This article reconsiders Russia’s “Pivot to the East” by reframing it through a broader research question: how might an “Eastward turn toward Russia” be initiated. The analytical framework builds on the intellectual legacy of Academician A.V. Torkunov and focuses on the institutional and ideational conditions underpinning Russian policy in the Asia-Pacific. The study identifies four groups of factors shaping the prospects of this strategy: (1) the dynamics of regional stability and instability; (2) the distribution of friendly, neutral, and unfriendly states across the region; (3) the economic trajectory of the Asia-Pacific, largely conditioned by the state of U.S.–China relations and China’s domestic priorities; and (4) the ideational and normative frameworks that reveal the limits of anti-Americanism and multipolarity as universal strategic foundations. Particular attention is devoted to the “China factor,” analyzed through a quarter-by-quarter assessment of the period 2022–2025, which highlights Beijing’s gradual shift from benevolent neutrality to a more pragmatic and cautious stance. The article examines China’s attempts to position itself as a mediator in the Ukraine conflict, the constraints of the “no-limits partnership,” and the lessons Beijing draws from Ukraine for its Taiwan policy. The economic dimension of Sino-Russian relations is characterized less by a strategic reorientation than by adaptation and substitution under sanctions pressure. The analysis concludes that, despite Russia’s continuing strategic value for China, the widening “fields of divergence” create new risks for aligning long-term interests. The sustainability of an “Eastward turn toward Russia” depends on gradual institutionalization of cooperation, integration into regional processes, and the avoidance of excessive ideological framing of foreign policy.

The conflict in Ukraine has revealed stark divergences in how Western and nonWestern states interpret global crises. With few exceptions, countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have refrained from supporting Western sanctions against Russia, choosing instead positions of neutrality or cautious engagement. These responses reflect not only pragmatic interests but also the persistence of alternative civilizational perspectives that challenge the presumed universality of Western categories in international relations. This article argues that the new geopolitical reality compels Russia to balance confrontation with a hostile European environment against the consolidation of cooperative ties with Asian and African partners. From Moscow’s perspective, the international system now appears bifurcated into two blocs: a Western one marked by institutional discipline and pragmatic cohesion, and an Eastern one shaped by national traditions, distinct models of economic growth, and resilient cultural frameworks. The analysis highlights three interrelated themes. First, it emphasizes the growing importance of conceptualizing a non-Western perspective within Russian scholarship, one that critically reassesses the translation of Western terms and recognizes the cultural specificities of Eastern societies. Second, it points to the need for an institutional platform under United Nations auspices to articulate an independent Eastern civilizational narrative and strengthen non-Western cooperation. Third, it identifies cognitive and decision-making styles in Eastern societies as a distinctive factor shaping political practice and international interaction. The article concludes that developing a coherent inter-civilizational code, grounded in Eurasian, Asian, and African experiences, is essential for constructing alternative theoretical frameworks of international relations and for redefining the global order beyond Western paradigms.

Scholarly attention to BRICS has intensified amid accelerating transformations of the international system and the search for alternative models of global order. Established as an economic coalition, BRICS has progressively expanded its remit, positioning itself as a platform for the Global South and as an actor with growing political and normative ambitions. This article advances the argument that the political organization of the world is undergoing a shift from hierarchical to networked forms. Such a transformation produces configurations more complex than the familiar imagery of unipolarity or multipolarity dominated by great powers. BRICS itself increasingly reflects this networked logic, not least through practices of digital and institutional connectivity, thereby exhibiting a structural affinity with the broader reconfiguration of world politics. The analysis proceeds from a central research question: does this structural correspondence enable BRICS to strengthen its international role, and if so, by what means? Empirically, the article traces BRICS’s trajectory from an economic coalition that consolidated influence in global economic governance to a multidimensional grouping whose agenda now encompasses social, political, and developmental issues. Conceptually, it situates BRICS within debates on global governance, world order, and the changing logics of institutional design. The article concludes that BRICS possesses the demographic, economic, and institutional resources, as well as experience in networked and digital cooperation, necessary to embed itself in the emerging order. Its capacity to shape this order, however, will depend on mobilizing the “power of ideas”: advancing persuasive normative visions for the principles and structures of a new world political organization.

This article critically examines the limitations of prevailing Western critiques of American Big Tech’s digital hegemony, particularly those influenced by the theoretical framework of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt. While the Negrian emphasis on the “multitude” and identity-based struggles has contributed to recognizing the multiple contradictions—racial, gendered, and class-based—that are reproduced and amplified in digital spaces, its categorical rejection of the sovereign state as a counter-hegemonic actor has led to a persistent strategic impasse. Through an extensive review of critical literature and empirical cases, the study analyses various forms of spontaneous, bottom-up resistance—including platform cooperativism, peer-to-peer networks, blockchain-based initiatives, algorithm audits, and public education campaigns—and demonstrates their inability to meaningfully challenge Big Tech’s monopolistic control. Using Robert Cox’s tripartite model of global power (Empire, sovereign state, and civil society), the article argues that effective resistance to digital hegemony requires alliances between the state and non-co-opted segments of civil society. The analysis extends to the Global South, where the combination of Big Tech dominance and NGOmediated civil society often undermines state-led digital sovereignty efforts. The case of China is presented as a noteworthy counterexample: since 2016, the Chinese government has placed political limits on domestic Big Tech, implemented people-centered regulatory policies, and maintained sovereign control over its digital space. While not without its contradictions, this model demonstrates that a state–society alliance can achieve tangible results in countering the Empire’s digital power.

The article concludes that overcoming digital hegemony requires moving beyond spontaneity-based paradigms toward structured, state-supported strategies—particularly in the Global South—capable of addressing the political-economic foundations of Big Tech’s global dominance.

China’s growing strategic and economic interests, coupled with its need for stable energy supplies, have deepened engagement with the Gulf states. This emerging relationship extends beyond trade to include investment, infrastructure initiatives, and political partnerships, forming a complex architecture of interdependence. At the same time, the weakening of the United States’ position has begun to alter the regional balance of power. Despite their long-standing security reliance on Washington, Gulf monarchies increasingly seek to avoid binary choices between the United States and China, pursuing greater autonomy in their foreign policies. This article examines how the evolving U.S.–China rivalry shapes international relations and security in the Persian Gulf. It first assesses the transformation of U.S. strategic thinking on competition with China and analyzes the principles of Beijing’s foreign policy that underpin its rising influence in the subregion. The study then explores how Saudi–Iranian tensions affect China’s regional strategy and, in turn, Washington–Beijing relations. Special attention is given to the United Arab Emirates’ strategy of balancing its ties with both powers while consolidating its role as a regional leader. The analysis demonstrates that China is consolidating its position in the Gulf through deliberate policy choices as well as broader geopolitical trends reflecting the emergence of multipolarity. While Gulf states seek to preserve independence by diversifying external partnerships, they remain dependent on the United States in defense and security. The article concludes that the Gulf has become a key arena of great-power competition, where Beijing’s growing presence and Washington’s enduring security role interact to reshape the regional order.

The article examines the impact of key macroeconomic, technological, demographic, and political factors on shaping the future global energy landscape. Based on a systems analysis of data from the IEA, World Bank, OECD, and leading think tanks, it is shown that by 2050 the combined population growth of Africa and the Asia–Pacific region by 1.4 billion and accelerated urbanization will account for up to 60% of the global increase in electricity consumption. The technological revolution, driven by AI and data centers, will raise their annual electricity demand beyond 1,000 TWh by 2030, comparable to Japan’s current level. The study demonstrates that the “green” transition faces constraints: achieving net zero by 2050 would require about USD 180 trillion in investments, while the power density of renewables remains far lower than that of conventional sources. Analysis of the nuclear sector reveals a 50% investment increase over the past five years, with China and Russia leading in new reactor construction and closed fuel cycle technologies. Coal retains around 25% of the global energy mix, with its consumption peak postponed, underlining the importance of balancing traditional and alternative sources. Strategic approaches of China, India, the US, and Russia to energy security are reviewed, including grid modernization, battery technology development, synthetic fuels, and coal power expansion. The paper concludes that an effective future global energy model requires integration of high-density traditional and low-carbon energy sources, enhancement of inter-fuel competition, and alignment of national strategies with global priorities.

The global energy market is undergoing profound restructuring as many countries adopt policies to phase out fossil fuels and reorganize supply chains. Nevertheless, demand for coal remains robust and continues to grow, with consumption increasingly concentrated in Asia. This regional shift has reshaped the geographical structure of global coal trade. The central hypothesis of this article is that major exporters and importers exhibit varying degrees of geographical concentration and diversification in their trade flows, and that these dynamics change over time.
The study examines long-term trends in the coal trade between 2004 and 2023 using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (0–1) to quantify geographical concentration. The analysis first situates coal within global fuel markets, then focuses on thermal coal as the most relevant segment for international trade. Results show that both exports and imports became more concentrated during the study period, reaching unprecedented levels in 2023. Export concentration consistently exceeded import concentration, with the gap doubling over time, indicating stronger bargaining power for suppliers. At the same time, most leading players reduced the concentration of their trade flows, reflecting diversification. Notable exceptions include Indonesia, which rose to the top exporter by volume while increasing its concentration, and Japan, which became more dependent on Australia and Indonesia. Russia maintained a relatively low and stable export concentration, while China’s shift from a leading exporter to a net importer after 2007 reshaped the global market and created new opportunities for other suppliers. The findings also highlight China’s significant role in shaping import concentration across all fuel markets in 2020.

This article investigates the relationship between investment security and technological sovereignty against the backdrop of accelerating deglobalization and the return of mercantilist and protectionist strategies. The erosion of radical globalization has forced states to reconsider their dependence on global supply chains and foreign technologies, placing renewed emphasis on national investment potential as the foundation of technological independence. The study asks which theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches can support the pursuit of technological sovereignty while maintaining effective control over investment flows. To address this question, it combines established approaches to economic security with the author’s development of an ecosystem perspective. The ecosystem approach is shown to provide a useful framework for balancing the imperatives of sovereignty with the continuing need for external investment, by coordinating the goals of states, business, and society. Comparative evidence from the United States, the European Union, China, and Japan illustrates how different strategies are employed to reconcile sovereignty with investment security: from tariff and FDI controls to supply-chain resilience measures and selfsufficiency programs. The analysis also suggests that, under current conditions, resource-export models—previously sidelined in an era of globalization—may regain relevance if paired with targeted mechanisms of revenue distribution.

The article concludes that an ecosystem view expands the set of indicators of investment security, integrating traditional metrics with new measures of supply-chain stability, digital risks, and institutional resilience. This framework provides a conceptual and practical basis for achieving technological sovereignty without undermining the inflow of investments essential for long-term development.