Historical origins of the current Ukrainian crisis is a complex topic since it covers a thousand-year history and includes the main issues of the past and present of the people living on the East European Plain. The preparation of an anthology of archival documents in support of Vladimir Putin's well-known article «On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians» is being completed. Andrei Artizov, Head of the Federal Archival Agency, shares some of the results of the joint work of scientists and historians-archivists in this article.

The article analyzes the discrepancy between the declared goals of sanctions against Russia and their practical effects. The author puts forward a hypothesis according to which the real purpose of the anti-Russian sanctions imposed after the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine is not to change the foreign policy of the Russian Federation but to weaken the country as much as possible by causing economic damage to it and destabilizing the domestic political situation. Under these conditions, it is reasonable to consider sanctions as an "economic war," which raises the question of the goals of such a war, the choice of optimal methods for its conduct, and ways to minimize damage to the national economy. The author distinguishes between "defensive" and "offensive" methods of economic warfare. The article argues that a country that has become the object of large-scale sanctions is unable to successfully resist them in the long term, relying solely on "defensive" mechanisms (for example, measures to support the economy). It must resort to "offensive" tools as well, for instance to the embargo for the export of goods that are of key importance for the stability of the economic model of the countries that initiated the sanctions.

The article focuses on the Chinese concept and strategy of using soft power to create an attractive image of the country. In the age of fierce competition for global/regional leadership, the concept of soft power has become the mainstream in China's foreign policy and was considered by Chinese politicians and experts as a tool to strengthen the influence through the introduction into the cultural space of other countries, the dissemination of language and cultural codes in order to create a positive image of China. The Western-based concept of soft power in China has been thoroughly analyzed and specified. Supported by a context-based approach, the article shows how, having previously criticized the concept of Joseph Nye, Chinese scientists and experts developed a specifically Chinese theory of soft power of culture (中国文化软实力), which was used in the foreign and domestic policy of the state and served as the basis for the observed changes in the strategy of using soft power. Based on the analysis of Chinese sources, the authors of the article conclude that at the beginning of the XXI century, the buildup of soft power through the creation of a network of Confucius Institutes was presented by China as a policy for mutual gain in the international arena. With the ascendance of Xi Jinping, the soft power of culture as a resource and tool of China's external influence is leaving the frontier of the political agenda. The foreign policy vector of the soft power of culture is redirected inward, and culture, which until recently openly acted as a driver of soft power in foreign policy, moves to the internal track and fits into the concept of "four self-confidences" and "double circulation", focusing on the qualitative component, while maintaining its high foreign policy significance for the Chinese policymakers.

In the post-pandemic years of 2021–2022, the post-Soviet space has entered a stage of decisive transformation, which will test the maturity of the state institutions formed 30 years ago for the region’s countries. The study captures a snapshot of public sentiment in these countries on the eve of this wave of transformation it is based on a series of largescale opinion polls in Belarus, Georgia and Kazakhstan, conducted immediately after the last elections to the lower houses of the parliaments of these countries in the pre-crisis era. The main research question of the sociological study was to identify demographic and geographical patterns in determining the attitude of voters toward the prospects for relations with Russia. Countries with traditionally different strategies of relations with Russia were taken: Belarus is a strategic ally, Kazakhstan is friendly but pursues a multi-vector policy, and Georgia is generally hostile at the level of the political class. The analysis showed that in matters of orientation towards positive relations with Russia, the voters of these countries nevertheless had more in common than differences. Based on the analysis results, several lines of delimitation can be distinguished. Firstly, the “macro-regional, geopolitical” line runs between Belarus and Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and Georgia, on the other. The second split along the “center-periphery” line takes place within states, i.e., Such a demarcation was singled out by many researchers, singled out concerning Russia; however, we found the same demarcations in Belarus (“Minsk and the rest of the country”) partly in Georgia and Kazakhstan. Finally, the authors admit to it the possibility of delimitation along the north-south lines: in Georgia and, to some extent, in Kazakhstan, as a result of territorial differentiation in the residence of Russians in the northern regions of the republic, where sympathy for Russia is more clearly manifested than in the southern regions remote from it; and this demarcation is less pronounced in Belarus, where it refers to the regions bordering Russia and Ukraine.

Poverty is one of the most controversial issues in the academic discourse. The numerous theories and their different interpretations make theoretical approaches to poverty applicable to achieve different goals but not the one of its eradication. The politization of the problem and the motivation of political actors to harness the issue of poverty result in significant restrictions for objective assessment of the situation. Central Asia has been facing the problem of poverty for a long time, but this issue remains unresolved. The state of affairs differs a lot from one state to another in the region, however all of them are exposed to high risks since poverty in Central Asia has acquired the character of a systemic phenomenon. The abovementioned theses determine adaptation of the existing academic findings to regional specifics. The article hypothesizes that in Central Asian countries the factors of poverty persistence are linked to each other in vicious circles, the rupture of which is possible through systemic solutions in three public spheres – education, labor market and development institutions. To verify this hypothesis, the nature of poverty is put under test for consistency, the key characteristics of the problem for each of the Central Asian countries are highlighted. The major factors, contributing to the preservation of poverty are analyzed; the most important of them are revealed and logically connected to the three public spheres mentioned. The latter proves to be the most significant for the regional approach to poverty issues. The combination of statistical data, the poor quality of which represent a major limitation of the study, and the results of empirical conclusions has made it possible to identify the existence of two related “vicious circles” of poverty in the region – a vicious circle of factors of poverty persistence and a vicious circle of poverty and its consequences. Based on the data obtained through econometric modeling, a number of recommendations aimed at further reducing the severity of the problem in the Central Asian states have been developed. The proposed recommendations are formed considering the complexity and unrealizability of complex and simultaneous solutions to the problem of poverty and are designed to launch a mechanism for assessing the situation and its initial resolution.

The article develops a novel temporal approach to the sustainability of nuclear anarchy. The extant literature offers two opposite perspectives on the topic: some scholars argue that nuclear anarchy is unsustainable, since it will inevitably either lead to a catastrophic nuclear war or evolve into a hierarchical world order. Their opponents doubt the inevitability of nuclear war in a system of sovereign states and/or its catastrophic nature. However, the debate, as it stands now, ignores the fact that both technology and social structures are embedded in – and mediated by – cultures and worldviews. In particular, both nuclear weapons and interstate anarchy are embedded in specific temporalities.

Taking this fact into account, we identify and compare perceptions of time that are interrelated with nuclear weapons, on one hand, and international anarchy, on the other. The article reveals a temporal contradiction of nuclear anarchy: while nuclear weapons imply a potential finitude of humanity, the system of sovereign states is intrinsically connected with an indefinite temporality. We derive two theoretical implications form the concept of temporal contradiction. First, a realization of finite temporality should subvert the legitimacy of an anarchic world order and encourage limitations on national sovereignty. Second, international anarchy should ‘eternalize’ nuclear weapons, i.e., reinterpret them as compatible with the eternity of human civilization. Familiar events of nuclear history including early attempts to establish international control of nuclear energy, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the evolution of the anti-nuclear movement are interpreted here as empirical evidence in favor of the theoretical implications described above.

Thus, the concept of temporal contradiction provides another argument in favor of the idea that nuclear anarchy is unsustainable in the long run, since the proliferation of the finite temporality leads to international hierarchy, whereas persistent indefinite temporality masks the severity of the nuclear threat, making nuclear war more conceivable and probable.

The article deals with the «total defense» concept considering it to be part of Sweden’s strategic culture and provides an overview of how this concept defines Sweden’s approach towards the defense cooperation within the EU. «Total defence» remains staple in the Swedish defence planning and the perception of risks to national security, but has not yet received sufficient attention from Russian researchers. The announced restoration of the effective total defense system potentially comparable to that of the period of bipolar confrontation is associated with significant difficulties due to the gradual reduction in defense spending after the end of the Cold War and the decentralization of the national crisis preparedness structures which was initiated in the early 2000s. The total defense itself also reveals tensions between the demands for consolidation and centralized decision-making and the liberal, open nature of the Swedish society and national economy, as well as the principles of responsibility, subsidiarity and similarity that underline the present Swedish emergency response system. The total defense, is, therefore, regarded as an attempt at creating an effective crisis preparedness system that would function successfully in a democratic society, both under the conditions of peace and potential armed conflict, without the need to declare an emergency and endow individual bodies or a selected group of individuals with exclusive powers. The Swedish strategic culture, therefore, stipulates that it is important not only to resolve a crisis effectively, but also to do so in a way which would not endanger the regular functioning of political institutions and the rule of law. Within the EU Sweden has earned credit for developing civilian or non-military elements of crisis management, while «more hardware» defense cooperation within PESCO and the European Defense Fund is defined by the pragmatic economic interests of Swedish defense companies rather than by strategic considerations. The Swedish Experience with «total defence» will continue to face the same dilemma – the need to rebuild a robust and self-reliant national defence while preserving the liberal principles in politics as well as in economy.

The focus of this study is the views of Feofan Prokopovich, a unique Orthodox thinker whose world outlook was shaped by an obvious influence of the ideas of the Protestant and Catholic Enlightenment. Talking about the Enlightenment, modern historiography focuses on the versatility of the phenomenon, preferring to talk about the Enlightenment, including the religious or confessional Enlightenment, aimed at rethinking the role of religion and the church. The Religious Enlightenment was a pan-European phenomenon that embraced Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, and Orthodoxy, and grew out of the desire to create an intelligent religion free of superstition and serving society. The intellectual movement of the religious Enlightenment sought to reconcile the natural philosophy of the 17th-18th centuries with a religious worldview, while trying to overcome the extremes of religious fanaticism, on the one hand, and nihilism and godlessness, on the other. The process of forming a new intellectual environment is marked by the coexistence and mutual influence of the most diverse, sometimes poorly compatible traditions, their transformation and modification. Comprehensively arguing the need for unlimited autocracy in Russia, Feofan Prokopovich, nevertheless, actively used the discourse of the Enlightenment in his writings, discussing the problem of the origin of the state, the mode of government, the boundaries of the power of the monarch, the rights and duties of subjects. On the example of Feofan Prokopovich, we can talk about the emergence and rooting of intellectual practices of a new type in Russian everyday life. The integration of Western European ideas and practices into Russian culture was ambiguous, multifaceted and depended on their adaptation to the socio-political space of Russia. Being well acquainted with the works of European authors of the 17th early 18th centuries, he rather took on the formal side of their discussions on socio-political topics, adapted a conceptual glossary that was new for the Russian educated public, which opened up opportunities for talking about politics in a new way.

The article investigates the modern historical memory in Iran of the Persian campaign of Peter the Great that became the first serious attempt of Russia to conquer a part of its southern neighbor’s territory. The article analyses Iranian historical memory of these events using relevant research publications of Persian-speaking authors, Iranian news agencies, and schoolbooks. It compares the Iranian perceptions of the Peter’s Persian campaign and of other Russo-Iranian conflicts at the beginning of the 19th century. The author concludes that the Iranians do not view Peter’s campaign as a war and distinguish it from other conflicts of the century. This perception can be accounted for by the short life of the results of the campaign; by the quick, peaceful restoration of the status quo; by the lack of an official state of war between Russia and the governments of Tahmasp II and the shahs from the Hotak dynasty and clashes between the armies of the countries. The Iranian media and educational literature do not mention the Persian campaign, even in the few publications and sections devoted directly to Peter I. Historical literature hardly mentions it either. Such “oblivion” of the main event in Peter’s of the first Russian emperor related to Iran does not stem from the degree of attention to his personality in Iran. He appears in the media more often than many other Russian rulers and draws comparatively much attention in the educational and scientific literature even in comparison with other significant historical figures. Iranian historiography perceives Peter the Great as a ruler who defined a new vector of Russo-Iranian interrogation but not as a person who attempted expansion on the territory of Iran. This experience helps to analyze the history of bilateral relations and the factors influencing the Iranian perception of the Russian image.

Book review: Tudoroiu T., Ramlogan А. 2021. China’s International Socialization of Political Elites in the Belt and Road Initiative. Routledge. 292 p.

Book review: Doshi Roshi. 2021. The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order. The USA: Oxford University Press. 432 p.