: Trade and scientific-technical cooperation were integral components of U.S.-Soviet relations during the détente of the 1970s. By the late 1960s, strategic parity had been achieved between the two superpowers, marking a turning point in their confrontation. The arms race came to be regarded as both costly and unsustainable. While the temporary balance of military capabilities reduced the immediate threat of war and eased direct confrontation, it also fostered the belief that strengthening commercial ties and advancing scientifictechnical programs and exchanges could provide a material foundation for lasting peace. In Moscow, this notion evolved into a programmatic directive, whereas Washington adopted a more pragmatic stance.Drawing on a broad historiographical foundation, archival documents from Russian repositories (RGANI, RGAE), published materials from the U.S. Department of State, and electronic collections of American intelligence and scientific communities, this article examines the evolving U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1970s. It focuses on the role assigned to trade, economic relations, and scientific-technical cooperation in the broader framework of superpower relations.
The study concludes that the unraveling of détente in trade and scientific-technical cooperation occurred in three distinct stages. The first stage began with the passage of the JacksonVanik Amendment in 1974, which disrupted the principle of equality in bilateral relations and inflicted considerable economic losses on the Soviet side. The second stage was marked by the Carter administration's emphasis on human rights beginning in January 1977. This introduced the threat of sanctions and escalated tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations. The third stage, initiated in December 1979 and solidified by January 1980, witnessed the dismantling of the infrastructure supporting bilateral scientific and technical cooperation. These developments underscored the shifting priorities and eventual decline of détente as a defining feature of U.S.-Soviet relations during this period.

The article employs structural analysis to examine the evolution of Cuban antiimperialist ideology. It begins by analyzing the historical context—Cuba’s struggle against colonial dependence on Spain and its subsequent incorporation into the U.S. sphere of influence—which shaped the foundations of its anti-imperialist thought. Central to this ideological framework are the ideas of Cuban national hero José Martí, who articulated two core principles that later became structural components of Cuban anti-imperialism: resistance against oppression and the unification of regional countries in this struggle. The article traces the development of Martí’s ideas as they were adopted and expanded upon by diverse political movements, including radical patriots, socialists, and communists. Particular attention is given to the interpretation of anti-imperialist thought by Julio Antonio Mella, the founder of the Communist Party of Cuba and the Cuban section of the Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas. After the Cuban Revolution's victory in 1959, a new structural component emerged under Marxist-Leninist influence: the principle of proletarian internationalism. This principle was institutionalized in Cuban anti-imperialist ideology and codified in official documents, including foreign policy declarations and the 1976 Constitution. Following the collapse of the "world system of socialism" and the USSR, during the "Special Period in Peacetime," Cuba was compelled to reevaluate its economic foundations and foreign policy. This period saw the removal of proletarian internationalism from the Cuban Constitution and the termination of military assistance to national liberation and revolutionary movements. Cuban internationalism shifted its focus to humanitarian missions, marking a significant ideological transformation.
The VI Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (2011) reinforced these changes, with humanitarian missions increasingly commercialized where feasible, and foreign policy emphasizing the defense of international law, advocacy for multipolarity, and the pursuit of an alternative, fairer world order. In contemporary Cuban anti-imperialism, the Marxist-Leninist components—such as class analysis and proletarian internationalism—play a reduced role, reflecting the leadership's adaptability to changes in the international system.
This analysis highlights the evolution and resilience of Cuban anti-imperialist ideology as it adjusts to shifting geopolitical realities while maintaining its foundational principles.

American politics is shaped by numerous variables that influence the development of both domestic and foreign policy. Among these, the formulation of party platforms plays a critical role in determining the policy direction of U.S. administrations. While it is often assumed that party platforms diverge from actual policy outcomes, recent research suggests otherwise in the U.S. context. Party platforms serve as official documents articulating a party’s ideological, political, and economic principles, including pre-election promises and foundational stances on various issues for the electoral cycle, typically spanning four years. This article examines the process of party platform formulation, focusing on the Republican Party's platform in 2000 and its subsequent implementation.
During the 1990s, the Republican Party initiated a reformation of its platform following a series of electoral defeats in presidential races. This restructuring, led by figures such as George W. Bush and shaped by influential conservative think tanks, embraced a strategy known as "compassionate conservatism." However, the actual trajectory of U.S. administrations often diverges from the initial platform due to unforeseen circumstances. This phenomenon was particularly evident during the presidency of George W. Bush, where foreign policy experienced a significant shift towards neoconservative influences.
The events of September 11, 2001, acted as a catalyst, fundamentally reshaping foreign policy objectives and altering public sentiment towards the Bush administration, as highlighted by sociological studies. These developments led to substantial changes in the nation's regional foreign policy priorities, reflecting the dynamic interplay between pre-election platforms and the realities of governance.

This article explores key aspects of the French royal court's policies in Northern Europe and the dynamics of Russian-French relations during the early 1570s. The first section provides a concise overview of the geopolitical situation in the Baltic region following the Russian-Lithuanian truce on June 24, 1570, and the Treaty of Stettin on December 13, 1570. The second section focuses on the conspiracy to overthrow King John III of Sweden, orchestrated by Charles de Mornay with support from the House of Valois. The author also examines the proposal for a Franco-Swedish alliance, articulated by Charles de Danzay, the French ambassador to Denmark. It is hypothesized that this alliance plan was opposed by Henry of Anjou, King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania, who sought to avoid direct conflict with the Russian state. The third section analyzes the decline of French influence in the Baltic region during 1574–1575, attributed to Henry de Valois' flight from Poland in the summer of 1574 and the cessation of matrimonial negotiations with the Swedish Vasa dynasty in February 1575. The article delves into Charles de Danzay's political project to transform Livonia into a French vassal duchy under François of Alençon, as well as his broader vision for a FrancoDanish-Swedish-Livonian-Polish-Lithuanian alliance. The analysis demonstrates that, despite the temporary alignment of the Russian state with forces opposed to the French kingdom, the gradual expansion of mutually beneficial trade relations and dialogue in the context of Baltic policies mitigated the potential for escalating confrontation. By the mid-1570s, conditions were increasingly favorable for Russia and France to pursue shared interests, highlighting the potential for cooperative engagement over outright rivalry.

This article, based on unpublished materials from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, represents the first historiographical analysis of the languages used in official correspondence—such as letters of credence, recall, and notifications—between the secular and ecclesiastical electors of the Holy Roman Empire and Russian emperors during the eighteenth century. Employing the methodological framework of diplomatics, an auxiliary historical discipline, the author utilizes formulaic analysis to examine the mandatory expressions and formulas in the opening and closing protocols of these letters. These linguistic conventions provide insights into the social status of both sender and recipient, reflecting the hierarchical nature of diplomatic relationships.
The article contributes to the growing interest in early modern diplomatic languages, a field that has gained traction in recent foreign historiography, particularly in studies of negotiation practices at international congresses. Archival research reveals distinct patterns in the linguistic practices of the electors. Saxon electors corresponded with Russian emperors in German, while the electors of the Palatinate and Bavaria initially used Latin before transitioning to German in the mid-eighteenth century. Ecclesiastical electors—the archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne—also wrote in German. On rare occasions, French was used. Conversely, Russian monarchs adhered to tradition, drafting official correspondence in Russian with German translations attached.
The article concludes that the choice of language serves as a formal indicator of the nature of relationships between rulers, highlighting the distinction between sovereign monarchs and electors, who, de jure, remained vassals. This hierarchical disparity is further reflected in the use of kinship terms within the correspondence. For example, Russian emperors addressed secular electors not as "brothers" or "sisters"—terms typically reserved for sovereign equals— but as "uncles," "aunts," or, later, "in-laws" (occasionally "cousins"). These designations underscored the unequal status of the correspondents.
Additionally, the correspondence sheds light on the process by which the influential Estates of the Holy Roman Empire recognized the imperial title of the Russian monarchs. By analyzing the linguistic and formal characteristics of these letters, the study provides new insights into the social and political dynamics of eighteenth-century diplomacy.

China is confronting escalating geopolitical and socio-economic challenges, prompting a structural reorganization of its economy centered on the high-tech sector and emerging technologies. This article examines China's contemporary industrial, technological, and innovation policies within the context of global economic disruptions and domestic structural constraints. The relevance of this study lies in evaluating China's capacity to adapt to a shifting international environment, heightened technological competition from Western countries, and domestic pressures such as an aging population and slowing economic growth.
The paper seeks to assess current strategies for the development of China's national innovation system (NIS) and critically analyze the transformation of its industrial policy. The central hypothesis posits that, despite outward signs of modernization, China's approach retains elements of traditional interventionism. Methodologically, the research draws on the theory of national innovation systems and elements of political economy, supplemented by case studies. These include an analysis of support mechanisms for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—particularly the so-called "small giants"—as a key example of the implementation of the "national champions" policy. The study relies on official documents and relevant statistical data.
The findings reveal that China's current industrial and technological policies are marked by ambivalence. On the one hand, there is a notable shift towards a more nuanced and multitiered support system, emphasizing incentives for technology-oriented SMEs and the development of advanced sectors such as integrated circuits, artificial intelligence, and renewable energy. On the other hand, elements of a techno-centric and mobilization-oriented approach persist, with "national champions" continuing to play a central role in driving economic development. While the definition of champions has expanded to include SMEs, and the criteria for their selection have become more flexible, the effectiveness of this policy remains limited. The case of the "small giants" highlights the risks associated with the new policy framework. Looking ahead, the Chinese economy and its technology policies will continue to face significant challenges. However, the potential for transformative change appears limited due to mounting external pressures and path dependency, which predispose Chinese leadership to replicate established approaches.

The Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) represents a commercial integration process that exemplifies the concept of liquid regionalism. Its defining characteristics include a lack of commitment and interest among member states, coupled with a pronounced pursuit of trade alternatives beyond regional boundaries. Rather than evolving into a robust common market, LAIA has primarily functioned as a zone of tariff preferences.
This article aims to highlight the fragility of commercial integration within LAIA and to analyze the strong tendency toward extra-regional trade, which undermines the foundational principles of Latin American regionalism. The study provides a comprehensive examination of the historical context, evolution, and institutional framework of LAIA, with a particular focus on intra-regional trade dynamics and the Association's interactions with other regions and countries.
The analysis concludes that LAIA epitomizes liquid regionalism in Latin America, a characterization stemming from the limited commitment of its member states, the institutional flexibility that defines its operations, and the prioritization of extra-regional trade at the expense of achieving its original objectives of economic integration and cooperation.
Although LAIA was conceived within the framework of open regionalism in Latin America, it has not developed into a fully-fledged regional integration process. Instead, its focus has remained narrowly confined to facilitating trade exchanges. The intergovernmental regionalism model underpinning LAIA has failed to progress toward the establishment of a free trade area, contradicting the objectives outlined in the Treaty of Montevideo.

Despite initial expectations that the New Development Bank (NDB) would emerge as a significant contributor to education aid, educational projects constitute only 0.3% of the Bank’s portfolio after nine years of operation. Why have the aspirations of the mid-2010s remained largely unrealized? Drawing on primary sources, including official BRICS and NDB documents, speeches by member states’ representatives, and aid statistics, this article traces the evolution of education aid within the NDB’s operational framework. The analysis tests several hypotheses to explain this trajectory, examining BRICS member states’ preferences for educational cooperation, leadership changes within the Bank, the impact of COVID-19, the demand for educational aid among NDB member states, and the division of labor between “old” and “new” multilateral development banks.
The findings indicate that the inclusion of education as a secondary focus area in the NDB’s agenda initially exemplified a case of “governing through goals,” as the Bank sought to enhance its reputation by contributing to the broadest possible range of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Subsequent developments, including heightened attention to BRICS educational cooperation at high-level and ministerial meetings, the adverse impact of COVID-19 on global educational progress, and the appointment of Dilma Rousseff as NDB President, further solidified social infrastructure (including education) as a priority on the Bank’s strategic agenda. However, despite increased rhetorical emphasis in declarations and strategic documents, financing for educational projects has not followed suit.
This disconnect can be attributed to two primary factors. First, the established division of labor between “old” multilateral development banks (e.g., World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank) and “new” institutions (e.g., NDB, AIIB) has positioned the former to prioritize social sector investments while the latter address deficits in infrastructure financing. Second, NDB member states have shown limited interest in altering this status quo. At the same time, stagnating aid volumes and the increasing politicization of educational aid by traditional donors, coupled with persistent needs to improve education systems in many developing countries, underscore the challenge for BRICS states to develop more effective mechanisms for educational cooperation—both within the bloc and with the broader Global South.

In 2022, the European Union (EU) took the unprecedented step of providing financial assistance for military purposes to a warring state, Ukraine, while also establishing mechanisms to incentivize member states to supply arms and military equipment to Kyiv. These measures, characterized as "hard instruments" of EU foreign policy, were developed in response to the "return of high-intensity warfare to Europe." This marked a significant departure from the EU’s traditional emphasis, particularly in the 2000s and 2010s, on non-military foreign policy tools. During that period, the EU took pride in achieving its objectives without recourse to force and deliberately avoided military pressure in international relations.
This article explores the concept of foreign policy instruments, categorizing them into hard, soft, and hybrid tools. It examines the EU’s repertoire of foreign policy instruments, distinguishing between its long-standing approaches and those recently developed. Through an analysis of EU policy documents, the article identifies the Union’s evolving interests in the Eastern Partnership countries—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—and evaluates the practical application of its tools in the region since the launch of the "Eastern Policy" (comprising the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership initiative).
The study concludes by analyzing the use of soft, hard, and hybrid instruments in the Eastern Partnership, outlining the nature of the transformations in EU foreign policy and hypothesizing their underlying causes. These changes in the EU’s foreign policy toolkit reveal broader trends in its strategic development and shed light on the specific dynamics of its engagement with six post-Soviet countries, which remain strategically significant for the EU while occupying a critical space within Russia’s sphere of interests.

This study examines German doctrinal documents issued under the government of Olaf Scholz in the context of the “Zeitenwende” (turning point) proclaimed in 2022. Key documents analyzed include the National Security Strategy, Guidelines for Feminist Foreign Policy, Strategy on China, and Defense Policy Guidelines. Of particular interest are the ongoing transformations in Germany's strategic culture, which are unprecedented in scope and aim to position the Federal Republic as a significant actor in military policy. In response to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, Berlin has increasingly emphasized the military dimension of its policy, including arms deliveries to Kyiv—an action that marks a departure from the postwar principle of refraining from supplying weapons to conflict zones.
The article explores how intra-German debates on military and political issues are reflected in these strategic documents. The participants in these debates can be broadly categorized into three groups: proponents of both the “Zeitenwende” and the government's associated policies; supporters of the “Zeitenwende” who dissent on the methods or tools of implementation; and opponents of the “Zeitenwende” in principle. Using qualitative content analysis, the study identifies contradictions within the documents and inconsistencies in the implementation of Berlin's declared objectives. Many formulations in the documents are characterized by ambiguity, allowing for future revisions or additions. Notably, the Green Party exerts significant influence over the content, promoting a bellicose rhetoric and advocating for an expanded understanding of security issues.
The findings suggest that Germany's practical approach remains measured and cautious. However, the incorporation of the “Zeitenwende” principles into strategic documents ensures their longevity, making it unlikely that any future government coalition will disregard these foundational shifts in Germany's military and foreign policy.