Preview

MGIMO Review of International Relations

Advanced search

Signaling, Constraining and Coercing in US sanctions policy towards Russia in the context of the Ukraine crisis

https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2020-6-75-77-98

Abstract

The development of the US foreign policy tools in the 20th century resulted in sanctions becoming one of the most convenient means for achieving administration’s goals on the international arena, as well as a useful tool in domestic politics. Institutionally established within the scope of the executive branch, buttressed by the US dominance in the world economy and viewed as a “humane” way of influencing foreign elites, it does not demand significant political capital and, as a result, can be implemented without deep strategic thinking. Current US policy towards Russia is constrained by the framework of the sanctions regime, created by Barak Obama Administration in 2014. This regime is inherently inert and is likely to determine the scope and methods of the US policy towards Russia for the foreseeable future regardless of the priorities of the country’s leadership. This article seeks to study the creation of the regime and explain the logic of decision-making process regarding this issue. Utilizing the approach of Francesco Giumelli, who developed a system of factors to explain the logic of a sanctions policy, the author shows that the US sanction policy towards Russia was framed by the desire to demonstrate the ability to mobilize international community and reaffirm its commitments to the security of the Eastern Europe. Low profile of the Ukraine issue on the US foreign policy agenda as well as low political cost of the escalation towards Russia resulted in sanctions becoming a substitute for a foreign policy strategy and were not accompanied by the analysis of the situation, determination of goals and the parameters for evaluating the success of the policy. The deficiency of such an approach is accentuated by the comparison with the European Union who paid a higher price for its sanctions and, despite a popular in Russia notion of a unified “West”, not only resisted the will of the US, but acted as a deterrent for its actions.

About the Author

O. I. Rebro
«Eurasian Strategies» consulting agency
Russian Federation

Olga I. Rebro – senior analyst

Russia, 119454, Moscow, prospektVernadskogo, 76.



References

1. Екимова Н.А. 2018. Международные санкции в отношении России: неявные выгоды.

2. Мир новой экономики. 12(4). С. 82-92. DOI: 10.26794/2220-6469-2018-12-4-82-92

3. Гурвич Е.Т., Прилепский И.В. 2016. Влияние финансовых санкций на российскую

4. экономику. Вопросы экономики. №1. C. 5-35. DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2016-1-5-35

5. Кнобель А.Ю., Багдасарян К.М., Лощенкова А.Н. Прока К.А. 2019. Санкции: всерьез

6. и надолго. Москва: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС. 80 с.

7. Политика санкций: цели, стратегии, инструменты: хрестоматия. 2018. [сост.

8. И.Н. Тимофеев, Т.А. Махмутов]; Российский совет по международным делам (РСМД).

9. Москва: НП РСМД. 280 с.

10. Тимофеев И.Н. 2018. Экономические санкции как политическое понятие. Вестник

11. МГИМО-Университета. 2(59). С. 26-42. DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2018-2-59-26-42

12. Фитуни Л.Л. 2019. «Санкционное таргетирование»: инструмент внешней политики,

13. нечестной конкуренции или глобального социального инжиниринга? Вестник МГИМО-

14. Университета. 3(66). С. 17-41. DOI: 10.24833/2071-8160-2019-3-66-17-41


Review

For citations:


Rebro O.I. Signaling, Constraining and Coercing in US sanctions policy towards Russia in the context of the Ukraine crisis. MGIMO Review of International Relations. 2020;13(6):77-98. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2020-6-75-77-98

Views: 1421


Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.


ISSN 2071-8160 (Print)
ISSN 2541-9099 (Online)