The introductory article delves into the evolving dynamics of the India-Russia relationship in the post-Soviet era, characterized by carefully forged cooperation, managed differences, and adaptation to the ever-changing international landscape. The authors emphasize that amidst the current state of global disorder, India and Russia can mutually assist each other within certain constraints. The article highlights how bilateral ties enable Moscow and New Delhi to pursue their national interests, with a commitment to safeguarding their respective sovereignty. The authors propose a nuanced understanding of the relationship, wherein India and Russia continue to engage in ways that uphold their own interests and prevent any infringement upon each other. The article sets the stage for further exploration of the numerous facets of the IndiaRussia relationship, examining areas such as strategic cooperation, economic ties, multilateral engagement, and addressing global challenges like climate change. Ultimately, it aims to provide insights into the complex and evolving nature of this bilateral partnership.

The article explores the ongoing evolution of India's relationship with Russia, using the concept of "uneven multipolarity" and its specific distribution of capabilities. It argues that India's perception of the balance of threats has shifted with respect to China, particularly in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, which are crucial to India's national security and future power projection ambitions. In the current context of uneven multipolarity, the capabilities of the US and China exceed those of weaker major powers, such as India, Russia, and Japan, without tipping the system into explicit bipolarity. This specific nature of current polarity and India's "China challenge" have led to shifting alignments in its foreign policy.

When combined with changes in Russia's external relations, particularly the breakdown of its relations with the West and growing closeness with China, these factors have created particular constraints on New Delhi's partnership with Moscow. Multi-alignment for India represents a choice other than the formation of alliances as a balancing response, but it does introduce a hierarchy in its foreign relations. Under prevailing conditions, it emphasizes the importance of the relationship with the US while diminishing the significance of the relationship with Russia, even as the value of the bilateral partnership is retained in specific ways. These observations are instrumental in the assessment of the present and future trajectory of Indo-Russian ties presented in the article.

The focus of the article is the analysis of the prospects of the relationship between Russia and India. The author examines the attitudes of the elites in both countries towards each other, using historical sociology, the theory of cultural hegemony, and post-colonialism to explain the formation and perspectives of these elites. The objective and subjective economic and political conditions have, until recently, hindered any genuine efforts towards bringing the two countries closer, as both sides perceived the West as a more promising partner. This attitude has been shaped by historical factors, such as the formation of the Indian elites under the influence of British political, economic, and military culture, and the reckless admiration of the victors of the Cold War by the Russian elites, which attempted to abandon the Soviet legacy after the collapse of the USSR. Despite declarations of strategic interest in forming a polycentric world and developing bilateral Russian-Indian relations, economic ties have not supported these intentions. However, the conflict in Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions have compelled the Russian elites to re-evaluate their priorities. They have been faced with a choice: either to return to a Western orientation, which could lead to internal discontent, or to build stronger ties with China or India. The path chosen will depend on the position of the Indian elites, who have the freedom to take a neutral stance in a conflict far from their borders, and on the outcomes of the Ukrainian crisis.

India and Russia share a vision of a multipolar world, which is reflected in their cooperation within international organizations and fora such as the United Nations, Russia-India-China (RIC), BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). India has shown greater enthusiasm towards RIC and BRICS than SCO due to its non-founder status and concerns over the group's creation to further China's regional agenda. The expansion of BRICS and a potential free trade agreement pose challenges to India-Russia relations and require more bilateral engagement. Russia should realistically assess the benefits of endorsing China's Belt and Road Initiative while also considering the potential of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to access West Asian and South Asian markets and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy. India and Russia must collaborate to build regional consensus on the INSTC through RIC, BRICS, and SCO platforms. Despite Russia's growing proximity to China, Moscow has not compromised its support for New Delhi on issues such as Kashmir, terrorism, membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the United Nations Security Council. In contrast, China continues to question and oppose India on these matters. Similarly, India has maintained friendly ties with Russia and has not succumbed to Western pressure. Cooperation between India and Russia in international organizations has further strengthened their bilateral ties, and they must continue to work together to maintain a multipolar Eurasia, as neither can achieve this goal alone.

Due to the breakdown in relations between Russia and major Western countries, Moscow is compelled to take extraordinary measures to reorient its political, trade, and economic ties. Due to its large and diversified economy and geographical proximity, China is increasingly becoming Russia's primary partner. Therefore, assessing the main outcomes of Russian-Chinese cooperation in trade, finance, economics, and science is crucial while identifying their achievements and probable limitations for further development. China has been Russia's largest trading partner for over a decade, importing mainly mineral products while exporting advanced technical products. In 2022, statistics indicate that the roles of Russia and China in bilateral trade have remained unchanged. China has further solidified its position as Russia's primary supplier of high-tech equipment, while Russia continues to be one of China's primary sources of gas and oil. China accounts for around 20% of the total foreign trade volume of the Russian Federation, while Russia's share in Chinese foreign trade turnover is about 3%. Although evaluating mutual direct and accumulated investments is challenging, it can be argued that China is among Russia's largest investors, whereas Russia's direct and accumulated investments in China, while likely higher than official estimates, are still relatively insignificant. The scope of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China in the scientific and technological sectors is narrowing, although additional incentives for expansion have emerged amid the heightened USChinese strategic rivalry and the crisis between Russia and the West. Russian-Chinese cooperation in the financial sector has had some successes, primarily the expansion of the use of national currencies in bilateral trade. However, this expansion is significantly limited by anti-Russian sanctions. In the current international climate, Russian-Chinese relations have the potential to deepen, but doing so will necessitate the creation of various mechanisms that enable large Chinese companies to avoid secondary sanctions.

The ongoing Russian military operation in Ukraine since February 2022 has presented significant challenges to China's foreign and security policies, as well as its economic and technological ties with the West. Initially, China refrained from criticizing Russia's military actions and adopted a "neutral" or "independent" stance in response to Western criticism. However, China was taken aback by the protracted nature of the conflict and Russia's inability to successfully conclude its military operation. This raised concerns within China, considering its own situation of potentially reunifying with Taiwan through military means if necessary. While there are distinctions between the situations in Ukraine and Taiwan, the initial speculation of China conducting military operations against Taiwan has gradually diminished, although military pressure on Taiwan remains. The conflict in Ukraine has also caused internal divisions within China and has had an impact on its relations with the West, which are crucial for China's rise on the global stage. This article aims to examine China's interests and positions regarding the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, the implications for its relations with Russia, and the opportunities and challenges that China faces in the current situation. The article employs an inductive approach, analyzing China's predicaments at four levels: perceptions within the decision-making bodies of the Communist Party, the foreign ministry, think-tanks, and the media community. It argues that in conjunction with China's economic contraction resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian military operation has prompted China to seriously contemplate how to safeguard its national interests, particularly with regard to Taiwan and its strategic objectives of attaining a prominent global position. These considerations carry medium to long-term implications for the evolving regional and global orders. In conclusion, the article briefly discusses the implications of these developments on India, shedding light on the broader regional dynamics influenced by China's response to the Ukrainian conflict.

The article examines the evolution of Russian defense industrial and economic policies during the military conflict in Ukraine, and the potential impact of these changes on Russian-Indian cooperation. The conflict has led to major reassessment of the defense industrial policies around the world, which is anticipated to affect Asia as well. In Russia, the conflict has prompted a long-term trend towards greater militarization of the economy. In this new context, there is a growing prospect for joint RussianIndian initiatives aimed at promoting defense industrialization projects in India, enhancing self-reliance, and bolstering India's economic mobilization potential. The most promising area of cooperation between Russia and India may not be limited to the sales of small numbers of selected high-tech weapons. Rather, it may involve creating a new industrial base to help India achieve defense self-sufficiency and be ready for economic mobilization. India's current favorable position in global politics may enable it to obtain Russian cooperation in this field on very favorable conditions. However, such a path may invite growing opposition from the US and the EU towards the IndianRussian cooperation. It is worth noting that such pressure has been present constantly, especially since 2014, but has been ineffective so far.

The India-Russia strategic partnership has been characterized by a longstanding and mutually beneficial defence relationship that has spanned over fifty years. This partnership has witnessed a notable shift from a buyer-seller dynamic to joint development and production of cutting-edge weaponry. Consequently, a significant portion of India's defence arsenal is comprised of Soviet/Russian weapons systems. However, as India aims to diversify its sources of arms imports and promote greater self-reliance in defence production, Russia's prominent position in India's defence considerations is diminishing. Moreover, recent challenges stemming primarily from the Ukraine conflict have cast a shadow over this defence relationship.

The focus is increasingly shifting towards how both countries can navigate practical and perceptual issues in their partnership. Furthermore, the exclusivity that India once enjoyed as the sole recipient of state-of-the-art Russian defence technology in its region, giving it a qualitative advantage over its adversaries, has been diluted with Russia now supplying advanced weaponry to China. Consequently, the Indo-Russian defence partnership is currently facing a significant test.

This article critically examines and analyzes the ongoing trends in the India-Russia defence relationship and explores the implications arising from these developments. It seeks to shed light on the evolving dynamics and challenges that both countries must address in order to sustain and strengthen their defence partnership.

The economic relationship between India and Russia has been limited and faced various challenges historically. However, changing geopolitical and geoeconomic situations have created new opportunities while also presenting challenges and risks. This paper aims to analyse the legacy issues and dynamic shifts in international trade and order that are currently taking place. The article explores the ongoing transformation of Indo-Russian economic engagement and proposes possible means for moving forward. The existing advantages of both countries in the areas of trade and investment are also outlined.

Assuming a resolution to the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine, the paper proposes an economic roadmap for continuing the recent momentum in the trade and economic relationship between Russia and India. The first step is to strengthen bilateral trade in existing priority export sectors of both countries. This can be followed by deeper cooperation in oil, civilian nuclear energy, and defence sectors. The introduction of rupee-rouble trade, even partially, could significantly boost these efforts. The paper also advocates for involving the private sector in these efforts by adopting a proactive approach by both governments.

By combining immediate efforts with long-term geopolitical maneuvers on both sides and an early resolution of the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine, it is possible to push bilateral trade and investment levels onto a sustainable growth path in the future. The paper argues strongly for this approach.

The prevailing geopolitical conditions, characterized by Russia's reorientation away from the West and India's steadfast pursuit of an independent foreign and economic policy, present a distinctive prospect for Russia and India to enhance their trade and investment collaboration to a heightened level. Despite the existence of a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between the two nations, the volume of bilateral trade and mutual investments has long remained insufficient in comparison to their political ties. Nevertheless, the trade volume between Russia and India is now experiencing rapid growth due to the significant increase in exports of energy, fertilizers, iron and steel, wood products, vegetable and animal oils from Russia to India. This article not only examines this phenomenon but also assesses the necessary conditions to address India's escalating trade deficit with Russia. These prerequisites encompass the expansion of the manufacturing sector in India, the rise in purchasing power of the Indian middle class, and the accelerated development of digitization in both India and Russia. The Indian economy has been notably stimulated by key governmental initiatives led by Narendra Modi, such as "Atmanirbhar Bharat" (or "Self-Reliant India"), "Make in India," "Skill India," and "Startup India," all of which prioritize digital transformation. Russian entrepreneurs demonstrate a keen interest in India's market trends and swiftly adapt to India's evolving demands and capabilities. Similarly, Indian business circles exhibit a growing inclination to acquire knowledge about contemporary Russia. This realignment presents an opportunity to expand trade beyond conventional goods and establish new investment connections between the two countries.

This study explores the implications of climate change for the bilateral relationship between India and Russia. While current research primarily focuses on the strategic aspects of their relationship, little attention has been given to the factors that could shape its future. Climate change has significant economic and social impacts on both countries, raising questions about how it will affect their relations. This paper examines the potential effects on livelihoods, agriculture, and trade, and investigates whether India and Russia can find areas of cooperation despite their differing roles as fossil fuel exporters and consumers.
Despite their reliance on Western technology transfer, India and Russia have the opportunity to collaborate and develop new technologies together. The study highlights the potential for joint efforts in renewable energy, such as wind and solar power, to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. It also explores collaboration in biofuel production using Russia's biomass resources.
Disaster risk management and information sharing emerge as additional areas of potential cooperation in the face of climate change. Collaboration in these areas can enhance preparedness and response mechanisms, strengthening overall resilience.
The study also considers the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a potential collaboration opportunity. As the Arctic ice melts, the NSR offers a viable trade route between Russia's European and Far Eastern regions. India has shown interest in contributing to its development, which could reduce shipping losses and emissions in transporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia.
In conclusion, the paper emphasizes the need for adaptation and adjustment in the bilateral relationship to address climate change challenges. It underscores the importance of scientific collaboration, exploring joint initiatives, and developing sustainable solutions to mitigate the impacts of climate change while strengthening the longstanding India-Russia partnership.

The article examines the cultural relationships between Russia and India, which have existed for several centuries, and their impact on the development of political relations between the two countries, particularly in the twentieth century. Culture has played an important role in the multi-layered bilateral relations between India and the Soviet Union. However, with the fall of the Soviet Union and geopolitical reorientations, Russia had to focus on rebuilding its economy before engaging with soft power. Similarly, India liberalized its economy in the 1990s and adapted to changing political equations in the international order.

Soft power, as defined by Joseph Nye, includes cultural resources, political values, and foreign policies that can be used to influence others. This article examines all three aspects of soft power and notes that Russia and India have channelized their cultural resources into public diplomacy since the 2000s, setting up institutions and bodies to deal with it. Despite their rich cultural resources and institutionalization of the dissemination of soft power, both countries do not fare well in soft power rankings.
The article argues that changes in the international order since the 1990s, shifts in political ideologies, and the reorientation of the foreign policies of both countries have led them to seek new allies. While cultural relations between the two nations continue, soft power and public diplomacy have yet to realize their full potential in this fluid scenario.

Connectivity has been one of the most challenging issues for developing trade cooperation between Russia and India. Due to the geographic distance separating the two nations, along with the unstable security environment in Afghanistan and border disputes between India and Pakistan, the creation of a direct and shortest transport route has proven difficult, thereby rendering it impossible to implement crucial projects in energy infrastructure.

This paper briefly outlines the functioning logistics between Russia and India, which has relied primarily on shipping through the Suez Canal, with an emphasis on the developments in the wake of conflict in Ukraine. The author briefly explores the prospects for maritime connectivity between the Russian Far East and Indian ports, and highlights several challenges for launching a regular Vladivostok-Chennai corridor.

The US and European sanctions against the Russian economy, combined with subsequent difficulties in transporting goods by sea, has reinvigorated Russia's efforts to complete the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). This corridor holds significant potential for Russia to expand its reach to India, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa. Additionally, it is believed that the project may facilitate India's connectivity with countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. Therefore, this paper particularly examines the case of the land corridor, exploring its current progress in implementation, the geoeconomic factors involved, existing challenges, and opportunities for compatibility with other initiatives, such as the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport Corridor (TRACECA), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Chabahar port.

The author argues that, although the implementation of connectivity projects between the two countries will not solve structural problems in their trade relationship, both have a vested interest in promoting infrastructure development for a deeper engagement with new regions. To qualitatively boost Russian-Indian trade, affordable logistical solutions should be developed simultaneously with the resolution of other issues like the settlements for financial transactions, and the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers.

Russian foreign policy has long championed multipolarity in international relations. As relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated, Russia has sought to establish a Eurasian project involving non-Western great powers. India has been identified by Russia as one of the major pillars of this global realignment. However, India’s global reach and power have been undermined by its entanglement in regional disputes and volatile relations with some of its partners. While some minor differences exist on the regional level in Eurasia between Russia and India, a major disagreement has been the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Russia views as a global organization, and India sees it as regional. Our analysis suggests that the US military presence in Afghanistan, along with its plans for geoeconomic and geopolitical dominance in Eurasia, has been a major distracting factor in Russia-India relations. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the decline of its influence may provide new opportunities for regional cooperation between Russia and India. Our research indicates that Afghanistan may be one such country where the interests of Russia and India can converge. Both countries are interested in a stable and secure Afghanistan, and both may be willing to accept Taliban rule, subject to certain conditions, if it helps achieve that goal. In Central Asia, Russia and India have previously pursued divergent agendas, with Russia being somewhat protective of its natural sphere of interests. However, we conclude that with the elimination of external disturbances in the form of US military occupation of Afghanistan, the interests of both countries could be reconciled in relation to Central Asia. By working in synergy, Russia and India could collaborate more effectively in this region.

Over the decades, the partnership between India and Russia has grown stronger, enabling them to undertake combined efforts for development and engagement in neighbouring regions and beyond. Central Asia, which is a common neighbourhood of both India and Russia, has historically and culturally had close relations with the two countries. Given India's status as a major rising economy and Russia's powerful presence with deep ties to the region, the two countries can work together to deepen engagement with Central Asia. The region has high economic, political, connectivity and cultural potential, and its significance has increased amidst the current international political and economic turmoil. This paper aims to identify the areas of convergence between India and Russia for practical cooperation both at the bilateral and regional levels to further strengthen their ties and contribute to the development of their common neighbourhood. Bilateral cooperation between India and Russia in Central Asia has great potential and is of significant interest. Trilateral cooperation of India and Russia with Central Asian republics has not been extensively researched and could emerge as a new area of interest. The paper explores this phenomenon in the context of economic and educational cooperation among the three sides, which can provide another anchor for regional stability, not only in Central Asia but also in the wider region.