The article analyzes the plans of Peter the Great related to the consolidation of Russia on the shores of the Baltic Sea. It focuses on the emergence of the idea to gain access to the Baltic Sea and the stages of its implementation. During the Northern War of 17001721, Russia's peace conditions changed. The article tries to explain the basis for the evolution of Peter the Greate's ideas of achieving the desired peace.

It shows that after the "embarrassment at Narva" in November 1700 and the first success of B.P. Sheremetev at Erestfer in December 1701 in 1702 1709, the conduct of hostilities and the diplomatic efforts of Russia were directed exclusively at keeping the outlet to the sea. The creation of St. Petersburg, the transfer of the capital to it, the construction of a defensive system at the mouth of the Neva all this was aimed at securing the mouth of the Neva for Russia. Russia agreed to the conclusion of a peace, according to which it received only Ingria and Karelia – the old Russian provinces.

After the victory under Poltava in 1709, a new struggle for peace began. The annexation of Livonia, Estland, the temporary occupation of Finland – all these conquests were motivated by the idea for which Russia started the war: keeping and ensuring the safe outlet to the sea. Russia constantly showed its readiness to conclude peace, but Sweden rejected all such attempts because it could not get along with the idea of parting with imperial ambitions.

Russia began ten-year-long harsh coercion of Sweden to peace, which resulted in the devastation of a part of the Swedish territories proper by the Russian army and the forced consent of the Swedes to peace. The Nishtad Peace of 1721 ended the war and became the starting point for the extraordinary development of the imperial imagination of Peter the Great. Russia's entry into the world arena as an empire, an autocratic state dangerous to its neighbors and actively participating in the incessant division of the world.

The article focuses on the issue of the international status of Russia during the reign of Peter the Great, which progressed from regional power in Eurasia to great power. It seeks to establish when and how Russia officially became a great power. The Poltava victory over the Swedish army (1709) showed that Russia had created the military-industrial poten- tial necessary for great power. The tsar gradually prepared the conditions for the proclama- tion of Russia as an empire and himself as an emperor. Arguably, the recognition of the title by the European states cannot be the main criterion for determining the time of Russia's transformation into a great power because recognizing the imperial title dragged on for sev- eral decades. The great power position of Russia and its new role in international relations began to find its reflection in the treaties between the leading European powers before the official recognition as an empire. International treaties of Russia with France, Austria, Prussia, Rzeczpospolita, Sweden, China, the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate show that for the first time, the new role of Russia as a great power, as the guarantor of the common Eu- ropean contractual system after the War of the Spanish Succession (1701 / 1702-1714) was enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty (1717), which was concluded between Russia, France, and Prussia. The subsequent treaty, which had a similar significance for the assertion of the great power role of Russia in Europe, was signed in Vienna on July 26 (August 6), 1726, with another great power - Austria. The system of treaties that Russia was part of in the last years of the reign of Peter the Great was strikingly different from the one that was at the beginning of the reign. According to the Treaty of Nystad, Russia was registered as the guarantor of the new internal state structure of Sweden (which ceased to be an absolutist state) and even the guarantor of the rights to the throne of King Fredrik I (Article 7). Under the allied defense treaty with Sweden (February 22, 1724), both countries agreed to be the guarantors of the internal political structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The analysis of docu- ments allows us to make a general conclusion that the treaties of Russia with other countries at the end of the reign of Peter the Great were one of the pillars of the system of international relations in Europe, which signified that Russia acquired new great power status.

The article is devoted to studying the role and significance of the Nystadt Peace as a historical document reflecting the strengthening and importance of Russia in the world arena.
 
The article studies the document's text using modern methods of political science research: content analysis, cognitive mapping, phonosemantic analysis. It shows that the Treaty of Nystad reflects the features of the formation of the internal political system of Russia, witnessed in the use of anthroponyms. It also reflects the features of the historical development of Russia: its gradual transformation into an empire, the absence of a banking system, merchants as an estate, a merchant fleet. The analysis of the document allows us to conclude that the agreement regulates interactions not only between Russia and Sweden but contains references to other European countries. It speaks of Russia's strengthening role in the international arena, not so much in the military but also in diplomatic terms. It is reflected in the ways the agreement is verbalized.

The results of the phonosemantic analysis show a positive perception of the toponymy of geographic entities annexed to Russia under the terms of the Nystadt Peace. At the same time, the perception of Sweden and everything Swedish is characterized by negativism. Nystadt peace was vital for the development of Russia, its transformation into an empire, into an influential military force, for the modernization of the domestic governance system, the creation of new social institutions and practices, and the strengthening of domestic diplomacy.

Empires are usually born through political recognition and extensive military successes. The ruler’s personality and the activities of political and military advisors and generals are crucial for the emergence of an empire. The authors argue that in the case of Peter the Great (Peter I), the political recognition and military successes were achieved simultaneously in the east and west, however, in different contexts. The authors make a series of comparisons between Peter I and other monarchs of the epoch, such as Carl XII, August II, Frederick I, Carlos II, Willem III, Leopold VI, and others, relying on three main categories, namely education, “vices and virtues” and political views. This comparison is necessary to highlight the essential prerequisites in Peter’s personal development that might have determined his political actions. In addition, the article carries out an evaluation of the geopolitical significance of the military campaigns and victories achieved by the tzar and his commanders. These achievements are substantiated to correlate with Russian rise as a great power directly. After the Peace of Nystad, the geopolitical interests of the Tsardom were finally met, with the territorial dominium of the Empire being outlined for a century ahead.

Furthermore, the territorial expansion was accompanied by the exercise of the “imperium” as a political authority exclusive to the Russian monarchs. The authors try to highlight the connection between the personal development of monarchs, their achievements, and imperial ambitions. The comparative analysis of these factors in various imperial cases provides additional considerations for understanding the historical period.

The article, based on the unpublished documents from the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, reveals for the first time details of a little-known episode in the history of the Russian diplomatic service – the mission of Empress' Elisabeth I minister plenipotentiary Count of Courland Hermann Karl von Keyserlingk to Frankfurt am Main and Regensburg during the War of the Austrian Succession. The mission's goal was to achieve recognition of the Russian imperial title from the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. The author managed to find out, it was Keyserlingk who had the idea to send the official representative of Russia to the election of the Emperor in Frankfurt in 1745 and then in 1746 to the Imperial Diet in Regensburg, which approved the election results. Keyserlingk proposed the most straightforward plan that did not damage the prestige of Elisabeth I – to transfer the credentials with the imperial title to the College of Electors and to receive a recreditive (leave-letter), trying to get the title included in the text. The same should have been done at the Imperial Diet. The main task of the diplomat was to prevent the issue of the title from becoming the subject of discussion at meetings of the College of Electors and at the Diet, since the details of the discussion would undoubtedly get into the official documents of these institutions and become public. The moment for solving this delicate issue turned out to be a good one: the continued hostilities forced the Imperial Estates to seek help from Russia. As a result, they were ready to do Elisabeth I a favor. This largely explains the success of Keyserlingk's mission, which enjoyed the support of imperial diplomats – representatives of the Electors of Mainz, Saxony, Bohemia and at the final stage – of the Elector of Brandenburg, King of Denmark and Emperor Franz I. The article also examines Keyserlingk's participation in recognizing the seventeen-year-old Grand Prince Peter as Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, a legal major a year early.

The article is devoted to the role of tsarist doctors in solving several foreign policy issues in Russia during the reign of Peter the Great. It analyzes the activities of two doctors Robert Areskin and George Polikala. Areskin played a crucial role in Peter I 's communication with the Jacobites under deteriorating relations between Russia and England in 1717-1718. Polikala, in turn, assisted the Russian government in several interactions with the Ottoman Empire.

Sources indicate that R. Areskin was the leading lobbyist for the idea of the Russian government supporting James III Stuart. With the help of his relatives, who actively supported the overthrown dynasty, Areskin negotiated with representatives of the Swedish King Charles XII and with other European diplomats during the second European trip of Peter the Great. The diplomatic scandal of early 1717 connected to the disclosure of another Jacobite conspiracy involving the official circles of Sweden affected Areskin's endeavors. During these events, the doctor's secret negotiations with representatives of a state at war with Russia became public. Despite the official assurances of Peter the Great and Areskin about their non-involvement in the activities of the opponents of King George I of England, negotiations with the Jacobites continued later, during the tsar's stay in France and Holland. Areskin remained the main initiator of these contacts even after Peter I returned to Russia, which only aggravated the problematic relations with England. However, the death of the tsar's doctor led to the fact that the "Jacobite intrigue" in Russia was over.

Medic G.Polikala was involved in the activities of Russian diplomacy in Turkey. In particular, he had contacts with the Russian envoy in Istanbul, P.A. Tolstoy, and attempted to withdraw A. Cantemir from the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, the information about Polikala's participation in Peter I's secret diplomacy events is sketchy.

The article concludes that the tsarist doctors played an essential role in implementing the foreign policy initiatives of Peter I.

German and Austrian historiography of the Holy League war is an essential source because German and Austrian historians have analyzed Russia's participation in this war since the 18th century. The discussion revolves around three main questions: about the moment of Russia's accession to the Holy League de jure and de facto; about the qualification of the Holy League as an international anti-Turkish and anti-Crimean alliance; finally, about the peculiarities of social and technological cooperation between the Venetian Republic, the Holy Roman Empire, and Russia. The German and Austrian historiography on Russia's role in the war with the Ottomans began to form at the end of the 17th century when Austrian diplomats started issuing pamphlets spreading the pan-European Christian idea. Leopold I acted in accordance with this idea as the defender of the European order on the Rhine and the defender of the entire Christian civilization from the Islamic Empire and its vassal of the Crimean Khanate. Russia was trying to secure its national interests in dealings with the European partners, which did not fit well with the relations between Vienna and Constantinople, Venice, and Constantinople, as well as the plans of Jan III Sobieski to compensate for the loss of Ukraine at the expense of the Danube lands. The assessments of German and Austrian historiography make sense if we regard Russia as a part of the European Christian civilization, sharing common cultural values and geopolitical challenges.

The issues of peace have always been important for historical science. However, in recent years, international historiography began to pay attention to Peace congresses' symbolism and socio-cultural design. The symbolic power of "special days" whether it is a Christian holiday or an event of exceptional significance allowed people of early Modernity to express their attitude to reality and power. An analysis of the choice of the dates for the conclusion of Peace by adversary states within the Westphalian system demonstrates three persistent variants of the dates. The first is signing a peace treaty on Saturday, Sunday, or a Christian holiday. The most striking example of this option is the signing of the Peace of Westphalia itself (treaties in Münster and Osnabrück on October 24, 1648), on Saturday the day before the second Sunday after Trinity. The second option involves a reference to an important event in the past. For example, the Peace in Passarovitz between the Holy Roman Empire and Porta (1718) and the Russian-Turkish Peace in Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi (1774) were signed on the same date July 21, the date when Istanbul and Peter the Great signed the Prut Peace Treaty in 1711. Since the age of the Enlightenment, when the "Right of Peace" began to compete with the "Right of War" in political theories, the date of Peace could be directly determined by the end of negotiations. Sometimes the conclusion of the Peace became a Christian holiday. Peter the Great decided to consecrate the day of the conclusion of the Nystad Peace Treaty by transferring the relics of the Holy Grand Duke Alexander Nevsky from Vladimir to the new Russian capital St. Petersburg. Conclusion of the Peace was used as a tool of social constructivism, implemented through modeling. The political idea was symbolically grounded in significant historical or religious dates. Combining the historical precedent, the Christian holiday and the end of the war emphasized the sacred nature of Peace as the highest social value.

The article presents historical research on the Church reform of Peter I, considering the Great Northern War (1700–1721) as one of the crucial transformational factors in church-state relations in Russia. The article introduces descriptive books of patriarchal estates in 17 counties of Russia. They were created during the audit of Church and monastic property in line with the decree of January 31, 1701. It considers features of the form and content of these documents and previously known descriptions of bishops' houses and monasteries, which were carried out according to the mandated memorials of the Monastic Order in 1701-1705. The article claims that the secularization of the patriarch's landholdings, in contrast to other church holdings, was complete and final already at the beginning of the 18th century. In this regard, there is an obvious need to reject historical parallels between the events of the early 18th century and the "monastic secularization" of 1764.

Comparing the Alexei Kurbatov’s proposals to Peter I in a letter dated October 25, 1700, with the content of the personal decrees of January 24 and 31, 1701 on the restoration of the Monastic Order allows us to hypothesize that the defeat at Narva and preparation for the meeting with the Elector Augustus II that would result in the signing of the Biržai pact, significantly adjusted the plans of the Church reform. The novelty of the January decrees that presumably started the reform (in the then-common European sense of the concept) was the inclusion of the patriarch's estates in the list of the Church's possessions subject to the control of the state in the future.

I conclude that the secularization of church-monastic possessions and property that followed at the beginning of the Great Northern War not only contradicted the centuries-old historical practice but was at that time organizationally overwhelming for the state, which was able to solve the problem of managing the escheat patriarchal lands but did not yet have the appropriate staffing and logistics capacities for control over all possessions of the Church.

Russia's regular contacts with the Republic of Venice on the eve of the RussianTurkish war 1710-1713 resumed after almost a ten-year break. Before Sultan Ahmed III declared war, the Tsar sent two letters to the doge. They can be interpreted as a call to Venice to recognize the intermediate results of the Northern War and as an appeal to the republic's orthodox subjects to join Russia in the impending conflict. This episode is scarcely covered in Russian and international historiography. The connection of the envoys with the Prut campaign is also not covered in the literature. Therefore, it seems necessary to establish a connection between the two events, especially in changes in Russian foreign policy towards Venice.

In March 1711, a Russian consul was sent to Venice to build support and attract volunteers for the opening theater of military operations in the Balkans. It is no coincidence that Dmitry Bozis became the first Russian consul in Italy. Being a prominent representative of the Greek community of the capital, he successfully extended his influence not only to the local Greeks but also to the Slavs of Dalmatia, who wanted to serve the Russian Tsar and fight the Turks. The outcome of the Prut campaign did not affect the consulate's work and the trade mission. Agents of the Russian government, who had commercial orders, were sent to Venice, and successfully fulfilled their mission. One of them was Count Savva Raguzinsky, an outstanding diplomat and successful commercial agent. His activities were relatively peaceful, although they still included political monitoring and legal intelligence.

The resumption of bilateral relations caused by the Prut operation positively affected Russian-Venetian relations. Since the departure of the consul Bozis and the diplomatic agent Caretta, who had the authority to create a second Balkan "front" in the rear of the Sultan, after July 12, 1711, the Russian mission transformed into a commercial agency with broad diplomatic powers. These changes open a new, fruitful period in the history of bilateral relations between Russia and Venice.

Book review: Jonker J., Faber N. 2021.Organizing for Sustainability. A Guide to Developing New Business Models. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 242 р. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-78157-6

Book review: Campos H. (ed.). 2021. The Innovation Revolution in Agriculture: A Roadmap to Value Creation. Springer Nature Switzerland AG. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030- 50991-0