of the influence of states and the way of their self-presentation.

Gaining international recognition for the White Movement was the most important foreign policy task of the Russian non–Bolshevik diplomacy. The article traces the evolving discourse of career diplomats considering this issue at different stages of the civil war. It shows their deep patriotism, professionalism, and persistency in carrying out the task. However, when the allies did not share the slogans of the White Movement, the possibilities for finding common ground were very limited. At the first stage (summer-autumn 1918), diplomats were cautious about the claims for recognition of numerous Russian non–Bolshevik governments. In the second stage (1918 – 1919), the issue of recognition played a unique role – participation of Russian representatives in the peace conference, and therefore in determining the configuration of the post-war world, depended on its success. The resolve of the diplomats to defend the Russia’s national interests did not suit foreign powers, who did not share the movement's slogan about restoring a united and indivisible Russia, its power, and its position in the world. At the third stage (spring-summer 1920), diplomats, loosing hope for military victory of the White Movement in the civil war, withdrew from the direct involvement in seeking international recognition for the Movement. However, they provided all possible technical support to the head of the Department of External Relations of the Wrangel Government, Peter B. Struve, who assumed this mission. France's recognition of the Sevastopol authorities in the summer of 1920 was limited, did not involve active military assistance, and caused justified skepticism in diplomatic circles.

Historiography of the famine in Soviet Russia and Ukraine 1921-23. includes a large number of scholar papers covering foreign humanitarian aid to starving population in the context of the work of such large organizations as the American Relief Administration, the Nansen Committee, etc. At the same time, there are practically no articles and thesis which fully describe the assistance to the Soviet starving from individual states and national aid committees. The purpose of this article is to highlight and summarize the main aspects of the activities of the Dutch charitable and public organizations on the territory of Soviet Russia and the Ukrainian SSR during the famine of 1921-23 on the basis of documents from the Russian central and regional archives, as well as the National Archives of Sweden, whose data are first introduced into the scientific circulation. Despite the absence of diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and the Netherlands, representatives of almost all sectors of Dutch society took part in that activities. The collected data allow us to identify four main channels for the receipt of Dutch humanitarian aid in the areas affected by crop failure:

1) Pro-government and public charitable organizations (the Red Cross of the Netherlands, the Dutch branch of the International Union "Save the Children"), which provided aid to the population in Volga region, Crimea and in Ukraine. In addition to sending humanitarian supplies, the Dutch Red Cross equipped its own expedition to Samara province;

2) Associations of trade unions of the Second International, which participated in the financing of an independent expedition of the "International Federation of Trade Unions" to the Chuvash Autonomous Region;

3) communist trade unions and associations of the Netherlands, acting through the organization "International Workers' Aid", which took part in the restoration of the Soviet national economy, and also maintained numerous orphanages in Soviet Russia;

4) Religious societies of Dutch Mennonite Protestants, which sent humanitarian aid to the places of settlement of their co-religionists, where, at the insistence of the Soviet government, they provided aid to all those in need, regardless of religion.

All the activities of various Dutch organizations and individual citizens in Soviet Russia and the Ukraine showed the readiness of the population and political forces of the Netherlands to maintain close contacts and interaction between our peoples, regardless of the official relations of states and political differences.

Academic literature is largely skeptical regarding the role of military deterrence in addressing low-level coercion. The stability-instability paradox suggests that increasing destructiveness of the armed forces (especially with the emergence of nuclear weapons) diminishes their utility in response to limited wars, proxy conflicts or economic sanctions. Recent debates often extend the same logic to foreign interference in internal affairs, as they position it as a supplement for forcible rivalries. This article seeks to advance understanding of the linkage between military deterrence and foreign interference in internal politics by exploring the record of the early Cold War starting from 1948 to the mid-1950s. The analysis attests that concern over the Soviet military capabilities had a major restraining effect on Washington. As a result, the US pursued more cautious activities against the Soviet Union in comparison to the campaigns targeting less capable states. This historical record reveals that interference is more amenable to military deterrence than other types of low-level coercion. It differs from them, as covert operations produce an existential danger to the political leaders of a target state, inciting overreaction on their behalf. Therefore, they create escalation risks when threatening a great power. Interference exacerbates confrontation even between adversaries that perceived each other as malign beforehand. Apart from signaling hostile intentions, it aggravates a sense of urgency on finding a response. Although military capabilities do not provide a direct solution to political threats, they serve as a repellent against potential subversive activities. These conclusions do not depend on the specific type of interference pursued by external agents. The findings of the article demonstrate that cross-domain deterrence is more prevalent than stability-instability paradox envisages.

The article studies the history of the US foreign policy adaptation to détente that started in the late 1960s. By this time the Americans had strong military and political positions on the Korean peninsula. Washington managed to thwart DPRK attempts in 1966–1969 to destabilize the situation in the South. Americans saw growing inter-Korean contacts as a new challenge. With détente gaining momentum, this led to the obsolescence of some American foreign policy instruments in the region, including the US-controlled UN Commission on the Unification and Rebuilding of Korea. Another challenge for the Americans was the North Koreans' «diplomatic offensive,» which strengthened North Korea's position in the world. It tried to use the accumulated political weight to turn the annual debate on the Korean issue in the UN General Assembly from a formality to something real. At the same time, the military threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for example, in the 1973–1975 conflict along the Northern Boundary Line, remained relevant.
Nevertheless, in 1968–1973 the Americans succeeded in reshaping their policy toward Korea under conditions of a dramatic improvement in the international situation of the DPRK and settlement of US-Chinese relations. The Americans managed to eliminate the obsolete UN Commission on the Unification and Restoration of Korea with minimal losses. They ensured that the discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations would not have a destructive influence on the internal political life of the South. Under these conditions, the inter-Korean dialogue remained merely a political game of the regimes on the peninsula. Preserving the status quo in the region was the main result of US diplomacy’s manipulative techniques. Such approaches are still relevant for the modern US foreign policy – getting rid of international instruments, which have exhausted their purpose.

The article analyzes the attitude of Yugoslav military analysts to the deployment of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979–1981. Afghanistan was not among diplomatic, or military priorities for Yugoslavia. After the coup in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, relations between the two countries, previously rather formal, deteriorated, as Kabul started to move away from the non-alignment movement taking a pro-Soviet orientation. Yugoslavia saw Afghanistan as a non-aligned country and was extremely concerned about the Soviet interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. This political assessment heavily influenced the views of Yugoslav military expert, resulting into some distorted conclusions and numerous overlooked lessons. This testifies to the primacy of everyday political (and even propaganda) needs over military science in Yugoslavia. They believed that Afghanistan would turn into a permanent problem for the USSR. Despite the rich empirical material, Yugoslav analysts did not see any novelty in tactics and the use of new weapons in mountainous areas. They neglected to analyze the tactics of anti-partisan actions in the highlands; their predictions were not original; they ignored the presence of militant fundamentalism as a factor in the conduct of hostilities.

The article studies the rise of the Sunni Awakening (or Sahwa) movement as an example of how different groups can be mobilized for collective action and disintegrated by internal and external factors. It also examines the motives of the Sunni tribal leaders to oppose the AQI and the factors that had a decisive influence on the disintegration of the Awakening movement. The emergence of the Iraqi Sunni Awakening was associated not so much with a sense of ideological, patriotic, or religious obligation but with the loss of economic power of the tribal leaders who decided to mobilize against the AQI.

Since 2006, the Sunni Awakening has been a key component of the US strategy to combat jihadi groups. The growth of the movement's activity led to a weakening of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and a significant decrease in the intensity of interfaith conflict in the country. After the official transfer of control of the Awakening to the Iraqi government, the relationship of the Sunni tribes with official Baghdad deteriorated, as Prime Minister Al-Maliki pursued a systematic policy of marginalizing and eliminating the Awakening. The disintegration of the Awakening was strongly influenced by two US decisions that were of strategic importance to Iraq: (a) support for al-Maliki following his defeat in the 2010 parliamentary elections, won by the secular Sunni-Shiite coalition; (b) poor timing of the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, as by the end of 2011, the Iraqi security forces were still not ready to ensure the country's security. As a result, in 2012, numerous supporters of the Sahwa began to participate in anti-government revolts, and thousands of fighters from the movement joined ISIL.

The article analyzes Turkey's changing regime of ethnicity between 2004 and 2019. Turkey is a multiethnic republic that used assimilation as the key policy in its early days to create the nation-state. The Kurds, as the most populous ethnic minority, had suffered the most. The ethnic anti-minority regime was reflected in the discourse of state officials. The ethnicity regime changed only after the Justice and Development Party came to power. The state authorities acknowledged Kurds as a distinct ethnic minority, admitted the previous human rights violations, and tried to make up for past mistakes. The article reviews the evolution of the ethnicity regime through analysis of its official discourse from initially being anti-minority and through tumultuous changes to the current inclusive one. It focuses on analyzing President Erdogan's public speeches in Diyarbakir. The main finding of the article is that when the state moved away from anti-minority policies towards the Kurds, President's discourse became more inclusive. Previous studies acknowledged the agency of the state as the determining power behind changing the regime of ethnicity. The second significant contribution of this study is that organized minority groups have an independent agency; their actions significantly contributed to changing the regime of ethnicity.

Exacerbating climatic change accelerates the formation of ESG national regulatory approaches and the development of non-financial reporting, stimulating new green financing mechanisms both abroad and in Russia. Russian oil and gas companies, particularly Lukoil, Rosneft, and Tatneft, demonstrate the strengthening of environmental and social components in their reports, administration restructures, and improved corporate regulatory documentation concerning the principles of sustainable development. Due to the national features of regulatory and market approaches, European companies are more ambitious regarding the pace of their energy transition and updating the climatic agenda at all operating levels.
The article compares the strategies of European energy companies (Shell, Eni, Totlenergies) and Russian energy companies (Lukoil, Rosneft, and Tatneft) in sustainable development and energy transition. The case selection is based on positive financial indicators and companies’ progress in sustainability rankings, such as ACRA, WFF Russia, CDP, and TPI. In conclusion, the article identifies the following priority corporate strategies: digitalization as a way of reducing emissions; an increase in the share of the gas business; development of renewable energy sources; optimization of the internal structure; adding ESG indicators to the leadership’s KPI; adding ESG indicators to requirements for contractors.

Book review: Sarotte M.E. 2021. Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate. Yale University Press. 550 p.