This article explores the challenges facing the modern energy market in the context of the accelerated energy transition. It concludes that neither the objectives nor the preparation for the energy transition have been aligned with the actual needs and demands of humanity. The current goals of the energy transition are ideologically driven and unrealistic, prompting countries and companies to reconsider their previously established timelines for achieving carbon neutrality, while investors are growing increasingly disillusioned with the «green» transition. Despite trillions of dollars in investments, alternative energy sources have failed to replace traditional fuels or ensure reliable energy supply. Concurrently, the demand for electricity will continue to rise with the advancement of artificial intelligence and the expansion of data processing centers.

The article highlights that in Europe, the emphasis on the «green» energy transition has led to economic downturns, while in developing countries, the implementation of the energy transition has manifested as «green» neocolonialism, characterized by resource extraction. Lobbying for an accelerated energy transition represents one form of market share competition. Another form includes unlawful sanctions and technological restrictions imposed by the United States on several countries, and the use of the dollar as an economic weapon, which has compelled developing nations to embark on dedollarization processes.

The article concludes that energy development must be linked to ensuring energy security, combating poverty, and addressing the interests of the majority. Therefore, hydrocarbons will continue to be a critical component of the energy sector.

The article examines the formation of Azerbaijan's energy policy and the multivector development of its fuel and energy complex. In the context of global transformations and changes in energy flow structures, the author emphasizes the balanced development of both hydrocarbon and carbon-free segments of energy. The proposed concept of sustainable energy development envisages the harmonious coexistence of traditional and renewable energy, enhancing Azerbaijan's economic stability and geopolitical influence. The significant role of the oil and gas sector, demonstrated by successful projects and substantial foreign investments, is reinforced by the active development of renewable energy sources. Azerbaijan implements large-scale projects in wind and solar energy, as well as initiatives for the production of «green» hydrogen, which contributes not only to the reduction of emissions but also to the expansion of the country's export potential. The article highlights the importance of balanced FEC development, focusing on emission minimization through the application of carbon capture and utilization (CCUS) technologies, as well as the need for infrastructure modernization to improve energy efficiency. Azerbaijan demonstrates a unique case where traditional and renewable energy do not compete but complement each other, strengthening its positions in international cooperation and within the framework of the Greater Eurasian Partnership.

The «Belе and Road Initiative» (BRI), proposed by China, marked a new phase in its external openness and growing desire to influence regional and global processes. However, BRI should not be viewed solely as a Chinese blueprint for restructuring Eurasia. The broad interpretative and geographical scope set by Chinese authorities allows flexibility in adapting the initiative to specific regions and countries, which is strategic for modifying or withdrawing commitments as needed. This paper examines why BRI has not become the foundation for a Chinese concept of Eurasia despite its significant impact on regional geopolitics.
Our analysis begins with a critical examination of President Xi Jinping's speech at Nazarbayev University in 2013, identifying the nuanced usage of «Eurasia» that primarily refers to the post-Soviet space rather than the entire Eurasian continent. We delve into the subsequent official documents, noting the delay and ambiguity in defining the geographical and conceptual boundaries of BRI. The 2015 document, "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road," illustrates the initiative's extensive and vague geographical scope, indicating that China did not initially aim for a broad Eurasian strategy.
By employing Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), we uncover how China's official rhetoric strategically frames BRI. The analysis reveals that Chinese discourse emphasizes bilateral rather than multilateral engagements within Eurasia, reflecting a «point-to-point» rather than a networked approach. This strategic ambiguity allows China to navigate its relationships with key regional players, notably Russia and the Central Asian states, without committing to a comprehensive Eurasian integration framework.

The findings highlight the cautious and adaptive nature of China's engagement with Eurasia. The shift from a regional to a global scope in BRI discourse underscores China's pragmatic approach in balancing its regional ambitions with global aspirations.

This article seeks to delineate the foreign policy priorities of the People's Republic of China (PRC) by analyzing the international visits of Chinese President Xi Jinping. It posits that the evolution of a state's foreign policy can be traced through the foreign engagements of its leaders. This is particularly pertinent for China, where presidential visits are historically significant. The article offers an overview of China's traditional diplomacy and the foreign policy activities of Xi Jinping's predecessors. It concludes that Xi Jinping continues to undertake foreign visits in alignment with the «openness» policy, similar to his predecessors. Through a detailed analysis of the frequency and destinations of Xi Jinping's international visits over his two terms, the authors present a periodization of his foreign policy priorities. A comparative analysis is conducted on the visit frequencies of Xi Jinping and his predecessor, Hu Jintao, with adjustments for the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. With Xi Jinping's re-election for a third term in 2023, this study provides insights into the nature and priorities of China's foreign policy for his current term and potential developments in the ongoing five-year political cycle. The findings indicate that from 2018 to 2023, Xi Jinping increased his visits to Southeast Asian countries, particularly Indonesia and Vietnam, while maintaining a consistent focus on Russia and the United States, akin to the approach under Jiang Zemin. The enduring partnership with Russia, spanning over two decades, corroborates the assertion that Sino-Russian relations are at their strongest in the history of bilateral ties. Data for this study were sourced from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, and materials from the Chinavitae and China Power research projects.

The objective of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of how media outlets in Russia, France, and Germany reported on events during the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis was carried out in three stages: comparing the actors of biopolitics, examining the ideologemes of biopolitics, and analyzing the spheres in which biopolitics were implemented. The theoretical and methodological framework of this study is grounded in Michel Foucault's theory of biopolitics, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky's propaganda model, and Didier Bigo's concept of (in)securitization. Texts related to the COVID-19 pandemic were categorized into four «waves» (January 2020 – March 2022) and retrieved using the keywords «pandemic», «covid», and «coronavirus» from the archives of «Rossiyskaya Gazeta», «Kommersant», «Novaya Gazeta», «Le Figaro», «Le Monde», «Le Parisien», «Süddeutsche Zeitung», «Die Zeit», and «Die Tageszeitung». The total volume of analyzed material amounts to 67.62 million words. 

The results reveal that state power consistently emerges as a key subject of biopower and biopolitics across all the media studied, following Foucault's traditional framework of biopower subjects. This includes a focus on the actions and decisions of government officials and institutions. Additionally, the study found that all examined media outlets participated in promoting vaccination campaigns orchestrated by the governments of Russia, Germany, and France, indicating a widespread alignment with state-led biopolitical strategies.

The analysis also shows that the insecuritization of public life during the pandemic affected various sectors including social relations, the economy, healthcare, and education. Media discourse in all three countries highlighted these areas of impact, often framing them within the broader context of public and existential security.

Furthermore, the study identifies notable differences in how the media in each country portrayed biopolitical themes. In Russia, media coverage placed a strong emphasis on the central government's role, while in Germany, there was a more pronounced delineation between federal and regional authorities. In France, media outlets often focused on the personal leadership of President Emmanuel Macron. Despite these differences, there were shared themes across all three countries, such as the emphasis on the importance of vaccination and the portrayal of government measures as necessary for public safety.

Mass cinema can act as a powerful tool for influencing public opinion by appealing to shared values and collective historical memory, while simultaneously constructing and guiding these elements in alignment with policy objectives. This article explores the thesis that national cinema, as an element of a common cultural code, plays a significant role in the formation and reinforcement of collective (socio-cultural) identity. Specifically, it examines the significance of Brussels' efforts to cultivate a robust film industry as part of the European Union's strategy for constructing a collective identity.

The authors test the hypothesis that cinema serves as a medium for fostering a sense of belonging and emotional connection among EU citizens. To this end, the study aims to uncover the specific mechanisms by which common historical and social narratives are conveyed through European Union cinema. The research methodology is grounded in a structuralist perspective on cinema (P. Wallen, C. Metz).

The article analyzes how the EU has intensified its institutional support and promotion of European cinema, particularly in response to the «crisis of ideas» in Hollywood, which has left a void in the global film market. This analysis is contextualized within the broader sociopolitical landscape, including the rising popularity of mass cinema during the pandemic and the heightened urgency for strengthening EU collective identity amid the Ukrainian crisis and the initiation of a special military operation.

The findings indicate that the EU is increasingly leveraging the film industry to disseminate narratives, ideas, and values critical for both situational objectives – such as consolidating public opinion on specific political issues (illustrated by the «militarization» of the film market in response to the 2022 military operation) – and long-term goals of fortifying the EU's collective identity. However, the long-term efficacy of cinema in shaping public opinion is constrained by its susceptibility to rapid trend shifts driven by audience preferences.

This article examines a previously underexplored aspect of the Russian Civil War during its critical phase in late 1918–1919: the logistical support provided by the Entente to the White armies in the South, set against the backdrop of the final military interventions. The authors concentrate on the interactions between General A.I. Denikin's regime and the British authorities, who were the primary proponents of the Entente's intervention in Russia, as well as the conditions surrounding the involvement of the French armed forces.
The research primarily draws on documents from the Russian State Military Archive, created by officers of the White armies of Southern Russia, and the National Archives of Great Britain. This comprehensive source base enables a reassessment of some long-held views in Russian historiography regarding the Entente's intervention in the Black Sea region. The study aims to delineate the scope and nature of the Entente’s support and to understand why this assistance failed to secure a victory for the White forces.
Post-Soviet historiography commonly posits that the Red Army enjoyed an economic advantage in terms of weapons and ammunition supply for most of the Civil War. This article, however, reveals that the support from Entente countries was substantial and that the use of foreign weapons and equipment significantly influenced the late 1918-1919 period. Nonetheless, the critical factor, as argued by the authors, was the timing of deliveries. The peak of the Entente’s military-technical support to the Armed Forces of Southern Russia occurred after the Red Army had already fortified its positions with adequate firepower. The lengthy strategic decision-making processes of the British Cabinet, characteristic of British democratic and bureaucratic systems, resulted in delayed assistance to Denikin’s troops, ultimately undermining its effectiveness.